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ABS1'RlC1' 
The principal aim of this thesis is to undertake a critical 
examination of the role of the international patent system in the 
transfer of technology to ~lest Africa, particularly Ghana and Nigeria. 
It focuses mainly on the patent systans and technology regulatory 
regimes of the two countries. The study is intended to identify and 
evaluate the impact of the international patent system on the transfer 
and develo~t of technology in this area. 
The first chapter provides a theoretical foundation to some of 
the more practical issues to be discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
The Paris Convention and the diplomatic revision exercise thereof, as 
well as other efforts and policies regarding patents and technology 
transfer at various levels are discussed in Chapter Two. Chapters 
Three to Eight consider the two case-studies undertaken in this 
thesis. Chapter Three begins with the historical development of the 
patent system in both Ghana and Nigeria, and the remaining chapters 
continue with a discussion of the present patent and technology 
regulatory regimes of both countries. Based on facts and figures the 
two case-studies examine critically the patent law and systaIS and 
technology transfer laws of these two countries including other 
related institutional measures highlighting their strengths and 
\Ieaknesses. 
The study argues that if the patent systems of both countr ies 
are to play a meaningful role in the transfer and developnent of 
technology they nust be utilized as a tool of economic IX>licy and also 
be related to the technology transfer regimes which nust necessarily 
be integrated into the national technology FOliey which should, in 
turn, be made an integral part of the entire national developnent 
plan. It is concluded that it is only in this way that the patent 
systEr.l can effectively contribute to the transfer of technology and 
the developnent of indigenous technological capabilities in the two 
ix 
The facilitation of the transfer of technology from the 
developed to the less developed countries (LDCs) is one of the 
fundamental issues that subtends the denands of the LDCs for the 
establishment of a new international economic order. The LOCs have 
deprecated the present framework within which international trade and 
investment transactions including the transfer of technology take 
place, and have advocated a restructuring of the framework to ensure 
fair and equitable transactions between the two sets of parties. A 
pivotal ingredient of the developed countries' (OCs) hegerrony over the 
world economic system is their control of technology and, thus, of 
industry. This is likely to be so for a consicerable period of time 
until the research and devel0Fment (R & D) capabilities of the LOCs 
improves sufficiently to generate the technology required for industry 
in the latter. ~Jhile some U:Cs are inproving upon their technological 
infrastructures as a long term solution, others have been 
concentrating on measures that will inprove their access to as Irdlch 
foreign technology as possible. 
In fact, most LOCs, in their naive assunption that the transfer 
of technology or access to technology is a panacea for their problems 
of under-developnent, have undertaken alrrost f!Ilery conceivable treasure 
to gain access to foreign technology. The assllI'rption is naive in that 
it ignores the need for the initial profound structural changes within 
the U:Cs without which the prospects of choosing technology capable of 
remedying the under-development of any country are 1 im! ted. In 
addition, the assumption is quite often divorced fram the preliminary 
determination of what kinds of goods and services to be produced in 
order to satisfy the needs of their societies, who is to produce them, 
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and how their producticn and distribution are to be organised. It is 
only when all these issues are duly considered and acted uIX>n that 
there could be a meaningful eclectic approach by the LOCs in their 
choice of technology from the nany existing and adaptable technologies 
which are roost appropriate to the goals of the social system in its 
battle against under-development. 
The measures undertaken by the UX:s to encourage the transfer of 
technology include favourable investment incentives to rrultinational 
enterprises, joint-ventures projects between either rost governments 
or individuals and foreign investors, and the engagement of foreign 
personnel under know-how and nanagement contracts. Another measure 
is the adoption of a patent system as well as the accession to the 
international (Paris) convention for the protection of iooustrial 
property. It is this measure which will be the nain focus of this 
study. 
A number of LOCs, including Ghana, Nigeria and other Hest 
African countries, have adopted a patent system of one sort or 
another, and, in addition, acceded to the Paris Convention which is an 
essential component of the international patent system. The latter 
also includes national patent laws and systems as well as practices 
connected with international trade and investment. Ghana and Nigeria 
have patent legislation which governs their patent administrations. 
'The main patent legislation of Ghana upon which its patent systan is 
founded is the colonial Patents Registration Ordinance of 1925 as 
amended by NRCD 81 of 1972. On the other hand, Nigeria in 1970, 
prorulgated its CM1 independent putent legislation, the Patents and 
Designs Decree of 197D, which governs the administration of patents in 
that country. 
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The main objective of this study is to investigate the 
contribution, if any, of the international patent systan to the 
effective transfer and development of technology in Ghana and Nigeria. 
In addition, the study assesses how the patent systems together with 
the technology transfer regulatory regimes of both countries COUld, 
inter alia, be utilized as measures for economic development. 
Accordingly, in this study I intend to examine critically, in addition 
to the Paris Convention, the patent laws and systems as well as the 
technology transfer laws of the two countries with a view to 
highlighting some of their strengths and weaknesses. The examination 
will also cover other related measures and institutions. Moreover, I 
will endeavour to offer some suggestions directed at improving the 
patent and technology transfer regimes of both countries. All this 
will be pursued within the broader context of the international 
political econo~. 
Chapter One examines the concept of technology and the legal 
nature of a patent. It also covers recent trends in patenting 
activities as well as the economic functions of the patent systan 
which include the disclosure and spread of technical knowledge, R&D, 
innovation and the transfer of technology. Furthermore, it examines 
some of the comoon rest r icti ve covenants in patent and technology 
licensing. These include export prohibitions, grant-back or 
improvement clauses, tie-ins, price fixing, field of use restriction, 
no-challenge clause and minimum royalty payments. The second section 
of this chapter deals with the technology transfer process and the 
thorny issue of third world development. It seeks to uncover the 
rationale for the entire process of technology transfer from the DCs 
to the LDCs and relates it intimately to the prd:>lem of under-
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development. The contribution of the transfer of technology to the 
development of LOCs' indigenous technological capabilities (I'lC) and 
the possible use of the patent system in this respect as well as 
closer technological co-operation between third world countries are 
also covered by this section. 
Chapter Two commences with the historical developnent of the 
Paris Convention and provides a critical analysis of some of its major 
provisions "lhich include those relating to the concept of national 
treatment (article 2), right of priority (article 4), the independence 
of patents (article 4 bis) , corrpulsory licensing (article 5) and 
irrports (articles SAl and 5 quater). This is foll~ved immediately by 
a discussion of the current diplomatic conferences on the revision of 
the Par is Convention which seems to have reached a stalemate. The 
chapter is concluded with a discussion of policies and efforts at the 
international, national and regional levels which are aimed at 
improving both the patent system and technology transfer regimes. 
In Chapter Three I discuss the historical development of the 
patent systems of both Ghana and Nigeria which will be traced to the 
discovery of the gold deposits in the Tarkwa district of the then C~ld 
Coast (now Ghana). I also examine critically the first colonial 
patent ordinance for the then Gold Coast which was used as a model for 
the former Lagos Colony, the Southern and Northern protectorates which 
together now constitute the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Subsequent 
colcnial patent ordinances such as the 1916 U.K. Patent Registration 
Ordinance for Nigeria and the 1925 Patents Registration Ordinances for 
both Ghana and Nigeria will also be discussed. The discussion under 
this chapter will cover the first patent infringement suit in Nigeria 
which culminated in the promulgation of the Patent Rights (Limitation) 
Decree, 1968. 
xiii 
Chapters Four and Five represent the main body of the first of 
the two case-studies. In Chapter Four, I examine the principal patent 
legislation of Ghana \'lhich is the 1925 patent Ordinance and NRCD 81. 
The examination here will seek to bring out some of tile strengths and 
weaknesses of these enactments and the possible impact on the patent 
system established by them, and in particular, on domestic inventive 
acti vi ty as well as the transfer of technology to the country. Also 
under discussion here will be the investment codes of 1981 and 1985, 
particularly the provisions regarding the transfer of technology and 
how they relate to the patent system. 
Chapter Five discusses the Ghanaian patent system, and, with 
empirical evidence, its practical effects on the transfer of 
technology to Ghana as well as the stimulation of domestic R&D and, 
in general, on patenting activity in the country. Related policy 
considerations will also be discussed. The second section of the 
cp~pter examines the possible impact of the technology transfer 
regulations as provided in the country's investment codes vis-a-vis 
the anticompetitive practices which still take place in licensing 
transactions involving Ghanaian firms. In this respect the 
effectiveness of and the practical problems facing the Ghana 
Investments Centre (GIC), the body set up to regulate technology 
transfer transactions will also be evaluated. Similarly, related 
policy considerations will also be discussed. 
Chapters Six and Seven represent the nain body of the second 
case-study covered by the thesis. Like Chapter Four, Chapter Six will 
undertake an examination of the main patent legislation of Nigeria 
which is the Patents and Designs Decree, 1970, and \'lill highlight some 
'of its strengths and weaknesses as well as its possible impact on 
indigenous inventive activity, I.T.C. and technology transfer to 
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Nigeria. The National Office for Irrlustrial Property (rolP) Decree, 
1979, which is the rrain enactIrent for the regulation of the transfer 
of technology agreements will be examined in the secorn section of the 
Chapter. 
Chapter Seven examines, with enpirical evidence, the practical 
effects of the Nigerian patent law am system on patenting activity in 
the country and the transfer of technology to that country. 
Similarly, on the basis of available figures and infornation, the 
practical inpact of the rolP Decree in the regulation of technology 
transactions will be assessed. In addition, the success of and 
problens facing the rolP, the nain body set up by Decree to control 
technology transfer transactions will be examined. Finally, related 
policy considerations will also be discussed in this chapter. 
The major differences and similarities between the patent 
systems and technology transfer regulatory regimes of Ghana and 
Nigeria will be discussed in Chapter Eight. This chapter will em 
with reconmmdations Mlich will be based on the findings of the study. 
The final chapter which is the conclusion provides a brief 
summary of most of the theoretical and practical issues and highlights 
sorre of the najor issues raised in the study. It will also contain a 
resurre of sorre of the suggestions and recoI'llIEndations mich will be 
offered by the study. 
The field\\Urk required for this study took the author to five 
countries namely Ghana, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Senegal and 
Switzerland where the author had a series of interviews and 
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discussions with officials from various relevant institutions. These 
interviews and discussions ~re, in nost cases, backed by docunentary 
evidence. The study is largely based on the findings of the field~rk 
research carried rut in the above IIEntioned countries, on docurrents 
and legal instruIIEnts and statutes, court cases, relevant govemIIEnt 
policies am programres, secondary sources such as books, journals am 
reports, and the author's personal knowledge of W::!st Africa. 
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Introductim 
In this chapter \\e shall endeavour to examine and clarify the 
concept of technology. This will necessarily help us, in view of the 
diverse neanings ascribed to the concept, to be clear about the sort 
of technology the study is concerned with. The chapter will also 
examine the legal form of technology, particularly patent, the 
economic functions of patents, am the technology transfer process am 
third world development. 
'Dle Concept of Technology 
The concept of technology is subject to a var ied nunber of 
definitions. Ho\\ever, the varying approaches to the definition of 
this concept can be categorised into two rrajor t~s. These are mat 
I refer to as the Technicist and Humanist approaches to the 
understanding of technology. The Technicist definition of technology 
explains it soley in terns of its technical aspects, mile the 
HUmanist definition relates it to societal needs. 
Among the Technicist definitions of technology is that offered 
by Gibson men he stated that "it is considered to be scientific, 
engineering, and managerial knowledge which makes possible the 
conception, design, developnent, production and distribution of goods 
and services". (l976, 24). This definition seens to be narrow, am 
might not include agricultural, military, medical and other 
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technologies. As a matter of fact, it is a good description only of 
industrial technology, and, thus, a specific example of man's 
knowledge which is necessary for the satisfaction of some of his 
wants. 
Similarly, Hayden defines technology as "the quantum of 
knowledge by which such inputs as patent rights, scientific principle 
and R&D (research and development) are translated into production of 
marketable industrial materials, c~nents and end productsn (1976, 
23) • This quantum of knowledge, he adds, ncomprises two parts: the 
engineering documentation and the manufacturing techniques. The 
latter are the human implementation of the written instructions 
contained in the former n (.IQiQ). This definition, though it clearly 
explains an industrial or a manufacturing technology, is equally 
narrow and suffers fram the same defects as Gibson's. 
Another technicist definition which appears to be a departure 
from the above two is that provided by Gruber and Marquis (1969). 
They define technology as nthe means or capacity to perform a 
particular activityn (p.255). It is derivable fram this definition 
that technology involves nprocessn in the sense that it is nan's 
capability to transform physical objects. This definition, on the 
other hand, seems so broad as to encoJIi)ass aloost every sphere of 
human activity. It is also vague in that it does not shed much light 
on what the nmeansn or capacity for undertaking a given activity might 
be. 
The Humanist definition of technology is typified by SiIOOn' s 
(1973). He defines technology as the "knowledge of how to 00 things, 
how to accomplish human goals" (p.1110). A similar approach is 
adopted by the Announcement of the 7th General SAINI' Conference, April 
1976, which declared that "Technology must be given a broad 
definition, something like the concious use of knowledge and 
experience to change reality according to human needs." (quoted in 
Galtung, 1979, 29, footnote 1). A Humanist definition such as these 
is preferable for three basic reasons. First, it brings to the fore 
the importance of knowledge in the process of acconplishing human 
objectives. Secondly, it unanbiguously rectifies the erroneous 
perception of technology in terms of machines and palpable substances 
instead of knowledge stored in a variety of forms. As Simon rightly 
points out, "to view technology in terms of machines and tangible 
substances is to mistake the shell for the snail, or the web for the 
spider" (1973, 111"). Finally, there is the anbodiIrent of the concept 
of human goals or needs. This is essential because technology must 
generally be related to the transformation of objects for the benefit 
of mankind. 
It is, therefore, clear that these definitions go a long way 
towards offering a much clearer understanding of the concept of 
technology. Nevertheless, as can be discerned from these definitions 
they tend to be broad and therefore need to be narrowed down. 
Moreover, the definitions do not accord sufficient prominence to the 
element of "tool" which needs to be produced and utilized by human 
knowledge to satisfy needs. That this view is shared by Vincent, is 
evidenced by his "more down-to-earth definition" of technology as "the 
art of producing and using tools" (1984, 256), which also misses the 
crucial aspect of human needs. Galtung, similarly, finds the element 
of tool equally important. He defines technology thus, "technology = 
technique + structure" (1979, 15). Initially, tool only seem to be 
implied, but he goes on further to explain that the "technique" 
component of technology is constituted by "tools and know-how" 
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(IQig.). Though Simon implied the element of tool in his definition 
especially when he referred to the nartifactsn of man, it was not 
highlighted enough to put it in the right perspective. 
Consequently, we shall understand technology to mean the 
knowledge to produce and use tools to satisfy human needs either 
directly or indirectly. This necessarily iII1plies the use of knowledge 
for the production and provision of goods and services respectively 
for human consumption. The satisfaction of human needsl , it nay be 
noted, makes the concepts of knowledge and tool not only crucial, but 
necessarily interwoven. They are interwined because the provision of 
human necessaries cannot be accomplished without both. 
It is important to appreciate that in neeting societal needs 
knowledge and tools or technology cannot be neutral or exogenous. 
They are closely related to the social relations or mode of 
production. Indeed, as Leys rightly points out ntechnology is an 
aspect of those relationsn (1984, 175). It is these relations or the 
nstructuren as referred to by Galtung nwithin which the tools become 
operational, and the cognitive structure with which the know-how 
becomes meaningful n (1979, 15). SO that the efficacy of technology 
in eradicating poverty and naking a society nconvivial n will, to a 
large extent, depend on either its compatibility or incompatibility 
with the relevant nstructuren• Thus the need to understand technology 
equally in terms of the nstructuren or the social relations of 
production. 
From our explanation of the concept of technology, it is clear 
that the concept can be classified, in fact it has been classified, 
1. See Galtung (1979) for a discussion on and classification of 
htman needs. See also Duller (1982, Chp. 7) and Aryee (1984, 
12"-147). 
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into different categories. These include hardware and software, 
general, system-specific and firm-specific2, and alternative, 
intermediate and appropriate.3 
Technology, as has already been indicated, is both anbodied and 
disembodied. The latter includes patent which forms an important 
aspect of this study. It is, therefore, appropriate to explain the 
legal nature of a patent in general and its econanic functions. 
Legal Nature of a Patent 
A patent may be defined as a legally binding nonopoly awarded by 
governments to inventors to exclude others from manufacturing, 
selling, or using the patented invention, without the patentee's 
consent, for a defined period of time4• This legalised monopoly can 
be discerned as a trade-off between the state and the inventor. To 
the latter, the grant of a patent monopoly expresses the "moral right" 
of inventors to their knowledge and financial rewards to be obtained 
from the exclusive exploitation of the patented invention. In return 
for the prompt disclosure of new inventions, which may assist the 
generation of industrial developnent, the state grants a limited 
exclusionary right to inventora. Limited m:mopoly in return for 
2. For a discussion on this classification see Hall and Johnson 
(1970). 
3. See Jequier (1976) and Jequier and Blanc (1983) for definitions 
and illustrations of this distinction of technology. See also 
Stewart (1978, 99-108) for a discussion on appropriate 
technology • 
4. See WIPO and UN's definitions of a patent in UOCTAD (1975a, 1). 
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disclosure is, therefore, seen as an incentive for industrial 
progress. 
The grant of a patent monopoly right is usually made after an 
inventor has satisfied the necessary requirements provided by law. 
This will normally include application for a patent, payrrent of 
application fee, and the filing of relevant documents including a 
specification which must contain a complete and adequate description 
of the invention. In most cases, a patent is granted for an invention 
only after an examination of the patent application has confirmed it 
is novel, of inventive step and industrial applicability. It may be 
noted that the laws of various countries on all this may vary in 
details. 
A patent grant confers on the patentee a proprietary right to 
his invention. A patent or an application for a patent, therefore, 
constitutes personal property and can be assigned, mortgaged, 
licensed, or pass from the patentee by operation of law. This 
contrasts with know-how whose proprietary nature is not legally 
recognised in countries with a codified system of law, and remains 
controversial in COImIOn law countries (see Correa, 1981). 
A patent may be contrasted with an inventor's certificate. The 
latter, which is poIXllar in East European Countries, gives to an 
inventor only the right to receipt of remuneration for the use of his 
invention while the exclusive right is transferred to the state. This 
means that, unlike an owner of a patent, a holder of an inventor's 
certificate cannot exclude others from the use of his invention. 
The patent system or the award of a patent was conceived to 
stimulate domestic inventive activity, and particularly to encourage 
the individuals who were involved in this activity. There has, 
however, of late been a change of beneficiaries as originally 
conceived by the patent system. 
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Recent Trends in Patenting 
It is now the case that big corporate firms are increasingly 
taking over inventive activity from lone inventors and thus increasing 
their share of patents to the detriment of the latter (Noble, 198~; 
Frost, 1965; See also Table l:l). This trend is in the ascendant and 
the protection which was provided for the lone inventor by the patent 
system as originally conceived is now increasingly becoming the 
monopoly of the corporate firm. 
Table 1:1 
Share of Corp>rations and IndividuaJ s in Patents Granted in 
Selected Countries 
Country and Year Individuals Corporations 
Total National Foreign 
U.S.A. (a) 
1982 21 78 45 33 
1983 18 8~ 45 35 
France (b) 
1964 23 73 18 55 
1968 2~ 77 17 6~ 
Chile (b) 
1937 5~ 49 4 45 
1967 13 8~ 2 78 
Argentina (b) 
194;9 55 47 
196'7 23 77 
OOURCE: (a) based on Statistical Abstract of the United States, 105th 
Edn., 1985 at P.536. 
(b) UNCTAD (1975a, 39). 
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The dominance of corporate firms in this field has been 
associated with a number of notorious practices. Science-based 
industrial corporations by virtue of their capital are able not only 
to "buy" the best scientific brains, and other resources for 
undertaking unlimited R&D, but also to J;Urchase patents of pltentees 
who do not have the resources to exploit their inventions. Through 
this process as well as consolidation, patent pools and "the regulated 
patent production through systematic industrial research" corporations 
have been able to concentrate patents under their domain and thus 
expand their "monopoly of monopolies". In roost cases they are able to 
dominate a given industry and this creates the very condition for its 
perpetual control. In such a case they control the "main stream of 
inventive thought" in that industry and can clog any further 
developments without their consent (see Noble, 198~, Chapt. 6 for 
examples including General Electric and others. Also see Vaitsos, 
1972; Machlup, 1952; Frost, 1965; Vaughan, 1948; Kahn, 1948 and 194~). 
Thus, through the patent system industrial corporations are able to 
dominate industry and use this dominance to regulate competition 
which, instead of encouraging inventions, has thernaxirndsation of profit 
as its ultimate goal. 
While the effect of this dominance may adversely affect both the 
DCs and LDCs the impact on the latter may be more considerable. A 
disturbing aspect of this dominance and the ensuing roonopoly is that 
the majority of foreign patents in the LDCs which are accounted for by 
corporate firms are not worked and instead used as inport monopoly 
permits. This impedes production and innovation in these countries, 
particularly in industries to which the patent grant relates. In 
addition, this monopoly over irrports excludes competition over the 
inportation of the patented products unless of course there exist 
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non-patent infringing substitutes. This could result in increased 
payments for imports than would be the case if there existed 
competition. 
In fact, studies carried out in the Colanbian, Chilean and 
Peruvian pharmaceutical industries have revealed that over-pricing of 
imported patented intermediate pharmaceutical products in 1968 ranged 
between 17 and 6,584 per cent (Vaitsos, 1972, 86). However, Penrose 
(1973) suggests that such increases may be attributable to factors 
"such as brand-name protection, transfer pricing to subsidiaries or 
loss-making exports which would not be available on a continuing 
basis" (P.777). Similarly, Lall (1984) also seems to suggest that the 
basis of assessing such increases in prices may be wrong if it 
involved prices charged on intra-firm transaction with what would be 
charged by a "non-patent observing imitator", since an "innovating 
firm had to charge much more than an imitating one" (p.13). 
Nevertheless, no one will contest the fact that in the absence of 
corrpetition inp:>rt JOOnopolies could lead to higher prices of the 
affected products. 
Finally, apart from the fact that patents are suwressed by 
corporate firms (though some patents may not be worked for p.lre 
economic reasons) they are also used as "scarecrows" to ward off any 
potential local competitors from penetrating into the relevant fields. 
So the national patent system instead of encouraging domestic 
inventive activity has the opposite effect. 
In spite of all this LOCs, like JOOst other countries, still 
maintain a patent systen and grant monopoly rights to inventors. The 
question then is what are the justifications for the p:ltent systen. 
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~ Econanic Functions of the Patent System 
The underpinning rationale of the patent system is said to be 
the promotion of public welfare, which, according to Machlup (1952), 
is the ultimate objective of the grant of patent nonopolies. It is 
believed that the grant of the monopoly privilege has a considerable 
positive influence on research and developnent (R & D), the speedy 
disclosure and spread of technical knowledge, the stinulation of 
innovation and the transfer of technology. All these activities which 
contribute to the acceleration of technological progress, it is 
further believed, help to advance public welfare. 
Research and Develogoont (R & Pl 
The generally received view about the patent system is that it 
spurs R&D through the provision of protection for inventors, and 
thus makes possible the breaking of new technological grounds by 
industrial concerns. It is similarly accepted that after new 
discoveries inventors and business enterprises are very cautious in 
the utilization of the new technologies especially when unsure of 
their economic results. The patent system, it is believed is a factor 
which contributes to spurring on the application of new technology, 
especially where the hazard of failure is considerable. So that, 
"when patents afford some exclusive rights to the new technique 
business cannot afford to be too conservative in research for and the 
application of the change" (Frost, 1965, 73). According to Machlup, 
the stimulation of R&D through the grant of monopoly rights "is the 
only sound justification for the patent system (1952, 281). 
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Through the grant of the monopoly right and the competition it 
is supposed to generate, the patent system is believed to accomplish 
technological advancement. The German chanical industry, it has been 
claimed, attained its advanced stage by about 1900 as a result of 
technical competition within the dye industry which followed the 
German patent law of 1876 (Frost, 1965, 73-4). Similarly, the rapid 
developnent of the electrical power industry, the more efflcient 
utilisation of crude oil in the production of gasoline and the 
creation of the petrochemicals industry all in the U. S. have been 
attributed to the competition generated by the patent system (~.). 
In addition, the stirrnllativeeffect of the patent system is said to 
have influenced the research which resulted in the developnent of 
aureomycin which later served as the basis for the developnent of 
tetracycline (Referred to in Harnza, 1984). 
Nevertheless, the encouragement that patents provide for R&D 
as well as the application of new techniques in the fields of human 
existence may, in some cases, not be as considerable as it is 
sometimes made to appear. '!Wo recent studies undertaken in Australia 
seem to confirm this. One of these is Llewellyn's (1981) survey, by 
way of questionnaire, of large domestic firms which account for about 
80 per cent of Australian R&D expenditure. The responses to the 
question "whether potential patentability is a decisive criterion in 
the decision to go ahead with a particular research project ••• " 
indicates that the influence of the patent systan on R&D expenditure 
is not strong. 
Of the 69 resJ;X>nses, only 9 (13%) indicated that 
potential patentability was, in more than a few cases, 
a decisive criterion in deciding whether to go ahead 
with a particular research project. (P.394). 
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In respect of the question regarding the proportion of R&D that 
would not have been carried out if patent protection were not 
available, the entire results were close to the above. 
Of the 61 responses to the question, 44 (72%) 
respondents replied that it would make no 
difference... A further 4 respondents (6.6%) reported 
that up to 5% of their R&D in recent years ~uld not 
have been carried out if they had not been able to 
patent any resulting discoveries. (Ibid.). 
The above revelation is supported by the Ill)re recent survey by 
Mandeville et al., (1982) into the effects of the Australian patent 
system. The findings of both surveys are consistent with the results 
of earlier studies by Firestone (1971) on Canadian industrial R&D 
activities and Taylor and Silberston (1973) on U.K. manufacturing 
firms. 
While it appears from the above that patents may not serve as a 
significant incentive for R&D, their impact here, as revealed by 
Taylor and Silberston (1973) and to some extent Llewellyn (1981), my 
vary according to industry. In their survey of the effects of the 
patent system on R&D within U.K. industries, by way of questionnaire 
and followed subsequently by discussions with the firms involved which 
helped them to quantify responses on the subject more precisely, the 
useable returns which were obtained for 32 major activities or class 
of production in 27 companies revealed the following: 
The six returns in which R&D was thought to be 
substantially affected were in the fields of 
pharmaceuticals (2), crop chemicals, special 
industrial chemicals, heavy industrial plant and 
automotive components. The majority of mechanical 
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engineering firms felt that their R&D was not at 
all sensitive to patent protection, certainly so far 
as its overall size was oonsidered. The two nan-made 
fibres firms believed that their R&D was probably 
very little affected. (P.197, also see Table 9.1). 
Similarly, Llewellyn I s (1981) survey found a varying effect of pitents 
on R&D in different industries (See pp394-95). 
It may also seem that the impact of patents on R&D may vary 
according to the size of the fi~ or inventor. The results of the 
study of Mandeville et al (1982) and an inportant 1m study in Germany 
which studied 1239 patents of German companies (see Gerstenfe1d, 
1977), thoughcmflictingin some details, reveal that the stimulative 
effects of patents on R&D vary according to the size of the firm or 
inventor. 
All this demonstrates that the omnibus argument of patent 
protection serving as an impetus for R&D or not may not be 
applicable or true of all industries. 
It is equally significant that besides the fact that the patent 
incentive is not generally a very crucial determinant for irrlustrial R 
& D activities or less inportant for a number of industries, its 
stimulative effect has increasingly become very doubtful so far as R & 
D in the LOCs is concerned. For nationals to be able to undertake 
effective and purposeful R&D and benefit from the protection of the 
patent grant they must be research oriented. This, ultinately, is 
determined by the level of education or skills in the technical and 
science fields and the overall climate for R&D which includes 
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goverrunent policy on science and tecimology. The low level of 
tecimical competence as well as passive government policies on science 
and tecimology could, for example, be discerned from the expenditure 
goverrunents in the LOCs conrni t to R&D (See Table 1: 3) • All this 
contr ibutes to explain the dearth of personnel engaged in R&D 
activities as demonstrated by Table 1:2. Though the table shows a 
gradual growth in R&D engineers and scientists in the LOCs the 
increase is not enough to have a fundamental effect on R&D in these 
countries. 
Table 1:2 
WOrld Region=Distribution of R&D Engineers and Scientists 
Year 
1970 
1975 
1980 
WOrld Total 
2,608,100 
3,236,900 
3,756,100 
Ires percentage 
7.9 
8.9 
10.6 
0Cs percentage 
92.1 
91.1 
89.4 
OOURCE: Based on UNESCO Annual Statistical Yearbook, 1984, p. v. 19. 
It is worth mentioning that in spite of the yawning gap between 
the manpower res'ources of the LOCs and the OCs, the situation in the 
former is constantly being exacerbated by what has generally been 
referred to as "reverse transfer of technology" or "brain-drain". 
That is the outflow of Sdlled manpower from the LDCs to OCs which is 
generally attributed to income differentials, inadequate professional 
opportunities and working conditions, and the social conditions in the 
LDCs (See UNcrAD, 1979). This implies a considerable loss of hunan 
capital and an important diminution of IDes' technological capacity. 
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In addition to the paucity of scientists and engineers, the 
inadequate expenditure on R&D in the LDCs also accountS for the 
limited amount of inventive activities in these countries. Table 1:3 
similarly demonstrates the limited expenditure undertaken by LOes on R 
& D. This will, in the same vein, restrict patenting activities. 
Year 
1979 
1975 
1989 
Table 1:3 
R&D Expenditure in QS$ mj lliro 
WOrld Total 
62,101 
113,815 
297,81 
IOCs percentage 
2.3 
3.9 
6.9 
0Cs percentage 
97.7 
96.1 
94.9 
SOURCE: Based on UNESCO Annual Statistical Yearbook 1984, p.v.19. 
Until all this is rectified to enlarge the science and technical 
manpower engaged in R&D and for Governments to spend a little more 
on R&D to enable the investigation of societal and human problems 
aimed at satisfying human needs and thus come out with new inventions 
patent per se as a sIXlr to inventive activities may achieve very 
little. 
Disclosure and fPreOO of Teclmical Knowledge 
The patent system, it is argued, encourages the disclosure and 
spread of technical advances, and thus erases a crucial retarding 
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factor - secrecy - in technological progress. It makes possible the 
uninhibited flow of both plre and applied scientific knowledge which 
is fundamental to increased rates of progress and best employment of 
scientific resources. This disclosure and spread of technical 
information is accomplished by the application of the invention in a 
patent specification, which describes the invention and the problem it 
is meant to solve, as well as the procedure for the application for a 
patent grant. After the grant of a patent the knowledge in the 
specification becomes available to the general public, though itself 
protected from imitation. In addition, licensing of patents also 
assists in spreading technical knowledge (see below for discussion). 
The discouragement of secrecy in technical progress through the 
grant of patent monopoly has been doubted and contested by writers 
including Plant (1934), Machlup (1952) and Taylor and Silberston 
(1973). They have argued that people take out pitents only when they 
cannot hope to keep and profitably exploit their secret technology. 
So that where certain secret technologies or formulae - say the case 
of Coca-CPla - can be kept secret for an unlimited period of time 
patents become unnecessary. 
Moreover, the disclosure of technical knowledge as a 
justification for patent grant has been brought into disrepute by 
practices that seem to be associated with descriptions of inventions 
in patent specifications. On the one extreme, as Bloxarn (1972) 
remarked: 
It is possible to obscure the issue by the very wealth 
of information he supplies. Although he must describe 
the best method, he does not have to identify it. For 
exanple, in a chemical case he may at the same time 
strengthen his legal and his conmercial position by 
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giving a wealth of experimental examples to support 
his patent claims while leaving it to the reader to 
discover which one is the commercial winner (P.17). 
On the other extreme, as Gilfillan tersely stated: 
It is possible, and often done despite the law, to 
write patents most obscurely, and to leave out 
essential details, such as which catalyst is best, 
among many listed as usable. (P.60). 
All this as well as the fact that quite frequently crucial technical 
know-how necessary for the most efficient exploitation of an invention 
on a large industrial and commercial scale is not divulged in a patent 
specification render the public disclosure justification unconvincing. 
While the inadequate and incomplete disclosure of an invention 
may in some cases be deliberate it is also believed that the practice 
of "first to file" associated with the patent system, by which it is 
essential to obtain an early priority date, may account for this (see 
Taylor and Silberston 1973, 95). In effect the non-disclosure of 
certain essential information in a patent specification may not 
necessarily be deliberate but may reflect the fact that the requisite 
information may not be available at the time of filing or is "simply 
too cumbersome to put into a specification". HCMever, it has been the 
practice for the rational inventor to patent his invention, where 
know-how is very necessary for its successful working rather than keep 
it secret. In such a case he is not only a beneficiary of some 
element of security for his invention, but also of some control made 
possible by his secret know-how. 
Nevertheless, technical disclosure through the grant of patent 
monopoly may appear to be more useful by way of providing novel 
technical knowledge which could serve as a basis for further R&D 
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than enabling the exploitation of an invention. This, according to 
Beier (1972), is the "modem function of disclosure". The patent 
system has in this respect been quite useful. Evidence of the patent 
serving as a source of information for solving technical and 
industrial problems has been given in connection with some 
manufacturing firms in Canada (see Patent Technical Information 
Services Project Report, 1981). These include rounder Erm.1lsions 
Limited, Senstek Corporation, Saskatoon (Saskatchewn), Bush-Hog/Melcam 
Corporation, Imperial (Saskatchewn), Morris Rod-Weeder, Yorkton, and 
British ColllI!bia Research, Vancouver. In all cases these firms found 
patents as valuable source of technical information which helped in 
solving some of their industrial and new products development problems 
(lllliD • 
While patents nay be a useful source of technical knowledge for 
the above Canadian firms and others this nay not be so for all firms 
and industries. For example, in a study carried rut in the U.K. by 
Taylor and Silberston (1973) it was revealed: 
Most firms •••• said that specifications were of 'same 
value' to research staff on technical details and to 
rranagement on general research trends and the work of 
competitors, but less than a third of these were 
prepared to term these benefits 'substantial'. Those 
that did so were in chemicals, machinery and man-made 
fibres, while respondents in electrical engineering 
were on the whole very sceptical (p.2l2). 
It nay seem on the whole that as a source of technical inforrration 
patents are useful. However, the degree of their usefulness, it will 
appear again, may vary between industries. Consequently, there may be 
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the need for a similar segregation of the various industrial 
activities in the assessment of the impacts of patents in this 
respect. 
Innovation 
The patent system can be said to stinullate innovation - the 
first introduction of new products and processes on a commercial 
scale, or the entire process of converting inventions into full scale 
productive operations including investment in new plant and equipment 
for the process. Innovation may also encompass marketing and 
managerial changes. Thus, besides product and process changes, it 
includes changes with wide-spread social and marketing impacts which 
have a low technological content. (See Lowe and Crawford, 1984, 
Chapter 3). 
The innovation process is believed to be the JOOst difficult 
stage of the entire technology developnent process, and can be said to 
be not only very expensive but also extremely frustrating. An example 
here is Barker'S (1977) account of the expenditure and frustration, 
and the cliff-hanging periods which the development of the Pilkington 
Float Glass incurred and experienced. The innovation process is also 
fraught with potential risks. These may be "technical" or "market" 
risks. The technical risk reflects the likelihood of the invention 
development resulting in no saleable output, and market risk concerns 
the possibility of a commercial failure (Parker, 1978, Chapt. 4). If 
the invention deve10pnent leads to no saleable products then the 
innovator stands the risk of losing funds which have been carmitted to 
the devel0t:ment of the products in the rope of future profits. On the 
19 
other hand, if it results in saleable output and there does not exist 
a market for it the same consequences will befall the inventor. 
The uncertainty concerning the desired market for products can 
have a negative impact on innovation. In fact, inadequate market for 
products has in some cases resulted in industrial upsets for a number 
of research-oriented companies. The recent example of Sinclair 
Research of the U.K. is very illustrative. The inadequate market for 
Sinclair computers and flat screen television sets resulted in about 
£30 million build-up of these products and the company's inability to 
meet its financial obligations. In an attempted rescue bid that 
followed the founder of the company eventually lost control of it (See 
"Financial Times", 18 June and 10 August 1985, "The Times" of 18 June 
and 10 August 1985, and "Financial Times", 8 April, 1986). 
All these make the innovation process a very trying one, and 
thus the need for some guarantees and safeguards for its undertaking. 
The patent system it is believed, can provide some of these 
safeguards, and in this way serve as an impetus for product or process 
development. '!his is made possible by the guarantee and security 
provided by the patent IOOnopoly grant to firms to reap reasonable 
profits from investment by excluding imitators from copying the 
invention during the patent protection period. '!he monopoly privilege 
is also believed to spur firms to undertake the cost involved in the 
establishment of new plants and equipment as well as the training of 
and mastering by technical personnel of new plants and techniques 
necessitated by the new technology. 
A recent study by Mansfield et ale (1981) of the imitation costs 
in respect of 48 products innovation sheds some light on the impact of 
patents on innovation. In their survey, they asked each of the 
innovation firms in the chemical, drug, electronics and machinery 
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industries whether it would have introduced each of its patented 
innovations in their sample if patent protection had not been 
available. Their findings were as follows:-
According to the firms, about one-half of the patented 
innovations in our sample would not have been 
introduced without patent protection. The bulk of 
these innovations occurred in the drug industry. 
Excluding drug innovations, the lack of patent 
protection would have affected less than one-fourth of 
the patent innovations in our sample (P.91S). 
While it will appear that IIOst of the 48 products rested on patent 
protection, this was more crucial to the pharmaceutical industries 
than the others. These findings are consistent with those of 
Mandeville et al.,(1982), Llewellyn (1981), and Taylor and Silberston 
(1973) • 
Moreover, Mansfield et ale (1981) study revealed that despite 
patent protection innovations seem to be imitated often and quickly 
(P.9l3; see also Mansfield, 1984, 143). Nevertheless, patent 
protection was found, generally to increase imitation costs. In the 
drug industry patent had a bigger impact on imitation cost than the 
others. The median estimated increased cost due to patent protection 
was about "30% in ethical drugs, in contrast to about 10% in chemicals 
and about 7% in electronics and machinery" (1981, 913). Finally, they 
found out that though patents increased imitation costs the increase 
was not enough to have an appreciable effect on the rate of entry. 
It may also be mentioned that the impact of patents on 
innovation may vary according to the size of the firm or investor. 
The studies of Mandeville et ale (1982, 101-102) and Macdonald (1982, 
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referred to in Mandeville, P.HJ2, fn. 14) reveal that smaller firms 
attach more weight to patents for their innovation processes. 
Nevertheless, the lack of adequate capital by smaller firms or 
inventors, it is believed, has for a considerable period of tine 
adversely affected their innovation processes (See Grundman 1970-711 
and Vaughan, 1925). 
Transfer of Technology 
The patent system is generally believed to effect the transfer 
of technology, and it is this belief which seems to influence the 
continuous participation by the LOCs in the international patent 
system. It is important, however, to note that patents per se do not 
effect technology transfer (see Vaitsos, 19731 and Vincent, 1984). 
Instead they may affect or influence the transfer process. It is 
believed that the existence of the patent system in countries does not 
only make it possible for patentees to register their inventions in 
other countries but also provider some guarantee and security to 
foreign owners of inventions to license then there. Though patents 
can influence the transfer of technology through a number of conduits, 
the major ones, it will appear, are the disclosure of the invention in 
a foreign country, imports of patented products, foreign direct 
investments (FDIs) and joint ventures, and patent licensing. 
Disclosure and spread of technical information is one of the 
functions of the patent system. However, as a result of the 
shortcomings of patent disclosure already discussed, it is not an 
efficient mechanism for transferr ing technology, especially to the 
LOCs which lack high level technical personnel. This is further 
exacerbated by the very set up of the patent offices in these 
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countries, which in a number of cases only register inventions and 
ignore the crucial role of a technology data base. (See Chapters 5 
and 7). 
Another channel through which patents transfer technology is 
through the imports of patented nachinery goods or patented products. 
The transfer is brought about through the use of the technologies 
present in the goods directly by the consumer or indirectly as a basis 
for further processing (Grief 1981, 53-54). This helps to set off a 
learning process which results in an increase of technical knowledge 
and ability to solve technical problems. Nevertheless, the 
importation of patented products to a patent granting country is not 
very popular with most LDCs because of reported cases of abuses of the 
patent oonopoly inport permits by foreign patentees (see above). 
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Foreign patenting, it is argued, promotes FOls and 
joint-ventures. The basis for this is that foreign firms would be 
unwilling or hesitant to set up manufacturing plants using patented 
technology in countries where patent protection was not available. 
Similarly, and for the same reason such firms, especially those ~ 
providing technology nay be reluctant to enter into joint venture 
arrangements with indigenous firms. Thus, the presence of patent 
protection makes possible FOls and joint ventures. The validity of 
this argument is difficult to determine because the evidence that 
exists, as Penrose puts it, is nainly "testiIOOny" (see Mandeville et 
al. (1982) findings). 
Finally, patent licensing is another conduit through which the 
patent system affects the transfer of technology. Through this means 
licensees, who could otherwise be prevented from working inventions of 
patentees, are legally permitted to do so. This transfer is made 
possible by the legal protection given by the patent to the inventor 
which guarantees his title and exclusive right to the technology. It 
is also believed that the legal nonopoly of the inventor also rrakes it 
possible for him to license the accompanying know-how which together 
enable the efficient and effective exploitation of the new technology 
(See Taylor and Silberston, 1973, 214). It may be pointed out here 
that because of the absence of licensees who may possess the requisite 
expertise and resources to exploit licensed invention on their own, 
pure patent licensing as a technology transfer mechanism is not very 
cOIrIIOOn in the LOCs. In actual practice, in these countries, patent 
licensing always goes together with that of know-how. 
Restrictiye Practices in Patent Licensing 
In the licence of either their patents alone, their patents 
together with know-how or their patents as part of an entire 
investment package, patentees or licensors usually insist on the 
inclusion of certain restrictive clauses which affect the exploitation 
of their technologies. This is done mainly to prevent the 
encroachment on their rights and industrial activities, and to enhance 
their economic gains. These clauses include (a) export prohibition, 
(b) grant-back or ircprovement, (c) tying arrangements, (d) price 
fixing, (e) field of use restriction, (f) no-challenge and (g) minimmt 
royalty payments. 
Export Prohibitim 
Aroong the most frequent clauses found in patent licensing 
agreements is the export prohibition clause. Export prohibition may 
be absolute or not. An absolute export prohibition is one which 
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restricts production and sale only to the territory or country of the 
licensee. The non-absolute prohibition, on the other hand, is that 
prohibition which confines the production and sale to the licensee's 
territory and other neighbouring or specified countries. These two 
types of prohibition are corrmon not only in patent but technology 
licensing contracts in general. A third and novel export prohibition, 
which the author in the course of his research into technology 
licensing agreements in Ghana found, is what I shall tenn as internal 
narket sharing restriction. By this, in addition to the export 
prohibition, the narket (i.e. the country or territory) of the 
licensee is partitioned between him and the licensor (For further 
discussion see Chapter 5). 
Export prohibition clauses occur in a number of LtCs' licence 
agreements with foreign licensors (see tables 5:4; 7:7 and 7:8. see 
also UNCTAD 1975a, P.2l, Table 1). Some developed countries are 
reported also to experience these clauses in their license agreements. 
(For Poland's experience see Janiszewski, 1983). These clauses are 
usually inserted in patent or technology transactions in order to 
preserve the licensor's narket and to shield him fram competition from 
his licensees. Moreover, for the patentee or technology supplier this 
clause is useful in dividing up the international narket which enables 
him to lease his technology in as many territories as possible. This 
certainly implies a number of different sources of royalties or fees. 
In addition, it is believed that such clauses ensure that licensees of 
licensors who are parties to cross-licensing agreements do not enter 
the narkets apportioned to patentees who are also parties to such 
agreements (Vernon, 1957; also see Vaitsos, 1972). Thus a licensor 
ensures that his patented technology is not employed by his licensee 
to frustrate or compete with his competitor in his apportioned "home 
narket". 
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For the licensee such a restrictive practice may have diverse 
negative effects on its operation. SUch a practice generally has the 
effect of restricting the production and sale of goods produced by the 
foreign technology to the market and other neighbouring markets of the 
recipient firm or country. Consequently, industries of the receiving 
countries of which the majority are LDCs are conpelled to maintain 
production at a minimum, and thus unable to effect a fuller 
exploitation of the licensor's invention. Similarly, export 
prohibition clauses make it ve~ difficult for LDCs to develop export 
orientation and capacities which will enable them to compete in 
external markets. The effect is that they stand to be deprived of 
hard foreign currency. This is significant since payments of 
royalties for the necessary inventions, equipment or know-how are 
almost always expressed in terms of foreign currencies. 
It must, however, be pointed out here that the exclusion of an 
export restrictive clause in a patent licensing agreement will not 
necessarily result in actual export by or export potential of the 
receiving firm or the licensee. In reality, IIllch will depend on 
factors such as the productive and marketing capacities of the firm, 
its relative conpetitive position in export markets as well as its 
export horizon. In other words, as put by one UOCTAD (197lc) r~rt, 
" • •• it is only when an enterprise can meet domestic requirements and 
can supply externally under competitive terms and would in fact export 
given the chance that export restrictions would limit the firm's 
commercial activity" (P.12). 
Nevertheless, as tersely stated by the same report, " •••• in the 
longer run the presence of export restrictions may discourage 
investments in new production facilities and perhaps make unit cost 
higher than would otherwise be the case through keeping production at 
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sub-optimal levels" (IbiQ). The non-prohibition of exports could, 
therefore, constitute a necessary, if not sufficient condition for 
export capabilities by licensee firms. 
The other significant consequence of an export restriction, 
especially in connection with integration schemes in both the 
developed and developing world, is that it tends to stultify the 
creation of a conmon market and iIrpedes endeavours to integrate the 
respective economies of the participating countr ies through the 
increase in intra-regional trade. This explains the hostile attitude 
adopted by the E.E.C. and the Andean pactS to this and other 
anticonpetitive practices. With the occurence of this and other 
clauses, as will be shown later, in Ghana, Nigeria and other West 
African countries EOOWAS may soon have to adopt similar attitude if it 
is to succeed in increasing inter-community trade. 
Grant Back or Tnprnyenent Clau® 
Another clause which also occurs in licensing agreement is the 
grant-back or inprovement clause. This clause obliges the licensee to 
grant to the licensor, for a consideration or not, the rights to the 
use of improvanents, variations or other new inventions that are 
developed by the licensee in the process of utilizing the licensed 
invention. Grant-back clauses are in roost cases either absolute or 
mutual. They are absolute where the licensee is obliged to transfer 
any inprovement made on the licensed invention or technology or an 
invention developed on the latter as well as the accompanying rights 
therein to the licensor, and mutual where there is a reciprocal 
exchange of inprovements between licensor and licensee. 
5. See EEC Anticompetitive Regulations and Andean Pact Decision 24. 
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Absolute grant-back clauses are offensive in that they do not 
only deprive licensee firms of their legitimate rights to such 
improvements or inventions but also make them worse off because of the 
money expended for their undertaking. Furthermore, they reinforce the 
dominant position of the licensor and also stifle the incentive of 
licensee firms to invent or undertake R&D geared to improving upon 
or rodifying the licensed invention to their peculiar envirorunents. 
For LOCs it is unfair that exploitation of technologies which have 
been improved upon or IOOdified to suit their envirornnents should be 
impeded by such clauses. The debilitating effect of such clauses, 
however, on industrial activities of LOCs is crucial only if there 
actually exists in these countries the technical expertise to improve, 
modify and adapt foreign licensed technology or invention. 
Mutual grant-back clauses appear to be more reasonable and 
acceptable because they permit the exchange of inprovements between 
the parties which keeps them abreast of recent developnents in the 
state of the art. However, in some cases, they may only be an 
escape-mechanism from the incursion of anti-trust or anti-competitive 
sanctions. About 88% of 42 contracts entered into with Spanish based 
firms studied by UNCTAD (1974a) contained improvement clauses which 
appear to oblige both licensor and licensee to comnunicate full 
information on technical improvement on the licensed technology to 
each other. This arrangement seemingly attractive is deceptive in 
that it is not the same as reciprocity of treatment. In fact, the 
terms on which the inforrration is comnunicated tend to be highly 
unfavourable to the Spanish based firms. The UNCI'AD report on the 
study of these contracts identified four aspects in which the bargain 
is unequal. They are: 
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First, Spanish access to foreign iIrprovements is in 
most cases under the same terms and conditions as the 
original contract, i.e. the Spanish enterprise pays 
for the inprovements. Second, the foreigner always 
obtains improvements emanating in Spain free of 
charge. Third, and fundamental, is the fact that the 
Spanish improvements nearly always become the 
industrial property of the foreigner. Fourth, though 
almost inevitable after the previous point, is that 
foreign corporation retains global right to 
sub-licence the Spanish firms I inprovements, usually 
on a non-exclusive basis (P.33). 
The totality of the above identified factors amply demonstrates that 
the presence of the mutual inprovement clauses is spurious. The only 
benefit derivable by the licensee firms is that they could use their 
improvements or innovations without paying for them. It may, 
therefore, be inferred that the presence of Imltual or reciprocal 
exchange of improvements in licensing agreements afe not, in some 
cases, backed by genuine desire of licensors to have access to 
improvements and to keep abreast as well as feed licensees with the 
recent developnents and inprovements in the state of the art (i. e. tpe 
licensed technology), but rather to evade the rigorous anti-trust 
measures now hunting MNCs.6 
As a result of all this, grant-backs, especially those which are 
not genuinely mutual are found unacceptable. However, Contractor 
(1981) in disapproving the inclusion of a grant-back clause in patents 
6. This does not mean however that all MOCs are guilty of this. 
For ~1N:s policy on grant-backs see Contractor (1981). 
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and generally technology transactions believes that, "it •• betrays the 
idea that, however improbable, there may be an inportant technical 
breakthrough or cornroorcial application not yet discerned by the 
licensors' technicians." (P.94). This objection appears to me to be 
frivolous because technology development is an ongoing process and 
experience has shown that novel technology is generally susceptible to 
further development. A more forceful argument against the grant-back 
clause is its inherent inequitableness. As Kahn (194~) rightly points 
out "invention is a group process, the individual contributions being 
relatively minor" (P.476). It is, therefore, wrong for a given 
"actor" in the process to demand an exclusive right to improvements of 
inventions based on his work which was also an improvement or an 
invention based on the work of others. Clearly grant-back clauses, 
particularly the absolute type, are among the most unjustifiable 
clauses in patent licensing agreements. 
Tie-in Mpn§f1j or 'lDm Arrangermts 
It is a comroon feature in the licensing of patented technolC9Y 
for a licensor to insist that the licensee acquires non-patented goods 
from him only or other specified exclusive sources as a condition of 
the patent. This practice is similarly caraoon in know-hCM licensing 
agreements. In the case of the licenSing of a patented process the 
licensor may reserve to himself the exclusive right to supply 
materials for the initial exploitation of the said process. This may 
be justified on technical grounds. For example, it may be the case 
that it is the licensor'S material alone which may be good enough to 
enable a satisfactory and reasonable working of the process.7 
7. See for exarrq;>le the cases of Dehydrating Process Co. v A.C. 
Smith Corpn., 292, F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1961), u.S. v toew's Inc. 
371 US38 (1862); 9 L.Ed 2d.11. 
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Tied-purchase clauses are also common in cases where there is the need 
for guaranteeing the quality of the manufactured good by the 
employment of specific units, especially where foreign brand names and 
trademarks are involved. Nonetheless, technology suppliers, in same 
cases, use the tie-in clause essentially to maximise their profit 
margins. The inclusion of this clause in patent licenses for such a 
motive unreasonably extends the patent monopoly. 
The inplications of tie-in clauses for recipient countries, 
especially LDCs, have been sufficiently spelt out by UNCTAD (1972b) as 
follows: 
When contractual agreements tie part or all of the 
inputs to a single source of supply, developing 
countries are deprived of the possibility of 
exploiting market opportunities and are faced with a 
price structure determined by the unique supplier. 
Tied purchase provisions thus result in a monopoly 
control of the supply of equipment and other inputs by 
foreign enterprises, leading to what has come to be 
known as 'transfer pricing', 'transfer accounting', or 
'uneconomic output '. By reason of his exclusive 
position, the supplier is able to charge higher prices 
than for comparable equipment and other inputs that 
could otherwise be obtained elsewhere. Overpricing of 
inputs in this way constitutes a 'hidden' cost of the 
transfer of technology, the effects of which are much 
the same as those of aid-tying. (P.27). 
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Moreover continued the report: 
Tied-purchase clauses connected with the transfer of 
technology not only affect production costs through 
the overpricing of inputs but also may have important 
indirect effects on the import substitution, export 
diversification and growth efforts of developing 
countries (P.29). 
The above quotations fully and directly touch on the core 
implication of tie-in clauses. It may be added that the structure of 
the market for intermediate and other inputs which are tied to the 
sources of technology by the licensor has implied an increasing 
dependence on imports of capital goods and intermediate outputs. 8 
This creates a perpetual dependency relationship between the licensee 
firms in the recipient countries and the original licensor, and thus 
makes little room for freedom of action by the former. A mnnber of 
LOCs find themselves in this dilenma. In Latin America for example 
only a few countries such as Argentina, Mexico and Brazil have been 
able to accomplish, in certain sectors, considerable "backward-
linkages" in domestic production (UNCTAD, 1971c, 14). It must be 
noted that despite all these adverse effects, LDCs still experience in 
8. See for example, the share of intermediate industrial inputs of 
the total imports of the Andean Countries, in UNCTAD (1971c). 
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their licensing agreements tie-in clauses.9 
An interesting aspect of tied purchase clauses revealErl by Table 
1:5 relates to ownership of the technology receiving enterprises. The 
table seems to suggest that the proportion of tie-in arrangements is 
highest in cases of licensing arrangement with non-affiliate 
enterprises. This is followed by cases in which foreign enterprises 
have a minority participation in equity. The clauses are least 
widespread or prevalent with regard to subsidiar ies of foreign 
companies. A caveat, however, needs to be issued here. That is, 
while this seems to be the general trend the supporting evidence is 
not adequate enough. It is imperative to note, however, that the 
infrequency of tie-in clauses in technology transactions invol ving 
subsidiaries of foreign firms may be attributable to the degree of 
foreign control over such enterprises which makes "tie-ins" and other 
clauses superfluous. 
Table 1:5 
Provisions mr tied inprt:s according to tym of gmership of the 
teclmology-receivim enterprises in India and the PhiliJpines 
Nature of Foreign Participation 
Minority Licence 
Country SUbsidiary Capital Agreement 
India 
Philippines 
113 
9 
OOURCE: UNCTAD (1972b, 26) 
In Per cent of total for the group 
113 
25 
20 
58 
9. For figures on Ghana and Nigeria see Table 5:4 and 7:7 
respectively. 
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Pri~Fix:im 
Included in patent licensing agreements are clauses which 
empower a licensor to impose on his licensee restrictions concerning 
the sale price of patented products or products manufactured by the 
patented technology or process. '!be obvious consequence of this 
restr ictive practice is that it pre-empts the licensee firm fran 
fixing its own prices as reflecting the production cost of its own 
goods. In addition, the imposed price nay have no bearing on the 
recipient firm's internal market conditions, thus ignoring the forces 
of supply and demand. Finally, in cases where the dictated price is 
higher than that of other competing products (e.g. imports from 
licensor and other sources) this is likely to have an adverse effect 
on the operations of the licensee firm. '!bough price-fixing clauses 
still occur in licensing agreements involving LDC licensees they are 
not as frequent as those already discussed (see Table 7:7; also see 
UNCTAD, 1972b). 
Field of Use RestrictiQD 
A nfield of use" restrictionl~ is one whereby the licensor of 
proprietary technology restricts the licensee as regards the scope or 
field in which the latter may employ the technology or licensed 
product. In such a case the licensee is obliged not to engage in the 
manufacture and sale of products other than those covered by the 
licence. This practice is sometimes employed by licensors as a 
vehicle for the allocation or division of markets. It also has the 
l~. For the classical patent position with regard to field of use 
restriction see Melville (1972,18). 
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effect of restricting the use of the licensed technology. It nay, 
holt.ever, be pointed rut that this restriction nay, in certain cases/be 
explained by the genuine use to \l.tlich the licensed technology is to be 
p.lt. 
Patent licensing contracts nay also enbody the "no-challenge" or 
"no-contest" clause. By virtue of this clause the licensor is able to 
forbid the licensee from challenging the validity of the patent under 
\\bich he is licensed during the life span of the agreeIreI1t. This 
clause appears to be in accord with the conmon law doctrine of 
estoppel whereby a party to a contract is estopped from denying or 
challenging the validity of a contract \>bich he freely enters into. 
In the case of patents the no-challenge clause seeks to forestall a 
state of affairs in Which a licensee is able to avoid a bargain he had 
made by contesting the validity of the patent under mich he is 
licensed while simultaneously enjoying the benefits derivable 
thereunder .11 
In addition to estoppel, Bloxam (1972) suggests the application 
of the doctrine of "caveat enptor" in patent licensing. The marriage 
of and extension of the doctrines of estoppel and caveat enptor to 
patent licensing contracts will certainly exacerbate the already It.eak 
position of the licensee for a number of reasons. First, the 
11. See the reasoning of the california Supreme Crurt in lear v 
Adkins 395 tE 653 (1969), 162 US POI. This court's judgerrent 
\'as subsequently rejected and reversed by the U.S. SUpreme 
Court. 
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oammodity involved in such a transaction is technical information the 
worth of which the licensee will not be in a position to evaluate till 
he has entered into a contract involving this same infornation. 
Furthermore, it is just not enough to warn a licensee to be aware of 
an impalpable commodity which he cannot examine until he has agreed to 
purchase. It will, therefore, be unjust and inequitable to tie dCMIl a 
licensee to a commodity which before the plrchase was not only 
impalpablebut also inaccessible, and which after it had becone palnable 
and accessible had been found to be worth nothing. 
The no-challenge clause, is normally used by licensors to 
maintain considerable restrictions on competition in conjunction with 
patent licenses especially where they realise the relative weakness of 
their licensed patents (See Cawthra, 1973). Another effect of this 
clause is given by the EEC Conmission. This practice, according to 
the Cormnission: 
••• involves a restriction on the licensee's freedom 
of action which is not covered by the- essential 
character of the industr ial property right i for it 
takes from him the power to challenge the validity of 
the contract in order to reduce the royalites and to 
have certain restrictions removed which could 
strengthen its conpetitive position while irrproving 
that of third party undertakings interested in the 
manufacture of the article under licence as well as 
that of users.12 
The no-challenge clause, therefore, is not only anti-competitive, but 
12. Decision of the EEC Conmission in the Case of Raynond v Nagoya 
Rubber (1972) CMLR.D45. 
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it also enables licensors or patentees to enjoy privileges that extend 
beyond those provided by the patent grant. In addition, its 
restrictive effect may extend beyond the licensee to other third party 
undertakings and users of the end product of the licensed technology. 
It is no wonder, as we shall see in due course, that this clause is 
becoming increasingly impermissible by licensing requirements of many 
countries. 
Miniwnn Ro:falty ~ts 
International patent licensors in the licensing of their patents 
also stipulate a minimum level of royalty payments irrespective of 
whether at the time the payments become due the patented technology is 
actually being exploited or not.13 1bough royalties on sales, for 
example, must assume some production, it is possible that owing to 
technical problems and other factors actual production may not take 
place for some time while royalties will be due and thus have to be 
honoured. Minimum royalty payment clauses are also quite common in 
licensing agreements involving LOC licensees. (see UNCTAD, 1972b and 
1975a). Though these clauses may be useful for the LDCs by 
encouraging rapid use of the licensed technology, such use may, owing 
to technical difficulties, never exist, and thus put more burden on 
their econ01l¥. 
In some instances where a guaranteed or fixed minimum payment is 
not demanded of the licensee, the licensor imposes on the former most 
often improper royalty formulae. For example, in a licence agreement 
covering a patented machine, the licensor demanded royalties on the 
13. See Hazeltine Research, Inc. v Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. 100, 
135. 
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use of the nachine after the expiration date of the patent, as well as 
before. The U. S. SUpreme Court did not hesitate in holding the 
imposition of such a royalty obligation for post-expiration use of the 
machine as an unlawful effort by the patentee to extend the teDn of 
his monopoly beyond that granted by law.14 
In other cases, some of which may concern policy decisions of a 
licensee' s goverrunent, guarantees are required of the licensee. Where 
guarantees are not demanded the contract would usually include 
provisions which make the licensee or domestic enterprise liable to 
compensation for lossess suffered by the licensor with respect to 
official policy (mcrAD, 1972b). All this is not confined to only 
patent but technology licensing agreements in general. 
So far we have endeavoured to explain the concept of technology, 
the legal nature and economic functions of patents as well as some 
restrictive practices in patent licensing. Having done so we shall 
now proceed to examine the transfer and indigenous developnent of 
'\ 
technology • 
The problem of transfer of technology, especially from the 
developed to the less developed countries, is deeply rooted in the 
international division of labour, which has developed the advanced 
countries of nodem industry, and which, by definition, explains the 
role of the LDCs as producers and suppliers of tropical food, minerals 
and agricultural raw materials with little or no domestic 
manufacturing industries. 
14. See the case of Brulotte v Thys Co., 379 US29 (1964). 
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The international division of labour, on the other hand, it is 
argued, is a product of imperialism.lS The phenomenon of ~rialism, 
which basically involves the search by capitalist firms for surpluses 
and the use thereof in incorporating new areas of the world economy 
into their system of accumulation, encompasses the entire range of 
production relations. It is also intimately associated with the 
export to the perpheries of capital used for the exploitation of the 
natural resources of the latter for the consumption of the 
metropolies. 
With imperialism at its maturity and territories coming under 
the domain of the capitalist countries, they initiated and urged, and 
where necessary forced the cultivation of crops and exploitation of 
minerals required by the home econ0II¥. Systematic colonial investment 
provided the underdeveloped world with a handful of primary 
commodities for export, instead of concentrating on meeting the need 
of the colonies, and thus transformed them into the farms and mines of 
the metropolis.16 It is no wonder that the economy of IOOst of the 
third world countries which experienced imperialism andVor colonialism 
bear the characteristic of either monocrop or bi-crop. 
It is obvious, therefore, that the development of colonialism 
led to the control of the economies of the LDCs and made them 
complementary to the metropolitan economies. It also accentuated the 
international division of labour. SO that during that period it 
IS. See, for example, the views of Sweezy (1970) and Nabudere (1977) 
as opposed to Warren (1980). 
16. For some evidence on India see Brown (1974), on Ghana see Howard 
(1978), and on Nigeria see Williams (ed) (1976) and Onimode 
(1982). 
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became more prominent that while the peripheries were made to 
concentrate on the production of raw materials the centres or 
capitalist countries were able to develop manufacturing industries and 
exporting manufactured goods to the colonies and other peripheries. 
All this put the peripheries in a disadvantageous position. Thus, 
imperialism and its resultant international division of labour did not 
only contribute to the impoverishment of the LOCs, but also accounted 
for their present industrial backwardness. 
In their desire to rectify this situation JOOst LOCs' economic 
strategies are directed to altering the structure of their economies 
by a considerable increase in the share of manufacturing in national 
output and by similar changes within the manufacturing industrial 
structure itself.17 For the successful realisation of this the LDCs 
must possess the requisite technology as well as the technological 
infrastructure and competence all of which they lack. Consequently, 
it has become necessary for them to import them. 
Clearly, the LOCs' interest in bridging the technological gap 
with the developed countries has been considerable since the 
post-colonial era. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that 
the international community has since the beginning of the sixties -
the first United Nations Development Decade - made efforts to confront 
the problems of the transfer of technology to the developing 
countries, particularly in obtaining better terms, and easier access 
to developed countries' technology (UNCI'AD, 197">. An integral part 
of these efforts was the debate for the reform of the patent system. 
In this direction, for exanple, as early as 19 Decanber 1961 the 
General Assembly by its resolution 1713 (XVI) called for a study of 
17. Some economists find these goals unexceptionable. For a 
discussion see Singh (1982). 
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the patent system and how it affects technology. In response thereto 
a study entitled nthe role of patent system in the transfer of 
technology to developing countriesn was published in 1964 (UN,1964). 
This study dealt, inter alia, with the transfer of both patented and 
unpatented technology to the LOCs as well as nthe ability of the 
latter to adopt and use such foreign technology in the implementation 
of their developnent programmen (UN, 1964). It is instructive to note 
that preceding all this was the call for the reform of the patent 
system by writers such as Kahn (194~ and 1948), Vaug~1948), Penrose 
(1951) and Machlup (1952). 
Among the bold formal expressions of this concern is the 
ratification of the International Development strategy of the Second 
UN Developrnent Decade in October 197~ which recognised the need to 
control the international conventions on patents, easier access to 
patented and unpatented technology at better terms, simple use of 
technologies appropriate to development strategies of LOCs and the 
encouragement of the development of indigenous technologies in the 
LOCs. This was followed by subsequent international meetings such as 
the sixth special session of the UN General Assembly in 1974 where the 
issue was raised again in the Programme of Action on the Establishment 
of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) 18. The subject is 
still being pursued by such UN agencies as UNCTAD, UNIDO and others. 
Both the LOCs and the International Community's concern for the 
transfer of technology is deeply rooted in the former' s underdeveloped 
nature. So that any discussion of technology transfer to the LOCs 
18. For further discussion see Laszlo and others (1978, pp 124-134), 
and Hart (1983, pp42-44). 
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must, in the main, relate to their underdevelopment and desire to 
eradicate poverty, and, in this way, meet their basic needs on a 
continuing basis. It is appropriate now to examine the concept of the 
transfer of technology with the hope of clarifying it and identifying 
the problems or issues most pivotal to it. In so doing we shall 
review some of the meanings ascribed to it by various writers and 
agencies. 
'!he Transfer of Technology 
UNCl'AD which is the UN agency which has for a considerable 
per iod of time been involved in the study of issues related to the 
transfer of technology particularly from the OCs to LDCs defines 
transfer of technology as follows: 
Transfer of technology •••• is the transfer of 
systematic knowledge for the manufacture of a product, 
for the application of a process or for the rendering 
of a service and does not extend to the transactions 
involving the mere sale or mere lease of goods 
(UNCTAD, 1983, 2). 
This definition, clearly, excludes the sale of goods to or the import 
of goods by LOCs fran the definition of technology transfer. However, 
it may not be entirely incorrect to state that the import of goods, 
despite its related constraints,19 can be a useful conduit for 
transferring technology. For example, as an alternative to foreign 
direct investment, it may at least help the local infrastructure to 
develop indigenous expertise by emulation rather than importing 
expertise as part of the package. Another attractive aspect regarding 
this means of transfer is that product markets are more competitive 
and easier to survey. 
19. For a discussion on some of the constraints related ~o the sale or 
import of goods as a vehicle for transferring technology see 
Steele (1974). 
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Besides the explicit exclusion of the sale of goods, the UNCTAD 
definition is akin to other definitions of the transfer of technology 
given by various writers. Gruber and Marquis define the transfer of 
technology as "the utilization of an existing technique in an instance 
where it has not been previously used" (1969, pp255-256), so that 
technology transfer occurs when technology developed in one context is 
transmitted and used in another. Similarly, Gee defines the transfer 
of technology as "the application of technology to a new use or user". 
(1981, 18). To him it is a process by which, in addition to a 
particular purpose for which a given technology is developed, such 
technology is utilized either in a dissimilar application or ~ a new 
different user. Following the same approach, Chen defines the concept 
as "the introduction into a country of technologies which exist 
elsewhere but not yet in that country" (1983, 63). Though the 
approach is the same Chen confines the process to countries only and 
seems to exclude the transfer between different firms and industries 
within the same country. Finally, to Brooks, "Transfer of technology 
is the process by which science and technology are diffused throughout 
human activity. Wherever systematic rational knowledge developed by 
one group or institution is errbodied in a way of doing things by other 
institutions or groups we have technology transfer." (1966,54). 
Inherent in all the above definitions is the development of new 
techniques or technology and its transfer and usage in either a new 
instance or environment. While we agree that a wider utilization of 
new techniques as implied by these definitions is essential, 
especially for those who lack the resources to develop such techniques 
to meet their needs, we do not fail to realise that these definitions 
have one major shortcoming. That is, they all fail to appreciate the 
major objective of technology, which is the fulfillment of needs. So 
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that for a transfer of technology to be successful and meaningful it 
must be able to satisfy the wants of its recipient on a continuing 
basis. It is possible to have a situation whereby the introduction of 
a new technology to another environment may not be able to fulfil the 
desired objectives which necessitated the transfer. And since 
technology is not transferred merely for its sake, its failure to 
realise the goals for which it is transferred will mean that the 
transfer has failed, which may be tantamount to saying there has not 
been any transfer. 
v' Consequently, we shall understand the transfer of technology to 
mean the introduction of technology from one environment to another 
where its use is not only capable of meeting the needs of the 
recipient, but equally capable of iIrparting the necessary knowledge 
and skills for the continual satisfaction of these needs. It follows, 
therefore, that the technology transfer process is never complete 
until there has been the acquisition of the necessary skills by 
indigenous labour to manage and utilise the technology autonomously as 
well as its total absorption and diffusion throughout the recipient's 
entire industrial and agricultural sectors. It is only when this has 
been realised that the recipient country may be in a position to 
satiSfy its needs on a continuing basis without depending much on 
either the original supplier or others. 
Based on the earlier definitions several methods have been 
adopted to classify the technology transfer process. These include 
the classification developed by Brooks (1966) which distinguishes 
between "horizontal" and "vertical" transfers of technology (pp53-64). 
This distinction has been adopted by Mansfield (1975, pp372-376). 
Others include Cotton's "domestic" and "international" (discussed in 
Smith III, 1981, 11), and Bar-Zakey's (1974) "organised" and 
44 
"incidental" transfers of technology. As would be expected, these 
taxonomies of the technology transfer process do not relate to the 
underpinning considerations which prompt most countries, particularly 
the LDCs, to import foreign technology. 
As stated earlier, most third world countries are underdeveloped 
and see industrialisation as a necessa~ element of any solution to 
this problem. Lacking the necessa~ technology and technical skills 
they consider their importation not only crucial in the development of 
their technological base but also as a spur to their industrialization 
efforts. So that for such countries the distinction of the technology 
transfer process into what I propose to call generative and 
consumptive may be useful. They stand to gain more by optin:J for what 
I call generative technology transfer rather than a consumptive 
transfer. 
v A generative technology transfer is transfer which does not only 
enable the utilization of the transferred technology to satisfy human 
needs, but more importantly has the potential for the further 
generation of technology. The generative transfer process may include 
the transfer of hardware technology such as nachines, inplernents, 
equipment and devices as well as software technology like technical 
and managerial experience. This type of technology transfer is 
crucial because the use of knowledge and tools to make tools for 
stated goals is the crux of the technology transfer process. 
Consumptive technology transfer, on the other, refers to a 
transfer which cannot be applied to satisfy human present and future 
needs without the technology itself being consumed or exhausted, and, 
thus, may not have any real potential for generating any further 
technology. This transfer includes the transfer of consuner goods and 
some consumer durables which themselves are the enbodiIrent of the 
technology that goes into their production. 
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It follows, therefore, that countries which desire a peDmanent 
technological base must, if possible, avoid consumptive technology 
transfer as much as possible and instead concentrate more on the 
generative transfer which by definition is organic. It nust be stated 
here, however, that the mere choice of a generative transfer without 
the establishment of the relevant structures may not necessarily lead 
to any economic or developnent growth and the satisfaction of the 
needs of the importing country. It is also important that the 
technology acquisition is accompanied by the adoption of measures to 
reduce the extent of dependence on the supplier. SUch measures may 
include upgrading the technical capabilities of the recipient country 
and executing its determination to generate its own domestic 
technology. For a generative technological transfer process to 
accomplish all this there rust necessarily exist in the receiving 
country the requisite technical competence. 
Technology Transfer and Indigenous Technological <;amhility 
It may be necessary to point out here that the additional 
technology to be generated by generative technology should not be 
conceived in terms of only ercbodied or disent>odied technology, but 
most importantly in the development of indigenous technological 
capability (I.T.C.) of the receiving country. This crucial aspect 
has, since the emergence of interest in the transfer of technology 
from the developed to the less developed countries, not been accorded 
significant attention by earlier studies. The latter tended to focus 
mainly on problems such as the "cost, suitability and effectiveness" 
of the transfer process. This IX>int has been made by Fransman (l984a) 
who adds that an implicit assumption made by these earlier studies was 
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that LOCs possessed exceedingly weak technological capabilities and 
that the attention ought, therefore, to be on the inflow of foreign 
technologies, rather than on indigenous technological abilities. This 
assumption, however, as he points rut, became subjected to challenge 
from the late 197~'s "as the focus of attention shifted to an 
examination of technological processes and changes in these 
countries". (Fransman, 1984a, 5). 
It has been suggested by stewart and James (1982), on the 
contrary, that "there is not a single new focus but rather a new set 
of directions" (p.l), which are concerned with technology in a 
"dynamic" setting, concentrating on how technology changes over time, 
unlike previously when the main concern was the "static" use of choice 
out of a given set of techniques. 
It would., however, appear that while there was some amount of 
interest in the question of indigenous technological capability before 
the 197~' s,2~ it was not until the 197~s that significant anpirical 
studies were undertaken in this area. Nevertheless, this is an 
encouraging development in the sense that it will create the necessary 
awareness for recipients of foreign technology, in addition to the 
development and strengthening of measures to minimise costs associated 
wi th such technology, to consider and develop the measures relevant to 
its employment in the development of indigenous technological 
capabilities and the learning processes that go with it. 
Indigenous technological capability (I.T.C.) has been broadly 
defined to include (1) the ability to select fran available 
23. An example of such studies is the 1964 UN study on the patent 
system and the transfer of technology to LDCs which, inter alia 
dealt with "the ability of the latter to adopt and use •••• 
foreign technology in the implementation of their developnent 
programme" (see PP24 and 25). 
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technologies (Dahlman and Cortez 1982, referred to in Fransrnan 1984b, 
303), (2) the ability to master imported technology (Westphal et al., 
1981), and (3) the ability to introduce a degree of novelty in the 
production of products or processes (Fransrnan, 1984b). This can be 
amplified to mean the ability not only to select but select sensibly 
and "cost effectivelyn off-the-shelf technologies, the efficacious and 
efficient mastery of inported technology so as to carry out the 
necessary modifications for more meaningful indigenous application, 
and the successful channelling and diffusion of the adapted technology 
throughout both the agricultural and industrial sectors. 
The ability to carry out changes to foreign technologies in 
order to adapt them to the different and peculiar circumstances or 
environment of the receiving LOCs appear to be the kernel of I.T.C. 
It seems to me, however, that it will not be entirely incorrect or 
inappropriate to stretch I.T.C. to cover the capability of LDCs, from 
the knowledge acquired through the utilization of foreign technology, 
to develop technologies peculiarly suited to their own environments. 
Consequently, we may disagree with Ranis (1984) when he suggests that 
it is nthe capacity to make those changes continuously, rather than to 
invent something emerging full-blown • from the brow of Zeus' n, that 
constitutes the roost relevant technological activity or capability 
(P.96). So that while I agree with Ranis that some foreign product 
technologies cannot be used without necessary roodification or that 
there does not seem to be much sense re-inventing existing 
technologies, I would argue that the ability to utilize acquired 
knowledge to develop relevant technologies to meet the needs of LDCs, 
is a worthwhile exercise. We will, therefore, understand I.T.C. to 
include not only the eclectic selection from the international 
technology shelf, the ability to master and adapt foreign technology, 
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but also the ability to diffuse such technology throughout the entire 
indigenous industrial and agricultural sectors as well as utilize 
knowledge acquired from the inported technology to develop both 
product and process technologies to meet the needs of the people 
irrespective of the simple nature of such local technologies. 
The development of I.T.C., it is instructive to note, cannot be 
accOIrplished solely by the mere importation of foreign technology. 
This needs to be matched with the availability of certain factors in 
the importing country. These include the availability of high quality 
human resources, a crucial aspect of indigenous capacity, and the 
appropriate organisational/institutional infrastructure to back up the 
learning process. 2l There is a third growing significant 
consideration, which is government intervention policy to protect the 
initial learning process. 
There is now a strong opinion (see below), despite the presence 
of isolated dissenting voices, for the need to protect learning 
process and the development of I.T.C. Among these dissenting voices 
is Dore (1984) who in referring to Indian manufacturing firms believes 
that the high level of protection enjoyed by Indian firms is one of 
the reasons for the low level of productivity and technological 
inca:rpetence in many but by no neans in all these firms. 22 The need 
21. For an interesting discussion of this see Ranis (1984, 
pplriH-I~6) • 
22. As another exarrple of such dissenting voices, Fransman refers to 
Ranis and others at the Yale Economic Growth Centre who 
hypothesize in a study that tariffs protection depresses the 
level of inventive activity and that the net effect of increased 
conpetition is to stimUlate innovation. 
footnote no. 9). 
(Fransman, 1982, 
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to protect I.T.C. results from the recognition of the effects of 
international competitive pressure, especially from multinational 
firms, which does render the unpredictable learning process 
unattractive or which in some cases might be so enormous as to prevent 
local firms from engaging in activities designed to strengthen 
technological capabilities. 
In addition to this strong opinion, there is, in actual fact, an 
increasing amount of evidence to suggest that learning and the 
improvement of technological capabilities have successfully taken 
place under conditions of protection (Lall, 1982, and 1984: Katz 1984: 
Dahlman, 1984: Westphal, 1981 and Westphal et al., 1981, 1984). Even 
Fransman's study of near-free-trade Hong Kong, while it demonstrates 
same merits associated with the near-free-trade regime, confirms that 
such a regime prevents the production of certain goods and services 
and thus impedes the attendant learning processes and technological 
change (Fransman, 1984b and 1982). Consequently, he also believes 
that ndirect government interventionn is necessary to promote 
"qualitative junp" in I.T.C. (Fransrnan, 1984b, 313). This should, 
however, not be carried to the extent that it renders local industries 
dormant, inco~tent and lag unnecessarily behind the international 
frontiers. It nay also be ~inted out here that the fact that I.T.C. 
proves successful under protection does not mean that the benefits or 
merits of protection necessarily outweigh the costs even in toose 
cases where protection works. Needless to add, the enhancement of 
I.T.C. may not necessarily take place under very condition of 
protection. 
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Condition for the Protection of I.T.C. 
While technological change and the learning process that go with 
it are acknowledged as being crucial, and thus, the need to be 
protected, little is yet known of the conditions required to promote 
their emergence and consolidation. Nevertheless, there is a rather 
wide consensus on the significance of the development of a local 
capital goods sector (Fransman (1984b), Rosenberg (1976), Dahlman and 
Westphal (1981) referred to in Fransrnan (1984b). This sector, is 
generally agreed, "lies at the heart of processes involving the 
generation and diffusion of technological change" (Fransrnan, 1984b 
303) and therefore makes a case for state intervention and assistance 
in its local promotion. Rosenberg makes almost the same point to the 
effect that all innovations require that the capital goods sector in 
turn produces new products (capital goods) according to certain 
specifications (Rosenberg, 10-11). Similarly, Dahlman and Westphal 
suggest that without some degree of local mastery in the er.bodirnent of 
technology in mpital goods the achievement of socially warranted 
adaptation will not be possible (Referred to in Fransman 1984b, 304). 
It appears, therefore, that a case for protection of machine 
production and other capital goods will seem quite reasonable. 
In addition, Katz in his study of Latin America metal-working 
industries, (1984, 113-136) has hinted that protection of infant 
learning may be appropr iate in cases where domestic markets are 
sufficiently large to permit internationally sufficient scales of 
operation, and secondly, where the world's technological frontier does 
not experience very dramatic jumps over time, thus permitting a 
gradual narrowing of the relative gap that separates developed 
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countries and LDCs from international technical standards. He points 
out that under such conditions a public policy of protection 
systematically maintained over several decades, seems to have 
successfully induced the development of highly corrpetitive national 
enterprises based on a solid local technological foundation. 
Two main issues are raised by Katz's hints. It is deducible 
from his analysis that where the market size is not as big as or close 
to the Brazilian then protection may not be appropriate. Since many 
LDCs do not have a rr-arket as large as the Brazilian it may be argued 
quite logically that Katz's conclusion relating to market size may not 
be very relevant to them. 
Secondly, if on the contrary, the world's technological frontier 
experiences dramatic jumps leading to the constant disappearance of 
mature products then to follow the frontier LDCs may well require a 
different or new set of technological skills. This may cornpliC<lte the 
issue of protection, particularly its duration. As Katz himself 
asked, "should society take upon itself to protect a second or even a 
third round of indigenous learning in order to prevent the 
technological gap from widening once again, or should the returns from 
the first learning sequence finance the dynamics of the evolving 
process?" (P.132) All this will seem to weaken the case for 
protection, especially if it is geared mainly to the reduction of the 
technological gap. 
However, in the case of mature products for which there are not 
perfect substitutes and for which there is enough demand a local firm 
could continue to exploit its accorrplished technical learning even 
within the framework of a matured product even if the international 
technological frontier experiences dramatic jumps (Katz, 1984, 131). 
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In spite of all these hints it still appears difficult to 
formulate any general public policy in the area of protection. 
Consequently, Katz suggests that 'tailor-made' policy action that 
would closely reflects "the specificity of the learning situation of 
each particular form of production organisation" will seen necessary 
(P.135). In the same vein Westphal argues for selective protection 
(1981, 31-35). 
IeTeCe and the Patent S,ystem 
Paradoxically, the development of the patent system which was 
intimately related to the proIOOtion of domestic development of 
inventions or technologies and their exploitation now serves as a 
"scarecrow" to the development of I.T.C., especially in the LDCs (see 
above) • Patent grants are increaSingly being used by inventors not 
only to ward off competitors but equally importantly to block any 
potential indigenous "intruders" in their respective fields. This may 
not only result in creating industrial monopoly, but it also adversely 
affects the development of I.T.C. in such fields. This necessarily 
ordains government intervention for the successful development of 
I.T.C. While other measures have been used by governments in this 
direction the patent systen which was basically conceived to stimulate 
indigenous technological development has not been effectively used in 
this respect. 
Government intervention in respect of I.T.C. has been conducted 
through import controls of consumer as well as intermediate and 
capital goods especially those of which local production exist. It 
will appear, however, that a more effective barrier for the protection 
of I.T.C. can be built through the mechanisms of the patent systen and 
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licensing requirement. Out of the two, the licensing requirement is 
now increasingly being used by a number of LOCs to discourage the 
payment for the use of technology from abroad when similar or 
equivalent indigenous technology already exist. It is instructive to 
note that the control through licensing, besides its effect on the 
balance of payment position of the country using it, is an important 
form of protectionism. It provides protection from technological 
competiveness necessary to nurture LOCs' I.T.C. 
Similarly, it may be hypothesized that the patent system can be 
efficaciously employed to nurture the development of I.T.C. and thus 
promote the goals for which it was developed. It will be appropriate 
in this respect for LOCs to examine more carefully their policies on 
patentability not only in terms of their economic development goals, 
but also in relation to the development of I.T.C. For the successful 
use of the patent system in this way there may have to be in existence 
a technology policy which must not only encompass it but which, in 
turn, must also be integrated into the national development plan. 
This, it will be argued, will ensure the use of both the patent system 
and the technology policy as tools for economic development, and, in 
particular, enable the former to contribute meaningfully to the 
development of I.T.C. 
I.T.C. and the Technological Gap 
An interesting issue of the ongoing development of indigenous 
technological capabilities in the LOCs is the increaSing attainment of 
technical sophistication by local manufacturing enterprises as well as 
their growing international competitiveness. 
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This LDC economic progress, particularly in respect of 
manufactured exports and the closing of the technological gap between 
DCs and LDCs, according to Kaplinsky, was a phenomenon of the 
nexpansionary upswingn which passed through its peak in 1971-1973. 
(1984, 139-160 of 41). And as the world econo~ becomes mgulfedin the 
"downswingn, roc export-led growth is threatened with the introduction 
and diffusion of microelectronics to DC industry. This, he believes, 
has the consequence of re-opening the technology gap. The widening of 
this gap results from the substantial gains der ivable from this 
introduction of electronics and its uneven diffusion in the world 
econo~ as well as the emergence of automation technologies which are 
dependent upon the widespread of electronics in a series of separate 
activities. Kaplinsky uses Cornputer-Aided-Design (CAD) to demonstrate 
this and to refer to the increase in the pace of DCs technological 
change as well as the increasing 
technologies for LDCs. 
inappropriateness of emerging DC 
In further illustration of this waning competiveness of roc 
producers and the growing narrowing of DC markets to the latter, 
Kaplinsky refers to his sugar industry study and points out that while 
Indian Vacuum Pan Plant manufacturers actively compete with DC 
suppliers in supplying similar equipnent to other LDCs, there have 
been no cases of the former supplying plants to DC markets. This is 
because, in addition to the fact that DC sugar producers generally 
process beet rather than cane, the Indian suppliers are unable to meet 
the demand for the automated processing systems used in DC economies. 
Furthermore, the unattractiveness of some LDC products is exemplified 
by the brownish sugar with inconsistently sized granuLe.. produced by 
the open pan-sulphitation technology which is peculiarly suited to 
most LDCs. 
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All this indicates that, in the microelectronic era, third world 
technological capability is increasingly becoming inappropriate for 
DCs, and, in addition, produces products unacceptable for DC 
consumers. Kaplinsky's analysis, however, should not be stretched too 
far so as to ignore the occasional significant penetration of OCs 
market by some LOCs even in high technology areas. The recent 
selection by the British Ministry of Defence, among four contenders,24 
of the Tucano aircraft designed in Brazil but to be built by Short 
Brothers of Belfast for the next basic trainer for the Royal Air Force 
is a case in point ("The Times", Fri. l-larch 22, 1985, ppl and 4). 
Though the choice of this aircraft has been criticised by opponents 
that it was a "pay-off" to Brazil for its help to the British 
government during the Falklands Campaign in 1982, it does not, 
nevertheless, question the technical competence of the aircraft. It 
may also be correct to state that in other technological fields where 
the world frontier does not experience very dramatic jumps LDCs may 
still be able to compete with DCs. 
Nevertheless, the move of OC technology CMay from batch to 
continuous production renders it less appropriate for LDCs, while the 
growth of LDC technology is particularly relevant to other LDCs. The 
resultant effect will seem to be a growth in technology trade between 
LDCs, with an accompanying decline in the share of this trade between 
DCs and LDCs. This, therefore, makes it imperative for LDCs to 
expunge the rigidities and major structural differences in their 
------------, ------
24. The other contenders for the contract were British Aerospace 
with the SWiss Pilatus PC9 aircraft, Hunting Firecracker with 
British designed aircraft, and Westland Yeovil with an 
Australian aircraft. 
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technology-related laws, such as patent and licensing legislation, so 
as to facilitate technology trade and dissemination of new technical 
knowledge among themselves. For example, the present patent law of 
Ghana, which will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five, makes it 
difficult not only for Ghanaians to obtain a patent but equally so for 
other LOC inventors, and therefore, needs to be reviewed. All this 
will make available to them not only appropriate technologies, but 
also appropriate products relevant in meeting their needs. 
Conclusion 
So far we have tried to clarify the concept of technology, 
examined the legal nature and economic functions of patents, as well 
as the technology transfer process, and have endeavoured to relate 
them to the question of human needs. ~7e have also emphasized the need 
to utilize acquired technology to enhance the development of 
indigenous technical competence. Since the satisfaction of needs is a 
continuing process the acquiSition of the necessary skills to meet 
one's needs becomes paramount. Finally, we have also mentioned the 
need for LDCs to co-operate in the field of technology since the DCs 
technology is beginning to be more and more inappropriate for the 
former. This, we believe, will serve to provide the requiSite 
technology and products to satisfy LOCs' need which DC technology 
cannot meet without its concomittant costs and problems. Having said 
so we shall proceed to examine the international patent system and 
some international, regional and national policies and efforts 
concerning the patent system as well as the transfer of technology. 
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0IAP.rER 2 
THE INl'ERNATIOOAL PATENI' SYs.rFN AND THE DEVEWPMmI' AND 
TRANSFER OF TEXlINJUXiY 
Historical Developnent 
The patent system as a reward mechanism for the developnent of 
new technologies took shape as early as the 15th Century, though 
"numerous examples" of privileges granted to innovators occurred 
during the 14th Century (Gomme, 1946, pp5-l3). 
The "systematic use of monopoly privileges for inventors" as a 
spur for inventive activity emerged in Venice in the 15th Century 
(Ibid.) • This spread to other parts of Europe, and by the 16th 
Century patents were widely used in Germany by some German princes and 
in England by the Crown to encourage invention and the introduction of 
new arts. The abuse that came to be associated with these grants of 
special rights, particularly in the latter, were so pronounced that it 
eventually culminated in the enactment of the statute of Monopolies of 
1623. Though this essentially aimed at curbing the increasing abuses 
by the Stuarts in the grant of monopolies, it served as the 
springboard of Anglo-saxon patent law. 
The Statute of Monopolies declared all monopolies void under the 
common law except: 
•••• any letters patent and grants of privileges for 
the term of fourteen years or under, hereafter to be 
made, of the sole working or making of any manner of 
new manufactures within this realm, to the true and 
first inventor of such manufactures which others at 
the time of making such letters patent and grants 
shall not use ••• (S.6). 
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This provision in particular and the statute in general have been 
acknowledged to be the "first general law of a nodem state to lay 
down the principle that only the I first and true inventor I of a new 
manufacture should be granted a monopoly patent" (Penrose, 1951, 7). 
It is instructive to note that the "first and true inventor" was given 
a much broader meaning under the earlier patent systems, and thus 
encompassed the first persons to introduce a new art from abroad (See 
Davies, 1932, pp397-398). 
The enactment of similar laws to encourage invention and 
development of industries subsequently spread to other countries. The 
latter part of the 18th Century witnessed countries such as the u.S. 
and France prOIlUllgating their own laws. It was not until the 19th 
Century that nore countries adopted a patent system. During the 
latter part of the century, however, the patent system came under 
attack in some countries of EUrope. This attack and the controversy 
surrounding the system eventuated in the repeal of the Netherlands law 
on patent in 1869 which was subsequently reintroduced in 1912. 
Similarly, this controversy also raged fiercely in Switzerland. 
Nevertheless, by the close of the 19th Century alnost all the 
present industrialised countries had promulgated patent laws (UNCTAD, 
1975a, Para 232). With this development there arose the need amongst 
these countries to devise minimum rules on patents. It was this need 
which eventually resulted in the Paris Convention. 
Prior to the approval of the Paris COnvention in 1883 and its 
coming into force on the 7th of July 1884 there was no multilateral 
mechanism for industrial property protection. The rights of a foreign 
inventor to protection in the field of industr ial property were, 
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therefore, dependent essentially on reCiprocity between the laws of 
his own country and those of the country in which he desired or wished 
to obtain protection. I,n . effect, there was no formalised standardised 
mechanism by which inventors could register their inventions in 
foreign countries so as to acquire the ronopoly rights they desired 
across their national frontiers. The need for an international patent 
system consequently became imperative for a nunber of reasons. These 
include (a) the then unsatisfactory situation occasioned by the 
numerous fundamental differences between the patent laws of different 
countries and the attendant disadvantage at which foreign inventors 
were placed and (b) the increasing importance of international trade 
and investment to the economies of the major industrialised countries. 
As would be expected, the United States and England, then great 
industrial powers played a very prominent role in the development of 
an international patent regime for the protection of the rights of 
inventors. In fact, it was the initiative of the U.S., and not the 
host country, Austria, which resulted in the COngress of Vienna (1873) 
which was the first international effort to harmonise the world patent 
systems (See Nanyenya-Takirambudde, 198~). This congress was 
restricted to patent matters and concentrated on the modes of 
accomplishing an uniform international patent system as opposed to the 
means of reducing diversity in national systems. 
The Vienna Congress was followed by the 1878 Paris Congress on 
industrial property. The latter was not confined to patents but also 
covered trademarks, designs and IOOdels. The general goal, however, 
was still the attainment of uniformity or minimum unification of the 
diverse world patent system. To realise this a permanent 
international commission was appointed to draw up legislation. 
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The subsequent and final international conference on patents 
which still serves as the basis for the present international patent 
system is the l88~ Paris Conference. This congress departed from the 
concept of uniform legislation as advocated by the two previous 
congresses. Instead, it favoured the formulation of a number of 
provisions to be included in an international convention to enable 
minimum divergence in national patent systems. It adopted a draft 
convention which was subsequently ratified at the 1883 International 
Conference which was also held in Paris. The convention came into 
effect on the 7th July 1884 following the approval of the draft 
convention and the exchange of the instruments of ratification. 
It is interesting to note that at the 1878 conference it was 
agreed that the then metropolitan countries should extend their patent 
laws and systems to the colonies (Penrose, 1951, 53). This was in 
fact done in most of the colonies, some of which still operate 
colonial patent systems. Consequently, the colonies which were 
neither participants in the various conferences nor signatories to the 
convention were also affected by it. On the attainment of 
independence a number of them formally acceded to the Convention and 
their participation has now taken a different dimension. It is their 
uneasiness with and stand against what I consider to be the rock (i.e. 
the essential provisions) of the Convention, which we shall discuss 
shortly, which has set in motion the current diplomatic revision of 
the paris Convention which has already been revised six times, the 
last revision being at Stockholm in 1967. Unless otherwise explicitly 
mentioned all references in this work are to the latest revised text. 
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Main Features and Provision of the Convention 
Among the major patent provisions of the Paris convention are 
Article 2 which establishes the principle of llnational treatmentn, 
Article 4 which provides for the concept of npriorityn and Article 5 
which deals with compulsory licensing and imports of patented 
products. 
National Treatmgnt (Article 2) 
Article 2(1) which provides for equal treatment for all patent 
applicants and owners by member countries of the Convention 
stip.llates: 
Nationals of each of the countries of the Union shall, 
as regards the protection of industrial property, 
enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the 
advantages that their respective laws now grant, or 
may hereafter grant, to nationals, without prejudice 
to the rights specially provided by the present 
Convention. Consequently, they shall have the same 
protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy 
against any infringement of their rights, provided 
they observe the conditions and formalities imposed 
upon nationals. 
The essence of this provision is to disallow menber countries from 
discr iminating between patent applicants and owners of different 
nationalities. So that a member country, no matter the level of 
underdevelopnent and scientific and technological capability, cannot 
discriminate in favour of its nationals as a rreans of encouraging 
indigenous inventiveness and initiative. 
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By virtue of the principle of national treatment foreigners and 
nationals are equal before the patent jurisdiction of a granting 
member country subject to exceptions provided under Section 3 of 
Article 21. Consequently reciprocity, which implies the conferral of 
reciprocal rights by member countries on their nationals and which was 
unanbiguously rejected when the principle of national treatment was 
included in the original text of 188(3, cannot be demanded by any 
member of the union. In addition, the rejection of the concept of 
reciprocity means that countries which do not have a patent law can 
adhere to the Convention and nationals thereof obtain equal treatment 
with nationals of other convention countries although the latter will 
not have any patent rights in the former countries, (See Penrose, 
1951, 64-65). 
Formal equality as provided for by Article 2 would operate to 
the mutual advantage of the convention countries if they were either 
at or almost at the same level of technological and economic 
development. However, with the present immense diversity in 
technological capabilities between the developed and the less 
developed member countries,the principle simply confers on the more 
developed members unlimited rights to the detriment of the other. 
1. Article 2(3) provides that nThe provisions of the laws of each 
of the countries of the Union relating to judicial and 
administrative procedure and to jurisdiction, and to the 
election of domicile or the designation of an agent, which may 
be required by the laws on industrial property, are expressly 
reserved". 
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The provision, therefore, does not appear to be fair, in so far 
as it mandates similar treatment for two unequals, that is, the 
advanced industrialised countries and their MNCs and the LDCs and 
their lone inventors. The need to protect and to encourage inventive 
activities of the two is obviously not alike. Logically, the 
provision to protect and encourage must, correspondingly, be distinct 
to each of them because the assumption underlying the article that 
there would be mutual benefits in the form of an exchange of patents 
and licences between members of the Union does not, especially with 
the membership of the LDCs, hold any longer. 
Any dissirrdlar treatment for DCs and LDCs members may seem to 
affect the main objective of the Paris Convention - non-discrimination 
between patent holders - it will, nevertheless, be in accord with 
existing practices in international trade whereby developed and 
developing countries institute dissirrdlar measures regarding economic 
activities of foreigners and nationals (See tm:TAD, 1977a, Paras 19 
and 2~: and Vaitsos, 1976, 9~). The institution of similar 
discriminatory measure in respect of patents may be confronted with 
practical issues such as the legal personality of subsidiaries of MNCs 
which may enable the registration of an invention in the name of the 
subsidiary, possible retaliatory measures in the area of trade 
(Vaitsos, OPe cit., 913) and the blockade of investment and the flCM of 
technology. 
As a way out Penrose (1951) has proposed an alternative strategy 
which has received the endorsement of UNCI'AD (1977a, para 83) and 
writers such as Vaitsos (.ihlQ) and Harnza (1984, 133-134). After 
having stated quite rightly that under present arrangements foreigners 
cannot be discriminated against by members of the Union and be made to 
suffer by the impoSition on them of special restriction, she went on 
further to propose, however, that: 
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••••• because the patents owned by foreigners are 
characteristically patents on inventions worked 
abroad, a de facto discrimination can be effected by 
the application of special limitations on patents thab 
are primarily worked in other countries. This method 
of dealing with foreign patents neither violates the 
International Convention nor necessarily exerts an 
uneconomic influence on the location of industry, but 
it reduces the costs to an economy of granting foreign 
patents (P.169). 
This strategy essentially involves altering the basis of concern and 
status for protection from the owner of a patent to the geographical 
origin of the patent. By this both foreigners and nationals would, 
supposedly, be offered the same treatment, thus not infringing the 
national treatment principle. Yet patents on inventions developed 
locally by either nationals or foreigners could be treated differently 
from patents on foreign inventions or inventions worked abroad but 
developed locally. How this is to be accomplished is not explained. 
While I agree with Penrose that the above strategy may possibly 
have the merit of minimising the costs to the economy of a country 
granting foreign patents, I will argue that the proposed 
discrimination based on the geographical origin of an invention rather 
than the nationality of an inventor will violate the letter and spirit 
of Article 2 (1) since every invention is traceable to an inventor a 
foreign invention may, thus be traced to a foreign inventor. 
Similarly, inventions worked abroad could also be traced to either 
foreigners or nationals. SO that by treating local inventions more 
favourably than foreign inventions countries would thus be 
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discriminating against foreign nationals who are the creators of such 
foreign inventions. This, therefore, will amount to what Ladas bas 
referred to, and is endorsed by Penrose herself, as a "circuitousn 
method of violating the Convention when he was examining the question 
as to whether imports of patented products could be impeded by heavy 
fines or custom duties (See Penrose, 1951, 76 and 77). 
It will appear, therefore, that Penrose's strategy may, 
necessarily, involve the entire revision of Article 2(1) to enable the 
LDCs to practise positive discrimination in favour of true indigenous 
inventions. SUch positive discrimination may also be extended to 
subsidiaries of MNCs engaged in genuine inventive activity. This 
should not create any difficulties in principle or practice.2 After 
all in international economic law there is now an increasing 
acceptance of nreverse preferencesn• Until this is oone it would be 
difficult for LOCs to encourage local inventive and R&D activities 
effectively by giving local inventors the much needed shelter without 
violating the letter and spirit of Article 2(1). 
Right of Priority (Article 4) 
Another major provision of the Paris Convention is Article 4 
which establishes the principle of priority. Article 4 (A) (1) states: 
2. UOCTAD takes a similar stand (1977a, para 82). Vaitsos (1976) 
however, believes it may not only be very difficult, but even 
impossible to revise this article. 
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A person who has duly filed an application for a 
patent, or for the registration of a utility model, or 
of an industrial design, or of a trademark, in one of 
the countries of the Union, or his successors in 
title, shall enjoy, for the purpose of filing in the 
other countries, a right of priority during the 
periods hereinafter stated. 
In the case of patents the priority period provided for by Article 
4 (C) (1) is twelve months. The principle of priority entitles any 
inventor who has duly filed an application for a patent in a 
convention country to have a priority of 12 months within which to 
file similar applications in other convention countries. It is 
interesting to note that the initial priority period provided by the 
1883 Convention, at a time when the means of oonmmication was not as 
efficient as today, was 6 months as opposed to the current 12 ronths 
(see Article 4 of the 1883 Convention). 
The principle of priority further provides that priority rights, 
are maintained under conditions of regular national filing (Article 4 
(A) (2) ). This is defined as "any filing that is adequate to establish 
the date on which the application was filed in the oountry ooncerned, 
whatever may be the outcome of the applicationn (Article 4(a) (3». It 
is clear, therefore, that the eventual fate of the patent application, 
that is, whether it is refused or not, does not prejudice the right of 
priori ty • This, as observed by one UNCrAD report, creates ".... the 
somewhat paradoxical situation that, although the priority right 
itself is concerned with temporal unification, the actual 
irrplernentation distinguishes between the right of priority and the 
final fate of the patent applicationn • (1977a, para 59). 
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The priority principle benefits mainly the patent applicants. 
It protects them from the loss of novelty that would occur in 
instances of non-concurrent application in countries which insist on 
absolute rather than relative criteria of novelty. Article 4(B) 
specifically establishes that the novelty of an invention will not be 
disturbed by reason of any act done in the course of the prior ity 
period. Consequently, the publication or working of an invention by 
anyone dur ing that period will have no consequence on subsequent 
applications in other member countries provided they are filed during 
the priority period. It must also be noted that Article 4(F) enables 
the sequential extension of the priority period with regard to 
elements of the invention not included in previous applications. 
An overview of Article 4 points to the conclusion that it is 
concerned more with the interest of patent applicants than the public 
interest as affected by patents. For the LDCs the effects of Article 
4 may constitute a strong disincentive to initiate research and 
development activities because of the cost a priority claim could have 
on time and money invested in such activities. Similarly, it could 
also affect the utilization of new inventions by indigenous 
enterprises since a priority right could be invoked at any time during 
the priority period. It is interesting to note that some LOCs, 
including Nigeria, have confronted this problem quite boldly. Nigeria 
has succeeded in this respect by the inclusion in its patent law of 
Section 6(4) which forestalls the situation whereby an indigenous 
inventor could be prevented by a priority claim from exploiting his 
invention (See Chapter 6). A similar line of action by the LDCs may 
reduce the negative effects of Article 4 of the Convention on their R 
& D activities. 
68 
IndElpendence of Patents (Article" bis) 
The article which together with Article 4 unduly increases the 
privileges, in terms of duration, of a patent based on priority is 
Article 4 bis (See particularly Article 4 bis (5). This article 
which was agreed upon and adopted at the 191313 Brussels revision 
conference establishes the independence of patents obtained fram the 
same invention in different countries. The main provision of Article 
4 bis (1) provides that: 
Patents applied in the various countries of the Union 
by persons entitled to the benefits of the Union shall 
be independent of patents obtained for the same 
invention in other countries, whether members of the 
Union or not. 
Section 2 of the article goes on to add further that: 
This provision is to be understood in an unrestricted 
sense, in particular, in the sense that patents 
applied for during the period of priority are 
independent, both as regards the grounds for 
invalidation and for forfeiture and as regards their 
normal duration. 
The independence of patents established by the article is, to sane 
extent, the result of the sovereignty of countries which implies that 
they are free to decide on issues such as patentability and other 
matters relating to patents generally. 
By virtue of this article patent applications which have been 
rejected, or, where granted, patents which have been nullified in one 
merrber country or even in the country of prior grant on the grounds of 
lack of patentability could still be granted or valid respectively in 
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other countries if they do not take similar actions to rej ect or 
determine them. For example, in early 197~ the u.s. Justice 
Department requested and procured the cancellation of what it deemed 
to be "fraudulently procu ..,edn ampicillin patent and the invalidation 
of ampicillin trihydurate patents. Meanwhile, patents for ampicillin 
had been taken out in more than 6~ countries and even in 1968 the 
world-wide sales by one corrpany alone and its licensees were about 
$17~ million (See Vaitsos 1976, 94 and 95: and UNCTAD, 1977a, para. 
68). In spite of the u.s. action other countries continued to grant 
monopoly privileges to the "fraudulently procurred" patents. This 
"fraudn on nost countries including the LOCs which suffer fran a 
dearth of skilled personnel is likely to continue for so long as 
Article 4 bis remains unaltered and the LDCs themselves are not able 
to undertake a meaningful screening and nonitoring exercise in respect 
of foreign patents. The setting up of a mechanism for the exchange of 
information on forfeiture proceedings between the Convention member 
countries will therefore be useful. In this respect, the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) could be beneficial to a number of LDCs. 
Moreover, if developing countries were to incorporate into their 
patent laws a provision requiring applicants for patent grants to 
submit to the competent authority the result of earlier applications 
in other countries, in particular, the result of the first application 
they may be able to reduce the cost involved in granting foreign 
patents. SUch a provision is available under Brazilian patent law 
(Article 2~, Law 5722, 1971). It would also be useful if countries in 
which the application was made were obliged to inform the others about 
the results of its examination. 
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Article 4 bis apparently seems to depart from the concept of 
"internationalism" of patent sought by the Paris Convention. It is, 
nevertheless, in complete harmony with the overall philosophy of the 
Convention to protect the interest of patentees. 
Canpulsory Licensing (Article 5) 
Though mst LOCs which grant patents for inventions are mst 
concerned that such inventions are exploited, only a small proportion 
are directly worked in these countries (UOCTAD, 1975a, paras 273-280) • 
TO deal with this problem of non-working as well as other abuses of 
the patent grant, the Paris Convention provides for the device of 
compulsory licensing. Article 5 (A) (2) of the Convention whose present 
provisions were agreed upon and adopted at the 1958 Lisbon revision 
conference states: 
Each country of the Union shall have the right to take 
legislative measures providing for the grant of 
compulsory licences to prevent the abuses which might 
result from the exclusive rights conferred by the 
patent, for example, failure to work.3 
Though compulsory licenSing procedure is conceived to be the major 
instrument for non-working of patents, as one UOCTAD report has 
demonstrated, it has in practice proved to be virtually of no value, 
(1975a), paras. 335-340) for a number of reasons. 
3. Canpare this provision with the previous Article 5(a) (2) which 
merely provided that nNevertheless each of the countries shall 
have the right to take the necessary legislative measures to 
prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the 
exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for examplE/failure to 
work". 
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One of such factors is the provision of Article 5(A) (4) which 
states: 
An application for compulsory licence may not be made 
on the ground of failure to work or insufficient 
working before the expiration of a period of four 
years from the date of filing of the patent 
application or three years from the date of the grant 
of the patent, which period last expires; it shall be 
refused if the patentee justifies his inaction by 
legitimate reasons. SUch a compulsory licence shall be 
non-exclusive and shall not be transferable, even in 
the form of the grant of a sub-licence, except with 
that part of the enterprise or goodwill using such 
licence. 
The strict application of this provision is likely to prolong the time 
lag to obtain a compulsory licence more than the periods indicated. 
This may be so especially in cases where prior examination as to 
substance is required before a grant, and also where the application 
for a licence is to be determined by the judicial rather than the 
administrati ve branch as recommended by the BIRPI Model Law for 
developing countr ies (See Section 44).4 This has in fact, been 
adopted by Nigeria, (see Schedule 1, Part 1, Patents and Designs 
Decree, 1970) and it is still continued despite the fact that the 
BIRPI Model Law on this issue has been revised by the moo l-lodel Law 
which proposes the patent office to be the authority corrpetent to 
4. Some LDCs have adopted it (See UNCTAD, 1975, para 339). 
However, Brazil, India, Israel, Mexico and Peru have recognised 
administrative jurisdiction on this matter. 
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grant COI11fXllsory or non-voluntary licence (See S.148). Furthermore, 
the option of MNCs to grant the first compulsory licence to any of 
their subsidiaries could widen the time lag (Vaitsos, 1976, 91; and 
UNCTAD 1977a, para. 35). 'lhis may mean further delays before any 
decision to grant a second licence could be made. Consequently, the 
usefulness of a compulsory licence even if obtained eventually would 
be considerably diminished as compared with what it would have been in 
the absence of such delays. The abuses would have continued for a 
longer period of time, and the patent would not only be close to the 
end of its life span but the invention or the technology itself would 
have become obsolete. 
A significant aspect of article 5(A) (4) which is endorsed by 
paragraph 2 of Section 34 of the BIRPI Model Law and again adopted by 
Nigeria (S.4 Sch. 1, Part 1) and other LDCs relates to the provision 
that a compulsory licence should be refused if a patentee justifies 
his inaction· by "legitimate reasons". The concept of "legitimate 
reasons" or "justifiable" actions is unclear and its interpretation 
would largely be dependent on the will of the authorities concerned. 
The notion of "force majeure" has been suggested to be appropriate in 
the circumstances (see UNCTAD 1977a, para 31). This may find favour 
with both developed and developing countries since it is generally 
accepted in international legal transactions. 
It is interesting to note that the BIRPI Model Law (S.43 (2» 
goes further to propose the possible cancellation of a non-voluntary 
licence if the state of affairs which initially justified its grant 
has ceased to exist. This is merely a reccmnendation and may not have 
much significance if not adopted. However, if it should be adopted, 
as Nigeria (s.l13, Sch. 1, Pt. 1) and other LDCs have done, then, 
besides the creation of an unavoidable uncertainty in the patent 
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system of the adopting country, it will also lead to unnecessary cost 
and inconvenience to licencees who would invest capital to exploit the 
invention and later have the licence withdrawn. 
Table 2:2 
Rm'ber of CoopJ.lSOIy Licences Granted in selected Countries 
Period 
COVered 
No. of am>licatims for CgIJ:111 soIl' Licence 
COUntries Filed Refused Abandcxled Granted 
~ 
Ghana 19~~-1984 None None 
Nigeria 19~~-1984 None None 
Morocco 1958-1963 None None 
Cuba 1958-1963 None None 
India 4 1 
Philippines 8 None 
Rep. of Korea 1 1 
~ 
U.K. 1959-1968 57 6 
canada 1935-197~ 192 14 72 79 
SWitzerland 1952-1963 None None 
Japan 1958-1963 None None 
Denmark 1953-197" 7 1 3 
Poland 1958-1963 7 None 
OOURCES: 1. Registrar-General' s Department, Accra, Ghana. 
2. Patent and Trademarks office, Min. of Trade & Commerce, 
Lagos, Nigeria1 and 
3. UNCTAD, 1975a, p.50. 
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Even when it is possible to obtain a compulsory licence within a 
reasonable time period and without any apprehension of a subsequent 
cancellation it is doubtful whether local licensees would be able to 
work the patented invention successfully witoout the necessary 
know-how. Unless the disclosure of the invention is really adequate 
and sufficient, and the licensee' possesses the requisite technical 
skills the prospects of a successful working on the basis of the 
compulsory licence are bleak. All these including the non-exclusive 
grant of the compulsory licenceS do render this licence as a very 
unattractive and ineffective patent abuse-checking mechanism. As 
Table 1 illustrates compulsory licence is neither popularly used nor 
easily available to the applicant in both the developed and developing 
countries. 
From the table it is very clear that the use of compulsory 
licensing in the LDCs is almost non-existent. This may create the 
wrong inpression that abuses of patent grant or non-working do not 
occur in these countries. This is also true of some developed 
countries. Canada seems to be an exception, and even here the total 
grant of licences is not very impressive. The grants represent an 
average of n2.3 licences per year or only 0.ln per cent of the average 
grant of patents in one yearn. A significant factor contributing to 
the high number of the grant of licence is the change of the patent 
law in 1969 which permitted COJnIXllsory licences for medicines to be 
granted either for nanufacture or importation (UN:TAD, 1975a, para. 
337). 
5. Some countries including Peru grant exclusive compulsory 
licences. 
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In spite of the inefficiency of compulsory licences, forfeiture 
or revocation which may be more effective in dealing with patent 
abuses are, according to Article S(A) (3), not available until after a 
further two years from the first conpulsory licence. This iIIplies 
that abuse of a patent privilege by a patentee can continue for a long 
period before it can be effectively checked. 
Inports (SAl. and 5 Q,laterl 
One other provision which touches directly on the interest of 
the LDCs is Article SA (1) which permits irnportation by patentees 
without losing their monopoly privilege. The working of patents in 
developing countries is of paramount importance to their economic 
development, and it might have contributed to inducing their 
participation in the international patent system. Their starn against 
i.rrports is so strong that they do not recognise them as conduits of 
technology transfer, though I have already indicated the usefulness, 
in some cases, of iIIports as technology transfer mechanism and Greif 
(1981 and 1982) has also painstakingly endeavoured to denonstrate 
this. Tb these countries the working of patents cannot be substituted 
for the importation of patented products. Nevertheless, the 
Convention by article S(A) (1) has provided quite explicitly that: 
The importation by the patentee into the country where 
the patent has been granted of articles manufactured 
in any of the countries of the Union shall not entail 
forfeiture of the patent. 
This article which was aimed essentially at the then French law which 
provided for forfeiture for the importation of a patented product by 
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patentee (Penrose, 1951, 75) also owes its place in the Convention to 
the "inexcusable interpretation" of the French word "exploiter" by 
Senator Bozerian, the Chairman of the 188r;, Paris Conference. He 
misconstrued the word "exploiter" (to work) which appeared in the text 
of the Convention to include "vendren (to sell) (i..tU.Q). This 
interpretation as Penrose rightly points out "was completely wrong in 
both the legal and popular usagen (.iQi.Q). 
Nevertheless, Article 5 (A) (1) has survived many revisions of the 
Paris Convention and is held dear by patentees. To ascertain the 
effect of this article it must be analysed in the context of Article 5 
as a whole. The effect of Article 5 (A) (1), as we have already 
observed, is the creation of import monopoly. It may be noted that 
some LDCs have taken steps either to erode this monopoly as 
exemplified by the Nigerian law (Schedule 1, Part II) or to deprive 
the patent holder of import nonopoly right as under Mexican and ArXlean 
pact legislation (see below). 
A second element of the import monopoly issue rests on Article 5 
quater. This article stipulates: 
When a product is imported into a country of the Union 
where there exists a patent protecting a process of 
manufacture of the said product, the patentee shall 
have all the rights, with regard to the imported 
product, as are accorded to him by the domestic law of 
the country of importation, on the basis of the 
process patent, with respect to products manufactured 
in that country. 
This article which was introduced into the Convention at the Lisbon 
revision conference in 1958 is of imnense significance to products, 
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such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals where the control of production 
processes is very important. Not surprisingly, it has been suggested 
that the chemical and pharmaceutical industries might have promoted 
its introduction (Vaitsos, 1976, 93). 
The article is applicable only to countries of the Union which 
recognise the grant of patent monopoly to na process of manufacturen. 
It must also be noted that Article 5 quater is applicable when the 
protection furnished by the process patent is extended to products 
manufactured by the use of that process. This practice has been 
suggested by the BIRPI Model Law, and Nigeria by virtue of S.6(l) (b) 
of its 197~ Patent Decree has adopted it. This is also true of same 
other LOCs. 
By virtue of Article 5 quater importation of a product the 
production process of which is patented by any party without the 
licence of the patentee constitutes an infringement whether there is 
in existence any local production in the irrporting country or not. 
Referring to this article one ~ report commented thus: 
This is one article in the Paris Convention that per 
se provides for a privilege of the patentee. Control 
over process is enough to give the import monopoly and 
thereby control the domestic market in the patent 
granting country (provided, as is almost always the 
case in developing countries that the privileges of 
the patentee include sale and use), (1977a, p.53). 
Article 5 quater obviously conflicts with any endeavour to expunge the 
exclusive right of importation on products manufactured abroad by a 
patented process. In addition, since in practical terms most of the 
patents are not exploited within the territories of developing 
countries, the article entails the acceptance of the import monopoly 
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if sale and use privileges are present, as it is a.lroost always the 
case, in their national legislation. Clearly, developing countries cb 
not derive any merit from the sustenance of this provision and the 
exclusion of it may be a reasonable target in the ongoing diplomatic 
revision of the Convention. 
As a result of all these negative effects of the above 
provisions it has been concluded that the IDCs cb not deri ve any 
significant benefit from the international patent system.6 (Grundman, 
197~; Vaitsos, 1972; Penrose 1973; ~reer, 1973; and UNCTAD, 1975a). 
Consequently, Greer, for example has suggested that these countries 
"should abandon patents en masse" (1973, 259). However, while the 
LDCs do accept the view that the cost involved in their participation 
in the international patent system greatly outweighs the benefits, 
they do not, at least by their continuing participation, seem to 
sympathise with the idea of abandonment. Instead they have so far 
preferred the revision of those provisions of the Convention which had 
adverse effects on their economies. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that, to some extent, through their initiative they have set in JIOtion 
the current revision of the Convention. 
ibe Diplanatic Conference on the Revisim of the Paris Cmymtim 
The idea for the further revision of the Paris Convention to 
include additional provisions of special benefit to developing 
countries was put forward in 1974 and consequently led to the setting 
6. Similarly, the Canadian Working Paper on Patent Law Revision 
(1976) raises doubts about the benefits Canada derives from the 
international patent system. 
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up of the Ad hoc Group of Governmental Experts for the Revision of the 
Paris Convention (WIPO, 1985,2). 
At its second session the Group of Experts adopted a Declaration 
of Objectives of the Revision of the Paris Convention which include, 
inter alia, (1) the promotion of the actual working of inventions in 
each country, (2) the encouragement of inventive activity in 
developing countries, (3) the facilitation of the developnent of 
technology by developing countries and the improvement of the 
conditions for the transfer of technology under fair and reasonable 
terms, (4) the increase of the potential of developing countries in 
judging the real value of invention for which protection is sought, 
and (5) the proper balancing of the needs for econanic and social 
development of countries on the one hand and the rights of patentees 
on the other (ibid.). 
In addition, the Declaration of Objectives included 
consideration for certain defined cases in which exceptions or 
alterations to the principles of national treatment and independence 
of patents as well as preferential treatment for LDCs could be 
permitted. Also included was the provision for a maximum degree of 
freedom to each country to adopt appropriate measures on the 
legislative and administrative levels, consistent with its needs and 
social and economic developnent (WIOO, 1985, 3). These really are 
bold recommendations or moves which are in tune with present 
international economic development. 
In pursuit of these objectives a Provisional Steering Committee 
of the Diplomatic Conference was set up by the Executive Committee of 
the Paris Union. '!he former Committee established the provisional 
Rules of Procedure of the Diplomatic Conference and took the necessary 
decisions concerning the preparation of the documents of the 
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Conference. It is these documents embodying the basic proposals for 
revision prepared by the Director General of WHO and adopted and 
forwarded to the Diplomatic Conference by the Preparatory 
Intergovernmental Committee which serve as the basis of the current 
revision exercise. These proposals contain amendments to existing 
articles and the creation of new articles. The existing articles 
sought to be amended include Articles SA and 5 quater, and the new 
articles comprise Articles A and B and 12 bis. 
The proposal to amend Article SA deals, especially, with the 
importation of articles covered by patents, failure to work patents, 
abuses of patent rights, exploitation of patents in the public 
interest and special provisions for developing countries. In the case 
of non~orking or insufficient working, it would be possible for any 
country to provide for the grant of non-voluntary licences to work the 
patented invention. In addition, forfeiture and revocation would be 
available as subsidiary measures. In respect of abuses of the patent 
forfeiture and revocation would be available. Finally, where the 
public interest requires exploitation of the invention, it is proposed 
to permit national laws to authorise the exploitation of the invention 
by the state or any person designated by the competent national 
authorities. The major significant innovation is that shorter periods 
and easier requirements in invoking these measures have been proposed 
in favour of the LOCs (see the proposed Article 5A(8) (a) 1 also see 
WIPO, 1985, 4 and WIPO, 1979). Also by virtue of proposed Article 
5A(1) (b) importation would not constitute working of the patented 
invention. With respect to Article 5 quater, the basic proposal is 
that it be expunged entirely from the Convention, or at least the lOCs 
be exempted fram its obligations. These are very bold alterations to 
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Article 5 which could go a long way to meet some of the demands of the 
LDCs concerning the article but could provoke a strong resistance from 
the developed countries. 
The proposed new Article A seeks the reduction by one half of 
fees payable by inventors in the LDCs when applying for patent rights 
in other countries of the Union. Article B on the other ham provides 
for the increase by one half of the priority period to 18 months in 
favour of an applicant for an industrial property right who is a 
national or resident of a developing country. Though these articles 
if eventually adopted may give the LDCs some preferential treatment, 
they would not alter the basic effects of the concepts of national 
treatment and prior ity. The other new article, which appears to be 
more useful, is Article 12 bis which relates to the provision of 
information regarding patent applications filed for the same invention 
abroad, to the industrial property office of the country in which a 
patent has been applied for. The proposed article entitles a patent 
applicant or patentee to receive information concerning a 
corresponding application or patent for the same invention in any 
country of the Union where such information is required by another 
country of the Union. However, where the latter doubts the 
information furnished by the applicant it may request the former to 
provide it. 
The first session of the Diplomatic COnference on the Revision 
of the Paris Convention took place in Geneva from February 4 to March 
4, 198". This session mainly occupied itself with the Rules of 
Procedure to govern the Conference. Nevertheless, during this session 
Article 12 bis and another two articles were adopted by the competent 
main Committee. The second session of this Conference took place in 
Nairobi from 28 September to 24 October, 1981. This session dealt 
82 
essentially with Article SA of the Convention. After prolonged debate 
a new text of this article ms tentatively agreed upon by the IOCs 
(the Groop of 77), the OCs (Group B) and the Socialist Cruntries 
(Group D), with the United States, in particular, owosing sone of the 
provisions, (WIPO 1982, 182 and WIPO, 1985, 9). SUrprisingly enough, 
during the third session of the Diplomatic Conference held in Geneva 
from 4 to 31iJ October 1982, and from 23 to 27 Novenber 1982, the 
controversial Article SA on mich progress was made at the Nairobi 
Conference ms only negotiated in an informal body and not in the 
competent Main Committee. The fourth session of the Diplomatic 
Conference mich took place in Geneva from 27 February to 24 March, 
1984 also could not reach any agreenent on Article SA am it is 
difficult to surmise how many Diplomatic Conferences it will take for 
a decision to be reached on the article. However, it will be very 
naive to think the developed countries will give in so easily. 
It is clear from the discussion of the Paris Convention that its 
provisions relating to the concepts of national treatnent and priority 
as well as the subjects of compulsory licence am importation do not 
operate in the favour of the IOCs, and its for this reason that they 
are seeking a revision of the convention, particularly the provisions 
they consider to affect them JOOst. However, in view of the developed 
countries' opposition to any fundanental changes in these provisiOns it 
will not be without greater difficulty that the LDCs will get 
acconplished the revision as required by them. 
It is \lwUrth nentioning that in spite of the difficulties with 
the revision of the Paris Convention some positive efforts and 
policies on patents as well as the transfer of technology have been 
initiated at the international, national and regional levels. 
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At the international level UNCTAD appears to be one of the most 
active organisations -involved in the field of industrial property and 
the transfer of technology. 
Patents 
In the area of patents UNCTAD has contributed to efforts aimed 
at the revision of the Paris Convention. Its efforts in this respect 
has been remarkable not because a revision of the Convention has been 
accorrp1ished, but because they have succeeded in creating an awareness 
among the LDCs of the inadequacies in the international patent system. 
Through its efforts - mainly reports - UNCTAD has been able to 
draw the attention of LDCs to the lop-sidedness of the. Paris 
Convention and how it affected them, and has suggested relevant areas 
as targets for revision (See, for example, UNCTAD, 1977a). In 
addition, UNCTAD's contribution in this respect can be seen in the 
useful suggestions in the changes in LOes' domestic patent system in 
order to enable them use it as a tool for national deve10prent (See 
UNCTAD, (1975a), and (1975e) and (1981». 
Transfer of Technology: JH:'l2\D's Code of Conduct at the Transfer of 
~ggy 
Though the contribution of UNCl'AD in the area of technology 
transfer is diverse, it is usually associated with its code of conduct 
on the transfer of technology. 
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The first initiatives for the elaboration of a code of conduct 
that would establish world-wide acceptable norms and standards of 
transfer of technology transactions were spearheaded by the LDCs both 
inside and outside the UN forums and subsequently endorsed by the 
international comnunity. To give rreaning to this endorsanent the UN 
General Assembly, at its sixth special session in May 1974, by 
Resolution 32~2(S-VI) on the Programme of Action on the establishment 
of a moo, called for the formulation of an international code of 
conduct on the transfer of technology corresponding to the needs and 
conditions prevalent in developing countries. The Assembly reiterated 
this call by its adoption of resolution 3362 (S-VII) at its seventh 
special session on development and international co-operation (UNCTAD, 
1985b). It decided, in the same resolution, that work on the Code 
should be continued within UNCTAD, where an intergovernrrental group of 
experts was already engaged in the preparation of a draft outline to 
serve as a basis for the formulation of a code of conduct. 
Following the above resolutions of the General Assembly, 
resolution 89(IV) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development held in Nairobi in 1976, and the decision of the General 
Assembly, by its resolution 32/188 of December 1977, to convene a UN 
Conference on the Code under the auspices of UNCTAD to negotiate the 
draft and take all decisions necessary for its adoption six sessions 
have so far been held between 1978 and 1985. The sixth being held in 
Geneva from 13 May to 5 June 1985 (UNCTAD, 1985b) to consider the 
present draft. 
The present draft code consists of a preamble and nine chapters. 
Chapter One deals with definitions and scope of application, Chapter 
TWo, objectives and principles, Chapter Three, national regulation of 
transfer of technology transactions, and Chapter Four, restrictive 
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practices. Chapters Five, Six, Seven, Eight and Nine deal with 
responsibilities and obligations of parties to transfer of technology 
transactions, special treatment for developing countries, 
international collaboration, international institutional machinery, 
and applicable law and settlement of disputes respectively. 
The substantive provisions of the draft code, following UNCTAD 
classification, may be classified into two broad categories: (1) those 
concerning the regulation of transfer of technology transactions and 
the conduct of the parties to them, and (ii) those relating to action 
to be taken by Government, either on account of their national 
policies or in order to meet their conunitments to the code. The first 
category of provisions are contained in Chapters Four, Five and Nine, 
and the second contained in Chapters Three, Six, Seven and Eight. The 
provisions of the coCe falling under the second category are all 
agreed upon, except for two subparagraphs in Chapter Eight in respect 
of the nature of the international institutional nachinery and the 
nature, mandate and timing of the Review Conference (UNcrAD, 1985b). 
On the other hand, most of the issues which are still 
outstanding in the draft code fall under the first category, 
particularly under Chapters Four and Nine. By contrast, all the 
provisions of Chapter Five, with the exception of the subparagraph on 
confidentiality have been successfully negotiated and agreed on by all 
regional groups. With respect to Chapter Four, the conference has so 
far succeeded in drawing up a list of 14 practices to be avoided by 
parties to technology transfer transactions. However, the extent of 
application of three of these practices namely, export restrictions, 
improvement or grant-back proviSions and post expiration restrictions 
are yet to be elaborated and clarified. Another stumbling block to 
the negotiations on Chapter Four has been, and still is, the 
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formulation of an introductory section, that is a chapeau, which would 
set forth the characteristics of the practices to be avoided, the 
circumstances under which they should be avoided, and the 
applicability of the provisions of the chapter to transactions between 
affiliated enterprises. It is worth mentioning that while 
considerable progress was made during the sixth session of the 
conference in this regard, same differences still exist among regional 
groups. 
In respect of Chapter Nine, which has not yet been formally 
drafted, while it does appear that there is a broad conSensus on the 
formulation of the provisions on conciliation and arbitration, there 
are still differences in the approaches proposed by regional groups 
with respect to the provisions on the choice of law. Consequently, 
during the sixth session held in May 1985, negotiations on the chapter 
centred on reconciling the differences between the Group B countries 
and to some extent the Group D countr ies which favour a clearer 
recognition of the contractual freedom of the parties to choose the 
law applicable to their contractual relations, and the Group of 77 
which wish to enphasise the observance by the parties, in choosing the 
law applicable to their relations, of the binding rules of the laws of 
their countries which cannot be derogated from the contract7 (See 
UNCTAD, 1985b). These differences remain outstanding and it is hoped 
that the efforts initiated by the President of the sixth session will 
be pursued further to bridge the gap between the regional groups. 
7. For the respective positions of the various regional groups see 
{]OCTAD (1985a, appendix B-E) or (]OCTAD (198~a). See also 
Thompson, 1982, and Hamza 1984 for discussion on these 
positions. 
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While these efforts are being pursued at the international level 
same countries have taken steps to streamline their patent systems and 
technology transfer regulatory regimes in order to rrake them JOOre 
relevant to their econ0II!i. 
NatiQNll Polici~ 
Patents 
The growing criticism on the role and benefits of the industrial 
property system, particularly patents, has resulted, in the 1979s, in 
reforms in the patent laws of a number of countries including sane 
Latin American countries such as Brazil in 1971, the Andean Pact 
countries in 1974 (Decision 85), Mexico in 1976, as well as India in 
197". These countries have reformed their patent legislation aiming, 
inter alia, at redefining the concept of "invention", on the basis of 
a subjective concept requiring inventive activity as an essential 
element of the invention (See Articles 1 and 2 of Decision 85). 
In addition, these reform seek to clarify and strengthen the 
conditions for the working of patents (see Article 83 of the 1970 
Indian Patent law). To this end the Mexican law on inventions and 
traderrarks of 1975, for example, enbodies a specific definition of 
exploitation which includes "the perrranent use of the patented process 
or rranufacture of the product covered by the patent" (Article 43). 
Similarly, some countries, particularly the Andean Pact members, have 
provided shorter patent grant duration of about five years with a 
possible additional five years provided the patent is adequately 
worked (Article 29 of Decision 85). Peru and India have also provided 
shorter period of duration. For the same purpose JOOst of these 
countries have provided for compulsory licensing as a prirrary remedy 
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against non-working and expanded the grounds for its procurement. 
Moreover, the reforms also seek to eliminate the rconopoly of 
iIrports granted to the patentee. For example, the Mexican law and 
Decision 85 do not only exclude inportation from the meaning of 
exploitation (See Articles 43 and 31 respectively), but also except it 
from the patent monopoly grant. The proviso to Article 37 of the 
Mexican law provides explicitly that patents "shall not confer the 
right to ilrport the patented product or a product manufactured by 
means of the patented process". Similarly, the proviso to Article 28 
of Decision 85 also provides that a patent "shall not confer an 
exclusive right to import the patented product or one manufactured 
under his patented process". All these are aimed at canbatting the 
abuses of the import monopoly of patentees and ensuring the domestic 
working of inventions for which monopoly grants are conferred. 
Finally, the reforms are also aimed at suppressing pltentability 
in certain economic sectors. Article S(c) of Decision 85 excludes, 
inter alia, from pltentability "pharmaceutical products, medications, 
active therapeutic substances, beverages and food for human, or animal. 
or vegetable consumption". This provision, like the others under the 
Decision, is currently in force in Ecuador, Colombia and Peru. 
Similarly, Mexican and Brazilian laws on inventions also except 
pharmaceutical products from patentability. The exclusion 
particularly of pharmaceutical products from the grant of pltents in 
most Latin American countries may be attributed to the unreasonabr 
high cost of imported drugs and pharmaceutical products. In the case 
of products falling under other economic sectors, their exclusion from 
patentability, as in the case of Decision 85, may be founded on 
economic development grounds (see Article See) of the Decision 85). 
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It is clear from the above that some LOCs have reformed their 
patent laws to make them rore relevant to their economies as well as 
assist in their economic develo};ment process. While there has been a 
decline in patent applications, particularly from foreign application 
since these reforms were introduced, it is early yet to know their 
full impact. 
Transfer of Technology 
Another area where national efforts have been evident is the 
transfer of technology. During the 1960' s a set of circumstances 
brought the attention of governments especially of the Latin American 
countries to the characteristics and effects of technology inpcrts. 
Arrong these were the impact of royal ties and technical fees on the 
balance of payments, the impoSition of restrictive practices, as well 
as the need to control technology imports on a broader basis and to 
increase the control of the host country's technological development 
and econ0nri. 
All this called for government intervention in the technology 
market which is imperfect and places recipient enterprises of the LDCs 
in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the DCs technology suppliers. 
Consequently, technology transfer regimes were established to regulate 
technology transactions. In general, the objectives of these regimes 
include the improvement of the commercial conditions of agreements, 
especially as regards prices charged by technology suppliers, the 
elimination of restrictive practices and the unpackaging of different 
corrponents included in technology transfers. Other aims of these 
regimes encompass the avoidance of duplicating available technology, 
improvement of conditions for the adaptation and diffusion 
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of the transferred technology and the regulation of intra firm 
operations of transnational enterprises (see Correa, 1981). 
The first general regulation in Latin America which 
systematically dealt with payments for transfer of technology is the 
Brazilian law 4,131 of 1962 (on foreign investments). It prescribed 
registration with the SUperintendencia de Moeda e de Credito (now the 
Central Bank of Brazil) of agreements involving technical assistance 
or royalties and duration. One of the major innovations it introduced 
was to prohibit a foreign subsidiary from paying royalties for patents 
or trademark licences to its parent or controlling company (.iQiQ..). 
This law as amended in 1964, law 5,772 (Codigo de Propriedade 
Industrial) and Normative Act No. ,:US of 1975 constitute the legal 
framework for controlling technology transfer transactions in Brazil. 
The Brazilian experiment was followed, in 1967, by the establishment 
of new agencies in Colombia and Chile to regulate technology transfer 
transactions (ihl.d). 
All these experiences influenced the formulation of the transfer 
of technology policy of the Andean Group which resulted in Decision 24 
(1970). This Decision which regulates the transfer of technology also 
controls the access to and operation of foreign capital in the Andean 
countries. In addition, it has determined the creation of specific 
bodies for the approval of technology transfer agreements and foreign 
investments and identified a set of restrictive practices which are to 
be avoided. The Andean Pact members including Bolivia, Colorrbia, 
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela have formally incorporated Decision 24. 
Apart from the Latin American countries others which have 
introduced measures to regulate technology transfer transactions 
include India and the Philippines. India initiated the control of the 
transfer of technology transactions after independence in 1947, and 
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has, therefore, the longest experience in this field. Three main 
stages can be distinguished in the Indian experience. During the 
first stage, which covered the period after Independence up to 1968, 
foreign collaboration agreements were approved in connexion with the 
implementation of the general industrial policy by the Foreign 
Agreements Committee. In the course of the second stage, which 
covered the period between 1969 and 1978, a more developed system of 
control was established. This included the publication of guidelines 
regarding foreign collaboration agreements in 1969 and the 
promulgation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1973 embodying 
provisions for technology transfer transactions by foreign CMned 
companies. This period, especially after 1974 when a Technical 
Evaluation Cornnittee was created, witnessed the beginning of the 
economic and technological evaluation of technology transfer 
agreements. The third stage, initiated in 1978, has included 
considerable improvement in the system of control, provisions which 
eliminate restrictive practices, the implementation of a nonitoring 
system and revision of the guidelines relating to foreign 
collaboration agreements (See UNCTAD, 1980b). 
Finally, the Philippines Technology Transfer Board (TI'B) was 
created in 1978 and entrusted with the responsibility of registering 
and evaluating all technology transfer agreements. Before the 
creation of the TTB technology transfer transactions were approved by 
the Board of Investments on the basis of guidelines provided by a 1973 
Central Bank circular (Bautista, 1980). 
In almost all cases the regulatory regimes of the above 
mentioned countries exclude from technology transfer transactions 
anticompetitive practices such as export restrictions, tie-ins, 
grant-backs and restrictions on R&D. They also prescribe royalty 
ceiling and duration for all agreements. Furthermore, they exclude 
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other practices which may have adverse effects on their economies. 
Though some of these regimes are in their enbryonic stage, trost of 
them have registered some success in the reduction of royalty payments 
and duration of agreements and exclusion of certain restrictive 
practices. However, in view of the weak tronitoring system in most of 
these countries it is difficult to measure the degree of their 
recorded success. It may also be mentioned that these controls have 
not affected the inflow of technology into the countries concerned 
(UNCTAD,1980b). 
Regional Efforts 
In addition to the international and national efforts, attempts 
have been made and are still being made on a regional basis to improve 
upon the patent and technology transfer regimes, as well as technology 
development. 
Patents 
One of the earliest regional agreements in the field of 
industrial property was the Montevideo's Convention on Patents of 
Invention of 6 January 1899.' This was followed by the Inter American 
Convention on Inventions signed at Buenos Aires on 20 August 1900, and 
the Convention on Patents and Privileges signed at Caracas on 18 July 
1911 between the countries which form the present Andean Group. 
Presently, the Andean Pact, and in particular its Decision 85, already 
referred to, represents one of the most genuine regional efforts in 
relation to patents. 
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In Europe, the European Patent Convention (EPC) signed in Munich 
in 1973 by 16 European countries, and the Community Patent Convention 
(CPC) signed in 1976 by the E.E.C. countries represent an attempt to 
construct a supra-national patent system. The CPC provides for a 
unitary grant throughout the E.E.C. It is, unlike the EPC, not yet in 
force. 
The African and ~~agasy Industrial Property Convention (O~~I) 
signed at Libreville on 13 September 1962 by 13 French-speaking 
African countries representS the first attempt towards greater 
unification and administration of patents on the African continent. 
The CAMPI has a central patent office in Yaounde (Cameroon) which 
registers the filing of patent applications and issues patent grants 
which have effect in each nernber state. However, the rights ensuIng 
fram the grant are regarded as separate national rights for which the 
courts of the individual countries are competent. 
A recent African regional endeavour with respect to industrial 
property was the adoption at Lusaka in December 1976, of an agreement 
on the creation of an Industrial Property Organisation for English 
Speaking Africa (ESARIPO) by IOOstly English speaking African countries 
including Ghana and Nigeria. This agreement was signed on 9 December 
1976. In spite of ESARIPO' s present menbership (English-speaking 
African countries) it is opened to other states which are members of 
the United Nations Economic Camnission for Africa (tJNOCA). So far 
ESARIPO has came out with a model law on patents (1978) for its member 
states, some provisions of which we shall discuss in due course, and a 
model law on trademarks. The model law on patents was prepared by the 
Secretariats of WIPO and UNECA under the auspices of ESARIPO's 
committee for patent matters. 
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It may be added that the WIPO, which was set up to succeed the 
United Industrial Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property 
(BIRPI) by the WIPO Convention adopted at stockholm in 1967 by the 
same diplomatic conference which revised the Paris Convention for the 
sixth time, has also contributed to regional efforts, particularly 
among the LDCs. It has offered advice and technical assistance to 
ESARIPO and CAMPI and others. It has also atterrpted to harmonize 
LDCs' patent laws and bring them into line with the Paris Convention. 
This is manifested in the provisions of its Model Law for developing 
countries on inventions (Vol. 1) published in 1979, which is a 
revision of its predecessor's Model Law, the BIRPI Model Law for 
developing countries on inventions published in 1965. We shall 
discuss some of the major provisions of these model laws in subsequent 
chapters. 
7.r~fer of Technology 
The Andean pact efforts and policies (see Decision 24) already 
referred to, represent one of the most genuine regional efforts in the 
regulation and development of technology. It is appropr iate to 
mention also that WIPO has contributed to regional efforts, 
particularly among LOCs. It has published a guide on the legal 
aspects of the negotiation and preparation of industrial property 
licences and technology transfer agreements appropriate to the needs 
of the LDCs (WIFO, 1977) and a WIPO (198QJ) Model Law for developing 
countries on inventions (Vol. II) which covers know-how. 
In Africa, regional efforts or policies in the regulation of 
technology transfer are absent. Nevertheless, the establishment in 
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1977 of the African Regional Centre for Technology CARCT) which is 
based in Dakar, Senegal represents an Afr ican reg ional effort in 
respect of the development and utilization of technology. The ARCT is 
an inter-governmental institution established under the auspices of 
the UN and Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Its objectives 
include, inter alia, contributing to the developnent and use of 
technology within its members states, strengthening their 
technological capabilities and assisting in the formulation of 
technology polices as an integral part of planned scientific, 
technological and socio-economic developnent. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have discussed the development of the 
international patent system and examined the provisions of the Paris 
Convention on the concepts of national treatment and priority, 
independence of patents, canpulsory licensing and importation. In 
addition, we have assessed the diplomatic revision exercise regarding 
the Paris Convention and surveyed various international, national and 
regional efforts and policies aimed at improving the patent system as 
well as the transfer and development of technology, particularly for 
the benefits of developing countries. 
It is clear from the above that in addition to the efforts 
towards the revision of the Paris Convention sorre LOCs have taken 
steps to align their patent systems and technology transfer regulatory 
regimes to the needs and development of their respective economies. 
These steps, in respect of patents, are based, inter alia, on the 
exploitation of inventions in the granting country and exclusion of 
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import monopolies. As regards technology transfer, they are based on 
policies relating to the country's balance of payment position, the 
exclusion of available technology and the ability to use the 
transferred technology to develop the country's technological 
capability and econo~. In the subsequent chapters we intend to 
investigate the national patent and technology transfer laws of both 
Ghana and Nigeria, and, in the process, ascertain whether they are 
underpinned by similar or any other considerations. 
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aJAP.l'ER 3 
THE mSlPRICAL I>EVEUlPMml' OF THE PATENI' SYs;I.Bf 
IN GmNA AND NIGERIA 
Introduction 
The historical development of the patent system of roost less 
developed countries, especially those which did experience, and are 
still experiencing colonial rule can, generally, be traced to the 1879 
Patent Conference held in Paris where it was agreed that the patent 
laws and systems of the colonial masters should be extended to the 
colonies (Penrose, 1951, 53). It may, however, appear that in the 
case of countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and the former British West 
African colonies this agreement to stretch the patent laws of the 
metropolitan countries to them did not have any immediate impact until 
1898. 
'11le Historical Deyelopnent of Patent Laws of Slana and Nigeria 
The historical development of the patent system of all the 
former British west African colonies including Ghana (the then Gold 
Coast) and Nigeria can be specifically traced to the development of 
the system in the Gold Coast. In fact, as we shall shortly see, it 
was the final draft of the then Gold Coast's patent bill which, served 
as the basis of the various patent laws of the remaining mentioned 
colonies including Nigeria. 
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The Introduction of Patent Law and S,ystem in the '1bEn Gold Coast 
The development of the present patent system of present Ghana 
(the then Gold Coast) can be traced to the year 1898 when the 
Secretary of state for the Colonies sent a despatchl transmitting a 
copy of a letter from Messrs. H. & W. Pataky, patent agents, to the 
then Acting Governor of the Colony of Gold Coast enquiring generally 
about the procedure for obtaining patent protection on the Gold Coast 
for an invention patented in England. The response from the Acting 
Governor was that patent protection for invention could not be 
obtained in the Colony because there was no patent legislation there. 
The receipt of this response from the Governor put the need of 
enacting a patent law for the Gold Coast under the consideration of 
the Colonial Office2• Consequently, the latter asked the Board of 
Trade for its advice on the need for a patent law for the Gold Coast 
to be modelled on that of British Honduras dated 18623• 
1. This is despatch No. 52 of 28 January 1898 in C.O. 96 Gold Coast 
1898 Vol. XXVII, 336. 
2. See Despatch No. 2~8 of 25 May 1898 in C.O. 96 Gold Coast 1898, 
Vol. XX, 329 and also Secretary of state for the Colonies' 
letter dated 3~ April 1898 to the Board of Trade in C.O. 96 Gold 
Coast 1898, Vol. IV, 313, Mar 9-31. 
3. See Secretary of state for the Colonies' letter dated 30 April 
1898 to the Board. 
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In its reaction4 the Board of Trade, after consultations with 
the Controller-General of Patents, endorsed the desirability of 
enacting a patent law on the Gold Coast, but suggested, mwever, for 
the consideration of the Colonial Office that it should be modelled on 
the British patents, Designs and Trade Marks Acts 1883 to 1888. The 
Board also pointed out that similar laws had been introduced in sone 
colonies, and it suggested the Patent Act No. 5 of 1888 of Westem 
Australia which was so based as a suitable model for the Gold Coast 
Colony. It rejected the British Honduras Act of 1862, mainly because 
it was apparently based upon the British Patent Law Amendment Act of 
1852 which had then been repealed and replaced by the Patents, Designs 
and Trade Marks Act of 18835• 
A copy of the westem Australian Act was sent to the then Acting 
Governor of the Colony with instructions6 to prepare a draft ordinance 
based on it to be submitted to the Colonial Office for ratification. 
Consequently, a draft ordinance was prepared in the Gold Coast Colony 
without any serious legislative deliberations 7 and 
4. See the Board of Trade's letter dated 16 May 1898 in C.O. 96, 
Gold Coast 1898, Vol. XX, 329. 
5. This Amendment Act sirrplified substantially the proceedings 
regarding the procurement and upholding of patent groups. 
6. See Despatch No. 2~8 of 25 March 1898 in c.o. 96. 
7. A cursory perusal of the minutes of the Legislative Council on 
its deliberations in respect of the Ordinance (C.O. 98 Gold 
Coast, Minutes of Legislative Council l899-l9~4, 11) shows that 
the Council only had to go through the bill as a matter of 
course. In addition, revelations by the draft Ordinance to be 
discussed in subsequent paragraphs confirm this point. 
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thereafter submitted to the Colonial Office in London. 
The process of ratifying the draft ordinance resulted in its 
considerable alteration by the Colonial Office in conjunction with the 
Board of Trade and the Controller-General. In the first place, the 
draft ordinance followed closely the west Australian Patent Act of 
18888 and was alm:>st a carbon copy of it. The similarity was so close 
that a clerical error9 which occured in the latter but corrected by 
the subsequent amending Act of 1894 was reproduced in the draft 
ordinance. In addition, subsequent amendments that were made to the 
1888 Australian law in 1892 and 1894 as well as the alterations in the 
British Act of 1883 since 1885 had not been taken into consideration 
in the drafting of the ordinance, and, thus, not incorporated. 
One change was the decision not to copy S.49 of the Westem 
Australian Act of 1888 which provided, inter alia, that no person 
should receive a patent for an invention or discovery which had 
previously been patented in Great Britain or any other country. The 
practical and adrninistrati ve problems and the cost of an official 
search for novelty necessitated by such an enactment, as pointed out 
by the Controller-General, prevented any similar legislation fran 
8. This Act is itself based on British legislation up to 1885. 
9. Clause 9, Sub-clause 2 of the draft Ordinance was apparently 
intended to provide that security for costs may be required from 
the opponents - but what would appear to be a clerical error 
occurs, "applicant" being written for "person giving such 
notice". 
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being adopted in Great Britain.HJ Nevertheless, clause 48 of the Gold 
Coast draft ordinance followed section 49 of the Western Australian 
Act of 1888, and the Board of Trade rightly expressed its doubt about 
the capability of the Chief Registrar of the Gold Coast to undertake 
the type of search contemplated by the clause with any reasonable 
chance or prospect of success. Another worrying aspect about the 
clause was the cost likely to accompany its execution especially so as 
it was desired by the Attorney-General of the Colony that "the 
ordinance must be worked at the least possible expense to the 
Government. "11 
As a result of the above considerations the draft ordinance was 
considerably altered12 to embody the amendments and alterations made 
in the model laws, and thereafter sent to the Gold Coast for 
enactment. The major changes that were finally made to the ordinance 
included the abandorurent of the world-wide novelty requirerrent and, in 
addition, the inclusion, in view of the international patent 
convention, of the priority concept. Another major change was the 
expunginp.: of sub-clause 2 of Clause 6 which permitted an application 
for a patent grant by persons entitled by bequest from deceased 
person. As argued by the Board of Trade, such a provision never 
Ie. The Board of Trade I s letter dated 25 January 1899 addressed to 
the secretary of state for the colonies (C.O. 96 Gold Coast 189, 
349) was very critical of the draft ordinance and the Board 
contributed greatly to modifying it. 
11. Ibid. 
12. The draft ordinance was amended in red ink on the lines proposed 
by the Control1er-General of Patents and returned to the Colony 
ready for enactment. 
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appeared in any British Act on the subject, and though it did appear 
in the 1888 West Australian Act it had since been repealed by the 1894 
Ordinance. However, in the case of applications by legal 
representatives of a deceased actual inventor or of his assigns, also 
covered by the same sub-clause 2, this was adopted by the ordinance 
apparently because it was reintroduced by the definition of true and 
first inventor in S.6 of the Western Australian Act of 1894. 
Some of the other alterations made to the draft ordinance 
included the extension of the provisions of Clause 4513 of the draft 
ordinance which related to exhibitions to include international 
exhibitions as well. (See S.44 of the 1899 Ordinance). This was to 
conform to S.3 of the British Act of 1886. Moreover, S.4(3) of the 
1899 Ordinance, unlike Clause 5 of the draft ordinance, but like the 
relevant section under the 1894 revised Western Australian ordinance, 
exhaustively specified the persons entitled to apply for a patent. 
Again unlike the draft ordinance the final ordinance adopted a 
separate clause on the legality of a patent grant to several 
applicants. (See S.4(2) of the Ordinance). Finally, there was the 
substitution of the phrase "proceeding for revocation" by the final 
ordinance (See S.2l (Ie) of the Ordinance) so as to conform to S.5 of 
the British Act of 1888. 
Finally, an interesting alteration that was made to the 
ordinance is contained in S.ll (2) which provided for security for 
costs by the opponent to a grant of patent. This sub-section 
rectified a clerical error which substituted "applicant" for "person 
giving such notice". (See Clause 9 (2) of the draft ordinance). This 
13. Clause 45 was the same as S.39 of the British Act of 1883 and as 
the Western Australian Act of 1888. 
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error occured in the western Australian Act of 1888 but was 
subsequently corrected by amending Act of 1894 which awarently 
escaped the Gold Coast legislators. 
It is interesting to note that even before the final enactment 
of the amended draft ordinance, it had been decided by the Colonial 
Office to send copies of the ordinance after it had been finally 
passed to other West African colonies, including the Lagos colony, the 
Southern and Northern Nigerian protectorates - which now constitute 
Nigeria - with instructions to pass a similar ordinance.14 Before 
discussing the essentials of this Patent Ordinance it may be 
appropriate to pause here and ask why the Colonial Office introduced a 
patent law in the Gold Coast and used same as a model for the other 
former English west African colonies. 
Rationale for the Introduction of Patent Law in the Ijben Gold Coast 
(now Ghana) 
The usual arguments advanced for the introduction of patent laws 
or the patent system in general include the fact that it spurs 
inventiveness, research and devel0tment (R&D), innovation, and, as 
between industries or countries, the transfer of technology (SUpra). 
However, in the case of the Gold Coast the development of the 
mining industry, especially the gold mining industry, was the pivotal 
consideration for the introduction of a patent law there. This is 
brought out lucidly by the Colonial Office when it stated in a letter 
to the Board of Trade that: 
14. See c.o. 96 Gold Coast 1899, 349. 
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There is at present no patent legislation in force in 
the colony [Gold Coast], but in view of the 
development of the gold rrdning district of Tarkwa, and 
the consequent introduction of machinery etc. Mr. 
Chamberlain [Colonial Secretary] thinks it would be 
well to take steps to afford protection to 
invention. IS 
This consideration was reiterated by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies when in a letter to the then Acting Governor he wrote: 
I have under consideration the advisability of 
enacting patent legislation for the Gold Coast in vie.w 
of the introduction of patented machinery and 
processes which will probably follow on the 
development of the mining industry.16 
It is abundantly clear that the introduction of the Patent Ordinance 
in the Gold Coast did not rest on the usual arguments advanced for 
the patent system (Supra). It may, however, be forcefully argued that 
the Ordinance also sought to facilitate the transfer of technology to 
the colony, though primarily for the benefit of the gold industry; the 
spill-over effect and the contribution thereof to the general 
development of the colony will be difficult to contest. Nevertheless} 
15. Colonial office's letter of 3~ April 1898 to the Board of Trade 
in C.O. 96 Gold Coast 1898, Vol. IV, March 9-31, 313. 
16. Secretary of State for the Colonies's letter of 2S May 1898 in 
c.o. 98 Gold Coast 1898, Vol. XX, 329 [Public Offices]. 
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it is only when one comes to realise or appreciate the overall 
objective of imperialism or colonialism as well as the community that 
benefited from this "transfer of technology" that one finds any such 
argument unconvincing. 
As discernable from the above quotations the introduction of the 
Ordinance was never meant to encourage either indigenous inventive 
activity, local R&D, innovation or to accomplish an effective 
technology transfer. It was geared rather towards the protection of 
property rights in machine technology relevant for the exploitation of 
the gold and other mineral resources of the Colony. This is not 
surprising since the main aim of imperialism and subsequent 
colonialism was the investment of excess capital in and exploitation 
of mineral and human resources of the colonies. 
It is appropriate to point out here that the gold industry, 
which as we have seen prompted the enactment of the Patent Ordinance, 
was the cornerstone of colonial Br itish economic programmes and 
policies for the Gold Coast Colony. It did serve as a pivot for 
almost every single progranme that was initiated and inplernented in 
the colony.17 
Patent Ordinance No. 1 of 1899 
The gold industry, therefore, unquestionably brought into 
existence the first patent law of present Ghana. This was the Patent 
17. For example, the gold industry considerably accounts for the 
present structure of the railway line in Ghana. The initial 
scheme of linking the coastal regions with the North was 
abandoned on the discovery of gold in the Tarkwa district. 
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Ordinance No. 1 of 1899, which \'as adopted alrrost in its entirety in 
the renaining former British ~t African Colonies. This Ordinance's 
counterpart in the former Lagos Colony and the two protectorates Which 
form present Nigeria were the Patent Ordinance 1900 of the Colony of 
Lagos, the Patent Proclanation No. 27, 1900 of Soothern Nigeria (as 
curended by Patent ArrerrlIrent Proclanation No. 19, 1901) am Patent 
Proclamation No. 12, 1902, of Northern Nigeria. After the 
analganation of Northern am Southern Nigeria (the Colony of Lagos am 
the then Soothern Nigeria) all these Ordinances were repealed and in 
their place was enacted a single patent ordinance - Patents Ordinance 
No. 30 of 1916 (infra). 
The provisions of the Gold Coast's Patent Ordinance and those of 
the Lagos colony am the Northern am Southern Nigerian protectorates 
were virtually identical. In his letter to the Crom for confirnation 
am approval for the Patent Ordinance of the Colony of Lagos, am thus 
praying for the accordance of the royal assent to this enact.Irent, 
which was subsequently re-enacted for both Southern and Northern 
Nigeria, the Governor of the Lagos Colony nade it very clear that the 
Ordinance was nbased on the Imperial Statute am Gold Colast Ordinance 
dealing with the rratter n.I8 He added, however, that certain necessary 
alterations which local requirements of the Colony of Lagos demanded 
were inserted in the Ordinance.19 Thus creating the impression that 
some significant dissimilarities existed between the two ordinances. 
This is not entirely true and any differences that existed rrainly 
related to the chronological table of ordinances. 
18. C.O. 147 Lagos 1900, Vol. 14, 151, Despatches Nos. 235-332, 21 
Sept - 31 Dec. 
19. Ibid. 
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As confirmed by the Board of Trade, whose conments were sought on the 
Ordinance, nthis Ordinance [Patent Ordinance of Lagos Colony] is 
mutatis mutandis, the same as the Gold Coast... the only difference 
being the omission in Sec. 5(e) of a chronological table of 
Ordinancesn20 • Consequently, the discussion of some of the provisions 
of the Patent Ordinance 1899 of the Gold Coast that follows shortly, 
could broadly be taken to represent those of the other ordinances. 
The Patent Ordinance No.1, 1899, of the Gold Coast contained 
comprehensive provisions for the grant and control of patents and was 
analogous to both the Western Australian and English enactments on the 
same subject during that period. It set up a Patent Office under the 
control of a registrar whose functions were similar to the 
Controller-General of the Patents Office in the United Kingdom. 
&>lication for a Patent Grant 
The Ordinance made adequate provisions for applications and 
application procedures for obtaining patent rights in the Gold Coast. 
Applications for patents were made in the relevant forms (5.5 (11» and 
together with their accompaniments, such as specifications, relevant 
drawings and declarations, were lodged with the Patent Office (S.5(2) 
and (3». Appeals from the decisions of the Registrar concerning such 
applications lay to the Attorney-General (5.7 (2» who could procure 
the aid of experts in the determination of such appeals. 
2~. Ibid. 
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In respect of patent applicants the Ordinance makes interesting 
provisions, and provides for three categories of applicants. UOOer 
S.4(l} any person, "whether a British subject or not", could apply for 
a patent. Any such person had to be either the actual inventor, his 
asSigns, the actual inventor jointly with the assigns of a party 
interested in the invention, the legal representative of a deceased 
actual inventor or of his assigns, or any person to whom the invention 
has been communicated by the actual inventor, his legal 
representatives or assigns (if the latter group of persons were not 
resident in the colony) (S.4 (3}). This provisions closely followed 
that of the 1894 West Australian Act, and corresponded to sections 4 
of the patent Ordinances of the Lagos Colony, the Southern and 
Northern Nigerian protectorates. 
A second category of persons competent to apply for a patent 
under the Ordinance was that of holders or assignees of patents 
granted or issued in Great Britain or any other country for any new 
discovery or invention (S.47). The only requirements to be satisfied 
here before the Governor exercised his discretion to grant any patents 
to this class of applicants were (i) that the applicant was the bona 
fide holder or assignee of the said patent, (H) that the said patent 
was in full force, and (iii) the payment into the government treasury 
of the equivalent sum of £15. S.47 of the Gold Coast Ordinance was 
the same as S.XLVII of Southern Nigerian Ordinance and S.47 of the 
Northern Nigerian Ordinance. The provisions under S.47 appears, 
however, to have been omitted fran the Lagos Colony's Ordinance and it 
is this omission which seems to me to be the only significant 
difference between the Ordinances of the Gold Coast and Lagos 
colonies. 
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The final category of applicants who could apply for and obtain 
a Gold coast patent grant were those who had applied for protection 
for any invention in England or in any foreign state with the 
government of which Her Majesty had mde an arrangement, under S. 103 
of the Imperial Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883, for nutual 
protection of inventions (S.48(1». Such applicants were entitled to 
a patent for their inventions in priority to other applicants, and the 
effective date of their applications was the same as the date of the 
prior applications in England or such foreign countries. However, for 
such applications to qualify for priority they had to be made within 
seven months from the date of their prior applicatiOns (S.48(2». 
This represents the patent bilateral and reciprocal arrangements that 
existed between countr ies before the introduction of the priority 
concept by the Paris Convention. The equivalent of the provisions 
here under the Patent Ordinances of the Lagos colony, the Southern and 
Northern Nigeria were those provided by Sections 53, XLVIII, and 48 
respectively. 
Eraroi nation of a Patent Pmlication 
Under the Ordinance the Registrar was vested with a discretion 
to refer any patent application to an examiner for the purposes of 
examination. The issues for determination by the examiner were 
confined to whether the nature of the invention had been fairly 
described and the application, specification and drawings, if any, had 
been prepared in the prescribed manner. (S.6). The provision 
corresponded to those under the respective sections 6 of the 
Ordinances of the Colony of Lagos, the Southern and Northern Nigerian 
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Protectorates. The final issue to be ascertained was whether the 
application sufficiently indicated the subject-matter of the invention 
(.nlli'D. The Registrar, on receipt of the examiner's report, could, if 
he was of the opinion that the application did not meet the 
requirements discussed, refuse to accept the application or require 
the effectuation of any amendments deemed necessary before proceeding 
with the application. 
It is very clear from the above that the examination required by 
the Ordinance was one of form and not of substance. This could be 
attributable to the fact that the Colonial government was most anxious 
to see the Ordinance worked at the least possible expense to the 
government (Supra). Moreover, the doubtful capability of the 
Registrar and his staff as well as the dearth of qualified personnel 
to undertake the sort of examination required by examination as to 
substance contributed to the adoption of the registration system. 
Term and Grant of a Patent 
On the satisfaction of the necessary formal requirements, the 
Governor in the name of Her Majesty granted patent rights (5.17). 
SUch grants could be made to several applicants jointly although only 
some or one of them were or was the true and first inventors or 
inventor (5.18). The duration of patent granted under the Ordinance, 
apart from any grant made under SS.47 and 48,21 was limited to 14 
years (S.2~). The provision here followed S.22 of the western 
Australian Act of 1888 and 5.17 of the British Act of 1883, and was 
the same as S.21 (1) of Lagos Colony's Ordinance, s.xx of Southern and 
21. The term of grants made under these sections are tied to those 
of the original grants and to the prior applications 
respectively. 
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S.2~ of Northern Nigerian Ordinances. Though the Ordinance did not 
specify the rights derivable under a patent grant it could be assumed 
that they included the monopoly right to manufacture, sell or import 
the patented product or product manufactured by a patented process, 
and the right to prevent others from infringing the said monopoly 
rights. 
Patent-1\buse-Olecking Measures 
There were also provided under the Ordinance measures to check 
abuses of patent grants. These included compulsory licensing and 
revocation. 
onder 5.25 compulsory licences were available if it was proved 
to the Governor-in-Council by any person interested that by reason of 
the default of a patentee to grant licences on reasonable terms, the 
patent was not being worked, the reasonable requirements of the public 
with regard to the invention could not be supplied, or any person was 
prevented fram effectively and efficiently exploiting an invention of 
which he was possessed. On any of these grounds the 
Governor-in-Council could order the patentee to grant licences on 
such terms as to the amount of royalties and secur ity for payment as 
it deemed fit, and any such order could, on application to the court, 
be enforced by mandamus. 
The measure of revocation could be cbtained by a petition to the 
court (5.29(21». The Ordinance explicitly excluded any proceeding by 
Scire facias22 to revoke a patent. lmy petition to the court for 
22. Scire facias to repeal letters is a judicial writ founded upon 
some matter of record, such as a judgement or recognizance and 
requiring the person against wham it is brought to show course 
why the record should not be annulled and vacated. 
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the revocation of a patent could be brought by (1) the 
Attorney-General, (2) his representative, (3) any person alleging that 
the patent was obtained in fraud of his rights, or of the rights of 
any person under or through whom he claims, (4) any person claiming 
that be, or any person under or through whom be clairred, was the true 
inventor of any invention included in the patentee's claim, and (5) 
any person who alleged that he or any person under or through whom he 
claimed an interest in any trade, business, or manufacture had overtly 
manufactured, used or sold, within the colony, before the date of the 
patent, anything claimed by the patentee as his invention (5.29 (4» • 
This last provisions is significant for two reasons. First, it made 
it possible for any such person to contest any attempt by patentees 
via the patent system to disrupt the former's business and 
manufacturing activities which had long been in existence but for 
which no protection was procured. Secondly, it appeared to discourage 
the duplication of existing technologies in the colony by making it 
possible to revoke patent grants conferred on new entrants in the same 
available technology. Similar patents-abuse-checking measures (that 
is, compulsory licences and revocation) were provided by Sections 26 
and 36 of the Lagos colony's Ordinance, Sections XXV and XXIX of 
Southern, and Sections 25 and 29 of Northern Nigerian Ordinances. 
Apart from the above provisions the Ordinance equally made 
elaborate provisions on issues such as specifications (both 
provisional and complete), legal proceedings regarding patents, 
opposition to the grant of patents and powers of the Registrar of 
Patents. 
It would have been useful and interesting to see how this 
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Ordinance and its counterpart Ordinances of Nigeria operated, for 
example, by way of how many patents were filed under the Ordinance, 
the sources of the inventions involved, the various industrial fields 
under which they fell and the number of compulsory licences that were 
granted as well as the number of patents that were revoked, if any. 
Unfortunately, documents covering the period within which these 
Ordinances operated are either missing from or unavailable at both the 
Accra and Lagos Offices and it would therefore be difficult to embark 
on any such exercise. In the case of the Accra office, it was 
explained by the Registrar-General's Department that these documents 
IIllst have got lost in the process of transferring them from the 
SUpreme Court Buildings to the Offices of the Registrar-General' s 
Department after the administration of patents had been transferred 
from the Courts to the latter.23 No explanation was given by the 
Lagos Office for these missing documents. 
The Gold Coast Patent Ordinance No.1, 1899 operated for about 
two and half decades when it was repealed in 1925 and replaced by the 
Patents Registration Ordinance, 1925 (cap. 179) which drastically 
restructured the then independent patent system in the colony (infra). 
The counterpart Ordinances of the Lagos Colony, Southern and Northern 
Nigeria, on the other hand, operated for about one and half decades 
until they were all repealed in 1916. In their place was enacted one 
single patent ordinance, the Patents Ordinance, No. 30, 1916, which 
applied throughout the whole of Nigeria, and was also subsequently 
replaced or substituted in 1925 by the Registration of United Kingdom 
Patents Ordinance No.6, 1925. 
23. Personal interview with the Registrar General in Accra, October 
1984. 
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IJbe Patents Ordinance No.3", 1916 
The promulgation of the Patents Ordinance No. 313 of 1916, 
instead of the autonoJrous patent system then in vogue, adopted the 
system by which a colony relied on the United Kingdom to examine 
applications for patent and merely registered patents already granted 
in the United Kingdom. Its introduction, therefore, conp1etely 
destroyed the independent patent system then in existence in Nigeria. 
It may, therefore, be asked, what factors prompted this dranatic 
alteration in the existing law. 
It does seem that, contrary to the impression that the 1916 
Ordinance might have been necessitated b¥ the 1914 amalgamation of the 
SOuthern and Northern Protectorates of Nigeria (See Ezejiofor, 1973, 
4(3), it was rather the dearth of required technical personnel and the 
consequent lack of expert advice on the patentability of inventions 
submitted for patent grants which led to the adoption of this 
Ordinance. This was made quite explicit in his advocacy and 
justification for adopting this Ordinance when the Attorney-General of 
the Colony of Nigeria in his report on the draft Patent Ordinance 1916 
stated: 
It is frequently impossible to obtain locally that 
expert advice which is required by the authority 
responsible for deciding whether or not a patent 
should be granted, and in the circumstances it is 
submitted that persons desiring to obtain protection 
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in Nigeria, for an alleged invention may probably be 
required to satisfy first the Patents Office in the 
United Kingdom that his invention is one for which a 
patent should be granted.24 
This justification for the introduction of the 1916 Ordinance was 
reiterated by the Governor-General in his letter on the subject to the 
Secretary of State for Co1onies25 and by the Colonial Office itse1f.26 
In supporting the adoption of the said Ordinance the latter also added 
that the colonial government did not have either "the experience or 
technical officers to work satisfactorily" the then existing systern. 27 
In addition, this reliance is also explained by the fact that the U.K. 
had had enough experience "in examining applications with some care 
before granting patents" and thus Nigeria, like other colonies, could 
rely on the U.K. for this purpose.28 
24. Report on the draft Patents Ordinance, 1916 by the 
Attorney-General of Nigeria dated 18.2.1916 in C.O. 583, 44, 
Despatches (Jan-Feb) Nigeria 1916, p546. 
25. In the words of the Governor-General, "The difficulty of 
obtaining locally the expert advice necessary for a decision as 
to whether or not a patent should be granted is a very real one, 
and, in the circumstances, I consider it not unreasonable to 
require that the granting of a patent in Nigeria should be 
dependent on the applicant first satisfying the Patents office 
in the United Kingdom ••• " See C.O. 583, 44, Despatches (Jan-Feb) 
Nigeria 1916, p541. 
26. C.O. 583, 44, Despatches (Jan-Feb) Nigeria 1916, p540. 
26. Ibid. 
28. Ibid. 
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On the strength of the Governor-General's letter on the matter 
the Secretary of State for Colonies wrote on 26 April 1916 to approve 
the enactment of the draft Ordinance29 which before this approval had 
already been published in the Gazette. 30 Consequently, on 13 July 
1916 the Patent Ordinance No. 30, 1916, which was rodelled on the 
Ordinances then in force in Hong Kong, East Africa, Uganda and Sierra 
Leone, but specifically on the latter,3l was promulgated and came into 
effect on that day. 
IJhe Main Provisions of the 1916 Ordinance 
The most significant provisions of Patent Ordinance No. 30, 1916 
were those regarding applications for patents and the effect of patent 
grants. 
Ag;>lication for Patent 
One of the fundamental changes that was introduced into the 
patent system of Nigeria related to patent applicatiOns which was 
governed by S.2 of the Ordinance. S.2(l) provided that: 
It shall be lawful for the inventor, or for the owner 
by assigrunent, transmission, or other operation of 
law, of any invention or of the exclusive right 
thereto within Nigeria to petition the Govenor for a 
patent for any invention for which a patent has 
already been granted in the United Kingdom •••• 
29. C.O. 583, 44 Despatches (Jan-Feb) Nigeria 1916, p547. 
30. C.O. 583, 44 Despatches (Jan-Feb) Nigeria 1916, p54l. 
31. C.O. 583, 44 Despatches (Jan-Feb) Nigeria 1916, p546. 
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In order to appreciate the full import of this provision two things 
need to be made clear. First, the 1916 Ordinance repealed the then 
existing Patent Ordinance and Proclamations except in relation to any 
patents already granted or applications for patents already made 
thereunder. In effect, the practice of applying for patents directly 
in Nigeria and the entire autonomous patent system were truncated by 
this new Ordinance. 5econdly, the new Ordinance did not, unlike the 
previous enactments, make any provisions for the procurement of 
original patents in the country. All this, therefore, neant that by 
virtue of 5.2(1) every inventor whether a Nigerian or not desiring a 
Nigerian patent first had to obtain the U.K. patent grant before he 
could petition the Governor for a Nigerian patent for the same 
invention. 32 
For every such petition under 5.2(1) it had to be accompanied by 
either the original patent granted for the invention in the U.K. or 
certified copy therefor (5.2 (2», and, in addition, a certified copy 
of the complete specification which accompanied the prior application 
in the U.K. Finally, the petition had to be accompanied by the 
relevant statutory declarations (5.2(3» and further necessary 
particulars (5.2 (5». 
Effect of Grant 
The effect of a Nigerian patent grant was regulated by 5.5(1) of 
the Ordinance. It provided that: 
32. 5ee further discussions on a similar provision in Chapter 4 
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• • •• a patent granted under this Ordinance shall 
confer all the rights and privileges and shall subject 
the grantees thereof to all the provisions affecting 
patents in the United Kingdom as fully as if the same 
had been granted, with an extension thereof to 
Nigeria, under the provisions of such statutes as are 
now in force in the United Kingdom or as near thereto 
as the circwnstances shall admit of. 
It is undoubtedly clear that the rights and privileges as well as the 
obligations of a Nigerian patentee were almost parallel to, if not the 
same as, those of U.K. patentees. Q1e example of this parallelism 
which was expressly discernable from the Ordinance related to the term 
of the patent. The term of a Nigerian patent grant corresponded to 
the U.K.·s for the same invention. In fact, the fomer was dependent 
on the latter, and it was possible for a Nigerian patent to avail 
itself of the extension for a further term of its U.K. counterpart. 
According to 5.6, if a court of competent jurisdiction in the U.K. 
extended the term of any patent grant for any further term or ordered 
the grant of a new patent the Governor-in-Council could on that basis 
extend the term of such patent, if already granted, for Nigeria or 
otherwise grant an original patent for a similar term for the same 
invention. 
In effect, sections 5 and 6 in particular and the entire 
Ordinance, as the Attorney-General for the Colony hinted in his report 
on the Ordinance (draft), sought to extend "to the owner of a patent 
granted in the United Kingdom the same protection in Nigeria as he 
enjoys in the united Kingdom". 33 Another significant aspect of all 
33. C.O. 583, 44 Despatches (Jan-Feb) Nigeria, 1916, p546 
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this is that by virtue of these provisions, especially S.5, U.K. 
enactments on patents were implicitly but effectively introduced into 
and given force in Nigeria. 
The 1916 Patents Ordinance consequently and successfully 
incorporated the Nigerian patents system into the U.K. 'so 'Ibis is 
further confirmed by a perusal of the provisions governing revocation 
of patents. According to S.5(2), for the SUpreme COurt to entertain 
any grounds for the revocation of patents in Nigeria they should be 
" •••• similar to those on which the revocation of a patent is 
justified in the United Kingdom ••• n Moreover, the same 8.5 (2) also 
provided that: 
• • •• a patent granted under this Ordinance shall not 
be revoked solely on the grounds that the patented 
article or process is manufactured or carried on 
exclusively or mainly outside Nigeria, if it is 
nanufactured or carried on exclusively or mainly in 
the united Kingdom or in any British possession. 
It is clear from the provision that, in addition to incorporating the 
Nigerian patent system into the U.K. IS, 8.5(2) sought, to sorre extent, 
to align the former to the entire British colonial economic 
arrangement, which is typical of both imperialism and colonialism. 
'Ibe tacit definition of exploitation of patent in Nigeria as working 
in the U.K. or in any British possession is very instructive. 
The 1916 Patents Ordinance operated until 1925 when it was 
substituted, a month after its introduction in the then Gold COast, by 
the Registration of United Kingdom Patents Ordinance No.6, 1925. 
Despite the Colonial Office'S suggestion that the Gold Coast Colony 
should consider adopting the 1916 Ordinance,34 the latter continued 
34. c.o. 583, 44 Despatches (Jan-Feb) Nigeria 1916, p54~ 
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to operate its 1899 Patent Ordinance until 1925 when it was also 
repealed by the Patents Registration Ordinance, 1925. The two 1925 
Patents Registration Ordinances (that is, for both Ghana and Nigeria) 
were similar if not identical, and will therefore be treated under the 
same heading. 
'!be Patents Registration Ordinance. 1925 
The factors which accounted for the introduction of the 1925 
Ordinance, especially in the Gold Coast Colony were similar to those 
responsible for the promulgation of the 1916 Ordinance in Nigeria. 
However, in addition to the inadequate technical personnel and the 
lack of experience for the satisfactory working of the then 
independent patent system, the paucity, it seems, of patents filed in 
the Gold Coast which were not solely U.K. patents also contributed to 
the enactment of the 1925 Ordinance. As hinted by the Colonial 
Office, in the case of Gibraltar which during that period had similar 
legislation, the Ordinance was considered relevant in view of the 
fewness of patents filed in the Co1ony.35 
Consequently the Gold Coast Colonial government repealed the 
1899 Patent Ordinance which established in the colony an autonomous 
patent system and in its place promulgated the Patents Registration 
Ordinance, 1925. The overall effect of the latter is similar to that 
of the 1916 Patent Ordinance of Nigeria. It also destroyed the 
independent system set up by its predecessor and aligned the Gold 
Coast patent system with the U.K.'s. The 1925 Gold Coast Ordinance 
35. See C.O. 96 Gold Coast 1989, Vol. XXVII, 336. 
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was introduced a month later in Nigeria and replaced the 1916 
Ordinance. For the Gold Coast the 1925 Ordinance drastically altered 
its patent system while for Nigeria, on the other hand, it was merely 
a substitution of the title of one enactment by the other. 
The introduction of the 1925 Ordinance in the Gold Coast marked 
the end of the historical developnent of the patent systen of Ghana 
since it still continues to use this Ordinance, besides the minor 
alterations made thereto, as its main legal instrument for the grant 
and administration of patents in the country. The Ordinance will 
therefore be discussed in detail in Chapter Four. On the other hand, 
in the case of Nigeria very significant developments took place 
between 1925 and 1973 when the country eventually enacted its own 
indepencent patent law. These developments include the case of 
Rhone-Poulence S.A. and May & Baker Limited v Lodeka Pharmacy Limited, 
and the Patents Rights (Limitation) Decree 1968. 
Rhone Poulence S.A. and ~ & Baker Ltd. y. Lodeka PhaIllil£Y Ltd. 
An interesting development in the patent systen of Nigeria which 
took place before the 1925 Patent Ordinance was altered by the 
government is the case of Rhone-Poulence and Mor. V. Lodeka Pharmacy 
Limited. 36 The first plaintiff was the owner of the U.K. Patent No. 
716237. This patent was sealed in Decenber 1951 "in respect of 
iIrprovernents in or the new phenthiazine derivatives". Phenthiazine 
derivatives are chenical substances derived directly or indirectly 
from the substance phenthiazine and the compound known as 
36. [1965] L.L.R. 9, (Lagos Law Report). 
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chlorpromazine hydrochloride. This patent was consequently registered 
in July 1957 in Nigeria under the 1925 Patent Ordinance (cap. 182) as 
Patent No. 367 with the second plaintiff as the exclusive licensee. 
The second plaintiff, May and Baker was a subsidiary of the first 
plaintiff and had been engaged in the sale and distribution of the 
product chlorpromazine which it has been selling under the name 
"Largactil". The defendant, on the other hand, is an indigenous 
Nigerian enterprise engaged in the importation and distribution of 
poisonous and dangerous drugs. 
It does appear that three main factors could have been 
responsible for this case. The first factor is the nature of the 
defendant's business which is importation and distribution of drugs in 
the country. The second and more crucial factor is the corranercial 
success of the first plaintiff's invention which as already indicated 
is sold under the trade name of "Largactil". This drug was said to be 
"widely sold and used in Nigeria and has acquired very wide and good 
reputation" .37 Consequently, the defendant's desired to partake of 
the commercial success of this product. The importation into and sale 
of the latter by the defendant in the country obviously infringed the 
plaintiffs' patent right. Thus the infringement suit. Finally, it 
would also appear that, the determination of the Nigerian gover.nment 
during that period to engage the services of indigenous enterprises 
more than foreign enterprises where the former were believed to have 
the capability of performing almost the same services also contributed 
to the commencement of this suit. As a result of this determination 
37. See Rhone-Poulence and Mor. v IOdeka Pharmacy Ltd., op cit., 
p10 
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the government engaged the defendants, instead of the second 
plaintiffs who were the exclusive licensees for the sale and 
distribution of the product in question in the country, to supply the 
products, the subject-matter of the suit, to the Federal Ministry of 
Health. 
The facts of the case are that the defendant in 1964, in breach 
of the plaintiffs' patent, supplied to the Federal Ministry of Health 
250,000 tablets of Chlorpromazine hydrochloride in bottles bearing its 
labels, and had received a further order fran the sane Ministry to 
supply a considerable quantity of the drug which it had agreed to 
execute. Furthermore, the defendant was alleged to have displayed the 
same drug at its stand in an exhibition of Pharmaceutical Industry at 
the Federal Palace Hotel in Lagos in April 1964. 
The plaintiffs cormnenced this action to restrain the defendant 
fran infringing their rights and in the meantime applied for an 
interim injunction to restrain further breaches pending the 
determination of the action. The defendant' s contention was that 
while it would amount to an infr ingement of the plaintiffs • patent 
rights to distribute the drug to the general public, it could not be 
so to supply it to the Federal Ministry of Health for use by the 
public. Consequently, the defendant relied on S.46(1) of the United 
Kingdom Patents Act, 1949 which provided that:-
Notwithstanding anything in this Act, any Goverrurent 
department, and any person authorised in writing by a 
Goverrurent department, may make use and exercise any 
patented invention for the services of the Crown in 
accordance with the •••• provisions of this section.38 
38. See the case of Pfizer Corporation v Ministry of Health, L.R. 
[1965] AC (H.L.) where this section was relied upon and 
considered. 
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After determination of the case, Ikpeazu J. held that the U.K. 
Patents Act, 1949 did not apply in "its totality or as such to this 
country" and would therefore, not be influenced by S.46(1) of that 
Act. Though he gave no reason for this holding it would ap~ar, 
however, that the 1949 Act which came into effect on 1 January 19se 
was promulgated after the reception date of 1 January 1900, and, in 
addition its provisions had not either implicitly or explicitly been 
extended to Nigeria by the 1925 Patents Registration Ordinance. 
The only significant effect the 1949 Act had in Nigeria was in 
respect of the rights and'privileges derivable fram the issuance of a 
Certificate of registration after the registration of a U.K. patent in 
Nigeria as provided by S.6 of the 1925 Ordinance. The section stated: 
SUch certificate of registration shall confer on the 
applicant privileges and rights to all conditions 
established by the law of Nigeria as though the patent 
had been issued in the United Kingdom with an 
extension to Nigeria. 
In respect of the effect of S.6 of the Ordinance vis-a-vis the 1949 
Act, Ik~azu J. held that the registration conferred on a ~rson who 
registered the patent in Nigeria privileges and rights such as were 
conferred on the patentee in the U.K. But this, continued his 
Lordship, "did not mean that the whole Act applied". 
His Lordship further held that S.46 (1) of the 1949 Act was an 
express power which the Act specifically conferred on a government 
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department which could operate in diminu.e;. ion of the patentee's X 
rights. And for that limitation to operate in the country the 
legislature of Nigeria had to make such a provision expressly in 
favour of the government departments in the country to enable them to 
authorise non-patentees or non-licensees to supply patented products. 
The Nigerian legislature not having done so, the conclusion, according 
to his Lordship, was that it did not intend that the power should 
exist. Consequently, an injunction was issued against the defendant. 
This case is very significant for three major reasons. First, 
it brought out quite vividly the limited application of the U.K. 
Patents Act, 1949 in Nigeria. Secondly, it threw into clear 
perspective the effect of a registration of a patent under the 1925 
Ordinance in Nigeria. Finally, and rore important is the fact that it 
ushered in another stage in the historical development of the patent 
systan of the country which finds expression in the promulgation of 
the Patents Right (Limitation) Decree No. 8 of 1968. 
Patents Rights (T,imitatiml Decree No. 8 of 1968 
The decision in the Rhone-Poulence case did not apparently find 
favour with the then Federal Military Government, and as a ripost 
thereto the latter in 1968 enacted the Patents Rights (Limitation) 
Decree No. 8 to counteract the effect of the said decision. Decree 
No.8, the provisions of which have been saved and continued in force 
by Part II of Schedule 1 of the Patents and Designs Decree, 1970, 
therefore, did not seek to address itself to the broader problems, 
such as the costly and cumbersome procedures involved in obtaining a 
Nigerian patent as well as the disincentive effect on indigenous 
inventive activity, associated with the 1925 Ordinance. 39 '1h:lt the 
Decree instead sought to react to the decision in the Rhone-Poulence 
case is evidenced by the various provisions thereunder. 
39. For further discussion on this see Chapter Four. 
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that: 
The first of these provisions was Section 1 (1) • It provided 
Where a Conmissioner is satisfied that it is in the 
public interest so to do, he may in respect of an 
article to which this Decree applies and intended for 
use in Nigeria, authorise any person including a 
government department to purchase, make, use, 
exercise, or vend, as the case may be, any such 
articles for the service of a gover.nment agency in the 
Federal Republic, anything to the contrary in any 
enactment or rule of law notwithstanding. 
This section was aimed at forestalling a situation similar to 
that leading to the case of Rhone-poulence, particularly in respect of 
the execution of the Federal Ministry of Health's orders by the 
defendant. It enabled a Commissioner to authorise any person 
including a government department to exercise the rights or privileges 
of a patentee in relation to a patented product without unlawfully 
infringing its rights. This provision corresponded to S.46 (1) of the 
U.K. Patents Act, 1949 and set the ground on which Government 
Departrrents could eJ~ercise powers which could operate.in diminution of 
the patentee's rights. 
The authority under S.l (1) could be given with respect to any 
patented article either before or after a patent had been obtained 
(S.1(2». It could also be given either before or after the acts in 
respect of which the authority is given had been done (ibiQ). This 
authority "may be given to any person whether or not he is authorised 
directly or indirectly by the patent holder to make, use, exercise or 
vend the article" (iQiQ.). S.1(2) obviously appears to operate to the 
1: 
considerable detriment of patentees. For example, an act which when 
committed could be an infringenent of a patentee's rights could 
subsequently be nade good by a retrospective authority. Moreover, the 
section does not define the persons to whom the authority could be 
given. So that it is even possible for rivals of patentees to be 
authoriSed to "infringe" the latters' patents. 
Furthermore, the Decree exempted the Government and any person 
so authorised from liability for the infringement of a patent granted 
with respect to the article covered by the Decree, or from liability 
to make any payments whether by way of royalty or otherwise to a 
patentee or any person deriving title from him (5.1 (3) ) • Similarly, 
the Decree provided that arrangements between the patentee and any 
person other than a ministry nade after the commencement of the Decree 
as regards the article was of no effect so far as it restricted its 
use or provided for the naking of payments (5.2). In addition, the 
Permanent secretary in the Ministry concerned could merely give the 
patentee such infornation as he deaned expedient from tine to tine 
concerning the extent of the use of the article. 
Special provisions were also nade for the use of the power 
during an energency to purchase, make, use, exercise and vend the 
article for any purpose deemed necessary by the Conmissioner. The 
purposes for which this power nay be exercised included the efficient 
prosecution of any war including civil war (5.3 (2» in which the 
Federal Republic may be engaged,41!J the supply and maintenance of 
essential services, and the promotion and protection of the econoII¥' 
(5.3 (1) ) • 
41!J. This provision appears to have been prompted by the Niger ian 
Civil War (The Biafran War). 
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The second provision which demonstrates that Decree No. 8 was a 
response to the judgement in the Rhone-Poulence case was that under 
5.5(3). It will be recalled that the subject-matter of the suit was 
the drug sold under the tradename of "Largactil". It was, therefore, 
no accident or coincidence that 5.5(3) which defined the "article" or 
"article to which this Decree applies" included "any drugs, 
pharmaceutical preparations, substances or materials ••• " 
The final provision which deIOOnstrates very vividly that the 
Decree was basically a ripost to the decision in the Rhone-Poulence 
case was that of 5.5 (2) • It stipulated: 
The Patents Act of the United Kingdom and amendments 
:thereof apply to Niger ia and they shall be read 
subj ect to this Decree. 
Apart from the fact that the U.K. Patents Act, 1949 was adopted by the 
Decree as a direct response to the holding that the former did not 
apply in Nigeria there does not seem to be any other rationale or 
justification for its adoption. By virtue of 5.5 (2) the Decree 
together with the 1925 Ordinance contributed to the deeper 
incorporation of the Nigerian patent system into that of the U.K. 
Admittedly, it is difficult to see the usefulness of this, 
particularly the adoption by 5.5(2) of the provisions of the 1949 Act 
in view of the fact that the latter was structured for a country whose 
envirornnent and level of industrialisation as well as its level of 
scientific progress considerably differs from Nigeria's. 
Nevertheless, the 1949 U.K. Patents Act was adopted and became 
operated in Nigeria from 13 March, 1968 when the Decree cane into 
force. In effect the 1949 Act, the Decree and the 1925 Ordinance all 
contributed to regulate the grant and administration of p;ltents in the 
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country until 1971a when a new and autonomous patent legislation, which 
will be discussed in Chapter ~ix was promulgation for the country. 
Conclusion 
From the above discussion it is not entirely wrong to infer that 
the discovery of gold and the gold industry in the then Gold Coast 
Colony considerably influenced the introduction of the first patent 
laws for both present Ghana and Nigeria. These laws, as discerned 
from the above, gave to each of the two countries an autonoIrOus patent 
system. 
However, as a result of the paucity of technical expertise 
required to operate these independent systems satisfactorily, the 
Colonial governments of both countries altered the then existing laws 
and substituted for them new enactments which made them dependent on 
the U.K. Patents Office for the grant of indigenous patents. In 
addition, these new enactments successfully incorporated the patent 
systems of Ghana and Nigeria into the U.K. IS. SUrprisingly, as we 
shall see in the subsequent Chapter, Ghana continues to operate this 
colonial dependent patent system while Nigeria, on the other hand, as 
we shall see in Chapter Six, has ceased to operate its colonial patent 
law and system and has instead enacted its CMIl independent patent law. 
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QIAPI'ER 4 
"l1IE GIANAIl\N PATENI' SYSI'fl1 AND mE TRANSFER OF TfUItDIOOY:' Uti 
Introduction 
Ghana, unlike most developing countries including Nigeria Which 
also experienced colonial rule, still operates a colonial patent 
system. By this we mean that the country still uses the colonial 
patent law and system of merely registering the inventions already 
registered in metropolitan Britain both of which it continued after 
independence in 1957. 
The patent system of present Ghana is governed by the Patents 
Registration Ordinance of 1925, cap. 179, as amendeal, and the Patents 
Registration (Amendment) Decree 1972, NRCD 81 which 
1. Cap. 179 is amended by Patents Registration (Amendment) 
Ordinance, 1933, the Patents Registration (Amendment) Ordinance, 
1956, and the Ordinances Extension Ordinance, 1935. The 1933 
and 1956 Ordinances (both by their sections 2) merely add the 
following words "of this Ordinance" to the last word of S.8 of 
Cap. 179, thus, relating the said section to the said cap. 179. 
The 1956 Ordinance, however, goes further to assign to the 
exprc~sion "priority date" in its appli~ticn to a patent in the 
U.K. the sarre meaning assigned to it in the U.K. Patents Act, 
1949. On the other hand, the 1935 Ordinance (by S.2) sought to 
extend Cap. 179, like all other ordinances to the whole of the 
Gold Coast, i.e. extending the Ordinances of the Gold Coast 
Colony to the Ashanti and Northern Territories as one single 
territory. It is important to note that apart from the above 
mentioned changes these ordinances did not fundamentally alter 
the patent system as established by Cap. 179. 
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essentially excludes pharmaceutical products from patentability. cap. 
179 replaced the Patent Ordinance of 1899 which, as we saw earlier on, 
created an almost autonomous patent system. The latter, as has 
already been noted in Chapter Three, mde adequate provisions for 
applications and application procedures for <:btaining patent grants in 
the then Gold Coast without any recourse to the U.K. Patent Office. 
In effect, it provided comprehensive provisions for the internal grant 
and control of patents. This autonomous system operated for about two 
and half decades. The NRCD81, on the other hand, as we will see in 
due course, is a direct ripost to the judgement in the case of 
Rhone-Poulence S.A. and another v The Ghana National Trading 
Corporation ([1972] 2GLR, 109). 
The introduction of cap. 179 which, as <:bserved earlier, could 
be attributed to the paucity of skilled personnel and patents which 
were filed during the operation of the earlier ordinance of 1899 
resulted in a major departure from the patent system previously in 
force. The former effectively determined the autonomous patent system 
established by the latter, and has succeeded in incorporating the 
country's system into that of the U.K. and rendered the former's 
patent office a mere registration centre for U.K. patents. 
CAP. 179 
On the whole cap. 179, as will be discerned from the discussion 
that follows, does not effectively contribute to the domestic 
technological development of Ghana. Because of the cost and tedium 
involved in obtaining a Ghanaian patent, it does not in particular 
encourage indigenous domestic inventive activity, but due to the fact 
that it allows the automatic registration of U.K. patents in the 
country, it enables the influx of inventions which may not be of any 
technological significance to the country. 
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The major provisions of Cap. 179 are those relating to the 
application for registration of U.K. patents in Ghana (G. Coast) and 
the effects of the registration of such patents. 
Application for Registration of U.K. Patent (S.4) 
One of the significant provisions of cap. 179 is S.4 regarding 
the applications for patent protection in Ghana which states: 
Any person being the grantee of a patent in the United 
Kingdom, or any person deriving his right from such 
grantee by assignment, transmission, or other 
operation of law, nay apply within three years from 
the date of issue of the patent, to have such patent 
registered in the Gold Ooast. 
By virtue of the above provision, and the fact that cap. 179's repeal 
of the 1899 Ordinance was accompanied by the total elimination of a 
true domestic procedure for a patent grant, the conferral of a patent 
grant in Ghana can only be made to U.K. patent holders or persons 
deriving their rights from the latter. '!be application for such a 
grant shall be made within three years from the date of the issuance 
of the U.K. patent. This neans that any Ghanaian who desires a patent 
protection for his invention in his country will first of all have to 
obtain a U.K. patent and thereafter register sane in the country 
within the said three year period. Similarly, non-Ghanaians including 
other Africans desiring patent protection in Ghana will also have to 
go through the same process. These provisions are the sane as those 
under S.3 of the then Nigerian Registration of U.K. Patents Ordinance 
No. 6 of 1925 (Cap. 141). 
J.JJ 
other prerequisites for the registration of U.K. patents include 
the acconpaniment of the awlication by a certified copy of the 
specification of the U.K. patent, and any drawings if necessary (S.5). 
In addition, the application must be accompanied by a certificate of 
the Camptroller-General of the U.K. Patent Office furnishing details 
of the issue of the patent on such specification (iQiQ). It is only 
then that the Registrar will issue a certificate of registration 
(S.6). 
Effect of Registratioo: furatioo and Privileges (S.7) 
The legal effects of a registration of a U.K. patent in Ghana 
and the consequent issue of a certificate of registration is provided 
by S.7{l) of the Ordinance. It states: 
SUch certificate of registration shall confer on the 
applicant privileges and rights subject to all 
conditions established by the law of the Gold Coast as 
though the patent had been issued in the United 
Kingdom with an extension to the Gold Coast.2 
This provision and that of S.7 (2) arrply deronstrates the effective 
incorporation of the Ghanaian patent system into that of the U.K. 
Section 7 (2) provides that: 
Privileges and rights so granted shall date from the 
date of the patent in the United Kingdom, aoo shall 
continue in force only so long as the patent remains 
in force in the United Kingdom ••• 
2. This provision is very similar to S.6 of the Nigerian patent 
Registration Ordinance of 1925 (Supra) 
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As a result of the above provisions, any extension of the original 
grant will automatically apply to that of the Ghanaian grant. 
Similarly, the annulment of the former will lead to the determination 
of the latter. SO that the legal effect of a U.K. grant is parallel 
to that ensuing from registration of the grant in Ghana. 
It may also be mentioned, as discerned from the above 
provisions, that the duration of Ghanaian patents as well as the 
rights and privileges conferred on patentees by a Ghanaian grant are 
uniform and of a non-discriminatory nature irrespective of the types 
of inventions for which they are granted. My differences in this 
respect may be explained only in terms of the original U.K. grant. 
Sane ])writs of rap.179 
The continuation of the Ordinance by successive governments has 
a number of implications which may appear to have a debilitating 
effect on indigenous inventive activity and the industrialisation 
progress of the country as a whole. In addition to the inadequacy of 
resources and skilled R&D personnel, the expensive and currbersorne 
procedure invol ved in obtaining patent protection in Ghana which 
directly emanates from Cap. 179 instead of encouraging inventive 
activity may adversely affect such activity, especially for inventors 
who by the nature of their inventions may require legal protection. 
This is attributable to the requirement that a Ghanaian seeking a 
patent protection will first have to secure a U.K. patent before he 
could procure the Ghanaian grant, and this could be costly and 
inconvenient. 
For a Ghanaian inventor to obtain a Ghanaian patent grant he 
will, first of all, have to lodge his application in the U.K. which 
mayor may not involve his physical presence. If it does he will need 
to meet his airfare from Ghana to the U.K. which will probably be in 
Cedis, the currency of Ghana, and in addition thereto, his board and 
lodging while there, his patent application fee as well as that for 
services of either a patent agent or attorney all of which will have 
to be met in foreign currencies. The significance of all this is 
fully appreciated when one considers the present foreign exchange 
restrictions currently in force in the country.3 Though the author is 
not aware of any specific instances whereby applications for foreign 
exchange facilities to enable inventors prosecute patent applications 
in the U.K. have been turned down it is difficult, in view of 
government regulations, to foresee the Bank of Ghana approving foreign 
exchange allocations for such an exercise. In consideration of the 
fact that foreign currency is scarce in Ghana the discouragement of 
inventive activity, particularly for those inventors requiring patent 
protection, is real. 
The second negative aspect of cap. 179 relates to the divergence 
between the enviromnents and needs of the U.K. and Ghana as well as 
the dissimilarities in the levels of industrialization between the two 
3. By virtue of present government regulations, apart from 
government officials on approved official delegations or 
assignments abroad and those travelling abroad on medical 
grounds approved by certified govermnent medical practitioners, 
no one travelling abroad is entitled to any foreign exchange 
facilities. 
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countries. All these may render the U.K.' s law on paten~ especially 
the subject of patentability not necessarily relevant and adequate for 
the needs of Ghana. Consequently, inventions that may be considered 
by the latter to be of imrrense economic importance and also patentable 
may not necessarily be considered so in the U.K., and thus denied 
patent grant. This is believed by some officials at the 
Registrar-General's Department (RGO), the institution charged with the 
administration of patents in Ghana, to be the case in respect of two 
domestic inventions falling under the soap and agriculture industry.4 
All this may, therefore, result in the limited application of such 
inventions in Ghana due to their non-public disclosure and the desire 
of their inventors to keep them secret in the absence of any legal 
protection. 
Finally, the 1925 Ordinance permits the wholesale registration 
and influx into Ghana of patented products of doubtful significance 
for any meaningful technological and industrial developnent of the 
country. Since the Ordinance allows the automatic registration of any 
invention which has obtained a U.K. patent as long as the relevant 
conditions for registration in Ghana have been satisfied it is not 
surprising that inventions one may consider worthless are still 
registered in the country. For example, on 15 February 1965 Philip 
Morris Incorporated of the USA registered and obtained a monopoly 
right for its invention of plastic cigarette container in Ghana. 
Obviously, this invention has very little contribution to make to the 
developnent of I.T.C. in particular and the economic development of 
the country in general. Plastic cigarette containers are products 
which almost all the plastics industr ies in the country can produce 
without much difficulty. Yet Philip Morris Incorporated has acquired 
4. Interview with Senior Officials at the RGO, Accra, Octooer 1984. 
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a patent right for it and can, therefore, legally prevent any local 
firm from manufacturing it without its consent. 
All this makes incomprehensible the continued application of the 
Ordinance from the date of independence to the present. It is equally 
surprising that in spite of the varying characters of the country's 
regimes between these periods the Ordinance still stands unabrogated. 
It is instructive to note that an opportunity which arose in 1972 and 
which could have been capitalized on to determine the Ordinance was 
not used to the full and the latter, besides some amendments made to 
it (see NRCD81 below), therefore, still has legal effect in the 
country. 
Rhon~Poulence S.A. and another V Qlana National Trading Cor,poratioo 
A developnent in the patent system of Ghana which could have 
triggered off significant changes in the patent law of that country is 
the 1972 patent infringement suit between a foreign corrpany and a 
national comnercial institution. This is the case of Rhone-Poulence 
s.a. and another v The Ghana National Trading Corporation (GN'IC). 
This case is important for a number of reasons. First, it shows how 
MNCs are able to use patent infringement proceedings to maintain their 
monopoly, including import monopoly privileges, over their patented 
products. Moreover, it provided the opportunity, which, 
disappointingly, was not sufficiently utilized, to revise the entire 
patent law and system of Ghana. Finally, the decision of this case 
resulted in some changes in the country's patent law, the most 
important of which is the exclusion from patentability of all 
pharmaceutical products. 
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The case itself seems to be rooted in (1) the commercial 
operation of the defendant which imported and traded in all kinds of 
goods and coIIl!rodities including pharmaceutical products, and (2) more 
importantly the remarkable commercial success of the subject-matter of 
the suit, a drug called metronidazole. As confirmed by the 
plaintiffs, this drug "has been an outstanding success since its 
introduction on the market in 1960, and until the introduction in 1969 
of a chemically related substance, called nitrimidazine, metronidazole 
was the only product effective for the oral treatment of vaginal 
trichomoniasis" (cited in Rhone-Pou1ence S.a v G.N.T.C. at p.113). 
Even after 1969, the drug has been, and still is, extrenely useful in 
treating many infections. This drug, apparently, since its 
introduction in Ghana, has been very popular and has had a very good 
market for a considerable period of time. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that the defendant desired to participate in its Ghanaian 
market. It is this desire of the defendant to break the second 
plaintiff's monopoly control over the sale of the drug in the country 
which led to this suit. 
It may also be mentioned here that another factor which 
contributed to the commencement of the entire proceedings, as emerged 
in the course of the suit, was the prior and repeated infringement by 
the defendant of plaintiffs' Ghana Patent No. 288 which is in respect 
of the product called chlorpromazine. This product is nanufactured 
and sold by the second plaintiff under the registered tradenark 
"Largactil" • It is in fact the infringement of their rights in this 
product of which they were initially aware, and accordingly they wrote 
to the defendant to stop any further infringement thereof. However, 
after the defendent had ignored their letter and canmenced the 
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infringement of their rights in another product, that is the 
metronidazole, covered by the Ghana Patent No. 522 they had no 
hesitation in commencing this suit. 
The first plaintiff was the owner of the U.K. Patent No. 836854. 
This patent was sealed in the U.K. Patent Office on 2e September 196e, 
and it covered an invention entitled the nNew imidazole derivatives 
and processes for their preparations". The said patent was 
subsequently registered in Ghana under cap. 179 as Patent No. 522 and 
dated 18 October 1962. '!he second plaintiff (May and Baker) was a 
manufacturer registered in Ghana as an external company dealing IroStly 
in pharmacutical and medical preparations, and was the exclusive 
licensee and wholly owned subsidiary of the first plaintiff in respect 
of the said patent in Ghana. The defendant, on the other hand, is a 
statutory corporation set up by the Ghana National Trading Corporation 
Instrument, 1965 (L.I. 395), which trades in all kinds of goods and 
commodities encompassing every conceivable provision. 
In this case the plaintiff applied for an interim injunction to 
restrain the defendant from infringing their patent rights in respect 
of the Ghana Patent No. 522 and from offering for sale a drug called 
metronidazole - one of the imidazole derivatives covered b¥ the patent 
and the product involved in the infringement suit - which is 
manufactured and sold b¥ the second plaintiff in Ghana and other parts 
of the world under the trade name nFlagyln. The defendant's 
contention was that it received the product in question from its 
manufacturer-supplier, called International Generics Limited of 
London, for sale in the country, and consequently could not be held 
responsible for any infringement. 
After the determination of the case, Atban J. held that where a 
patent has been granted in Ghana for processing a particular product, 
the importation from abroad and the sale in Ghana of that product mde 
according to the patented process by a person who is neither the 
patentee nor the licensee of the latter is an infringement. 
Accordingly, the court granted the application of the plaintiffs and 
restrained the defendant from infringing the Ghana Patent No. 522 
pending the further order of the court. 
Another interesting holding of the court related to the 
applicability of the U.K. Patent Act 1949 in Ghana. In this respect 
the court held that the U.K. Patents Act 1949 did not apply to Ghana. 
Though the court reasoned that the Act which consolidated the Patent 
and Design Acts 1907-1949 was not a statute of general application, 
its non-applicability to the country can rightly be explained by the 
fact that it was passed after the reception date of 1876. Moreover, 
as pointed out by the court, there was no evidence that its provisions 
had been adopted by the country's legislature. 
There are three interesting similarities between this case and 
the Nigerian case of Rhone-Poulence and another v Lodeka Pharnacy Ltd. 
(SUpra) that need to be brought out. First, the plaintiffs in both 
cases are the same MNCs. Secondly, chlorpromazine which is 
manufactured and sold by the second plaintiff featured in both cases. 
Though it was the subject in issue in the Nigerian case it also came 
up prominently in the Ghanaian case. Thirdly, the Ghanaian court like 
the Nigerian also held that the U.K. Patents Act did not apply to 
Ghana. Finally, both courts issued injunctions against the defendants 
which happen to be domestic firms. The significance of the two cases 
is that they demonstrate how foreign MNCs are able to use infringement 
suits to prevent U;X; indigenous firms from "intruding" into their 
"territories" and thus retain their import monopoly privileges over 
their patented products. 
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The judgrrent in the case of Rhone-Pculence S.A. and another v 
G.N.T.C. provided a fertile ground for the Glanaian governtrent to have 
a fresh look at the entire patent law and system of the country but 
this \>as not to be. Instead of a nuch broader approach to the patent 
issue, the pronpt government response \'thich was provoked by the 
judgrrent far from addressing the G1anaian patent system in a nuch 
broader perspective only sought to ccunteract the effect of the 
court • s dec is ion. The governrrent' s reaction is manifested by the 
pronu1gation of the Patents Registration (AIrendrrent) Decree, 1972, 
NRC) 81. It is interesting to note that the tirre lag betw=en the date 
the judgrrent \'as delivered and the Decree \'as pronulgated :is only one 
rronth. This \'as important in nipping in the bud the effect the 
judgerrent might have had on the state corporation. The judgement ms 
deli vered on 26 l-tay, 1972, am the Decree pronulgated on 28 J\me 1972. 
Patents Registration (1\neldnentl Decree 1972« NIQ) 81 
The Patents Registration (Anendrrent) Decree, 1972 is essentially 
a response to the decision in the case of Rhone-Pculence S.A. and 
another v GNTC. The Decree basically seeks to exclude from 
patentability all pharmaceutical products. S.l(l) of NRCD 81 provides 
that: 
No application shall be entertained under the Patents 
Registration Ordinance (Cap. 197) (hereinafter 
referred to as the Ordinance) in respect of any drug, 
medicine, or pharmaceutical preparation, substance or 
naterial. 
In addition, the Decree also effectively and retroactively cancelled 
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all patent monopoly privileges granted to pharmaceutical products. 
S.1(2) explicitly stated: 
The Registrar-General shall cause to be cancelled 
every entry in the Register kept under the Ordinance 
in respect of any drug, medicine, or pharmaceutical 
preparation, substance or material. 
So that from 29 June 1972, the date on which the Decree was 
promulgated, all pharmaceutical products ceased to qualify for patent 
protection in Ghana, and in the case of those which, like the 
metronidazole, have hitherto enjoyed such protection they were, from 
that date, deprived of any IOOnopoly privilege. All this helped to 
forestall any adverse effect the decision in the Rhone-Poulence case 
might have brought on the GN'IC. The above provisions, it does appear, 
have been and are still being strictly enforced. 
Clearly, by virtue of S.l of NIQ) 81 the Ghanaian patent law, 
particularly in respect of pharmaceuticals has since 1972 closely 
followed those of other LDCs such as India which in 197B excluded the 
patentability of drugs and Colombia which after 1971 changed its law 
again in 1978 with the formal incorporation of Decision 85 of the 
Andean Pact, thus excluding, among other things, drugs from patent 
protection. Other LDCs which exclude pharmaceutical products fran 
patentability are the member countries of the African and Malagasy 
Industrial Property Organisation (OAMPI) which include the Ivory 
Coast, Senegal, Togo and Burkina Faso. Some LOCs such as TUrkey, 
because of heavy foreign exchange losses and inflated prices of vital 
drugs (Kirim, 1985), and Brazil exclude from patentability both 
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pharmaceutical products and processes. Mexican law also excludes 
pharmaceutical products and processes from patent protection. 
However, in the case of processes they may be protected under 
inventor's certificate. 
It is imperative to nention another important provision which 
found its way into NRCD 81, but which does not seem to have been given 
much effect. This is S.2 which provides that: 
Where the Registrar-General is of the opinion that the 
registration of a patent under the Ordinance would be 
contrary to the public interest, he may, after 
consultation with the Attorney-General, refuse any 
application in respect thereof and return any fee paid 
by the applicant. 
Obviously, S.2 vests in the Registrar-General a very wide discretion 
to refuse any patent application if in his opinion it is in the public 
interest so to do. This provision is very significant since it may 
permit a selective consideration of patent applications against the 
background of the objectives which the government may consider to be 
relevant to the public interest. 
However, in contradistinction to S.l which has been effectively 
used to refuse registration of patents for pharmaceutical products no 
application for patent registration has ever been refused on the basis 
of S.2. This may be attributable to the fact that pharmaceutical 
products being the prine target of the Decree all efforts are, 
therefore, directed more to them than any other products. Moreover 
and equally iIrportant is the fact that the present legal structure may 
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not be an appropriate framework within which the efficacious 
application of S.2, particularly in terms of the eclectic inflow of 
foreign technology, can be made. This is because the refusal or 
conferral of patent grants for inventions of different products may 
need to be undertaken as part and parcel of an overall technological 
programme or policy. This may be distinguished from the refusal of a 
given patent application on the grounds of public morality or legal 
considerations which may not be difficult to carry out. But when the 
refusal or acceptance rests on technological developmental 
considerations then it cannot be accomplished piecemeal but rather in 
relation to the entire technological programne. Consequently, without 
such a programme, as in the case of Ghana, the successful application 
of S.2 will be difficult to achieve. 
It may also be mentioned that, in addition to its major 
objective of excluding pharmaceuticals fram patentability NRCD 81, by 
virtue of S.4, makes a provision for patent fees, an issue over which 
cap. 179 was absolutely mute. This is significant in the sense that 
it has filled in a serious gap in the administration of patents by 
providing legally enforceable fees which may contribute to meeting 
some of the administrative expenditure involved in the process of 
registering patents and issuing certificates of registration for 
patentees. Disappointingly, however, S.4 subjects all inventions or 
patents to the same fees without any differentiation on the basis of 
the dissimilarities in the economic importance of the invention 
covered by the patent or of the value to the patentee of the national 
market, a value which may vary from one class of patent to another. 
Similarly, the chargeable fees do not have any relationship to the 
industrial sectors into which the inventions fall. It may also be 
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added that the fees prescribed by S. 4 and those currently charged are 
so srrall that they cannot be considered to neet in any reasonable 
proportion sone of the expenditure involved in the administration of 
patents in the coontry. All this clearly reveals an absence of any 
indicators of economic irrportance which inplies that the notion of 
enploying patent fees as an instrwrent of economic policy with respect 
to patents is yet to be either accepted or adopted by the country. 
The final significant provision of NRQ) is that of S.6. It 
concerns the then pending patent infr ingernent suits brooght by foreign 
patentees against t\\O rrajor state organisations. The first of such 
suits was the substantive suit \\ilich \'as then pending and brought by 
Rhone-Poulence against the GNIC. The other suit was that brought by 
Hoffrran La Roche owners of valium and librium - trade nanes for the 
drugs diazepam and chloridiaze paxide respectively - against the Ghana 
Industr ial Holding Corporation, Pharmaceutical Division (GIHOC 
Pharrraceuticals). The latter infringed the plaintiff's patent rights 
men it comrenced production of these drugs. It is instructive to 
note that while S.l stultified these infringenent suits it is S.6 
which effectively and unanbiguously ordained the withdrawal of such 
suits. The section expressly provides that: 
All actions pending immediately before the 
comrencerrent of this Decree in respect of any matter 
arising under the Patents Registration Ordinance (Cap. 
179) in relation to any drug, medicine, or 
pharmaceutical preparation, substance or rraterial 
shall abate on the comrencenent of this Decree. 
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Obviously S.6 provided no alternative for these foreign patentees but 
for the abatement of the actions they had commenced against the above 
nentioned state organisations. The premature determination of the 
then pending substantive suit between Rhone-Poulence S.A. and anor. v 
GN'n: by S.6 goes to confirm that the promulgation of NRCD81 was 
essentially a ripost to the interim judgrrEnt in that case. 
Though NRCD 81 generally has the nerit of narrowing down the 
unregulated monopoly privileges provided by cap. 179 by excluding 
pharmaceuticals from such privileges it does not, together with the 
latter, provide for the country an adequate patent law. Taken 
together Cap. 179 and NRCD 81 do not seem to constitute a 
comprehensive patent regime, and stand far apart from the modern 
patent law which may have the potential of serving as a spur to 
indigenous inventive activity, innovation and technology transfer. It 
may also be nentioned that the two pieces of leg islations do not 
contain any patent-abuse-checking measures such as compulsory 
licensing revocation and forfeiture to deal with patent abuses 
including non-working. 
Not surprisingly, the present patent regime, as already hinted 
and as will be clearly discussed in the next chapter, has not, inter 
alia, been able to afford the country the benefits that the patent 
system is generally believed to give. In addition to the other 
functions of the system (See Chapter 1) the present regime has not 
succeeded, to any reasonable degree, in transferring technology 
effectively to the country. In fact, it has been used by patentees, 
as we shall see in the next chapter, to impede the efficacious 
technology transfer to the country through the inclusion of anti-
competitive practices in their licensing and investment transactions. 
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It is in this respect that a legal regirre for the regulation of such 
technology transfer transactions including FDIs becoJres very crucial 
if the effects of the inadeq,Iacies of the patent regirre are to be 
minimized. 
Technology Transfer Regine .in (}}ana 
Technology transfer regulation in G1ana is a novel art, and can 
rightly be considered to be in its enbroynic stage. Nevertheless, 
with the current enthusiasm on the subject, it nay not be very IOn:J 
before a Jreaningful and effective control of the inflow of foreign 
technology into the country will becOJre a reality. 
Historical Pevelqment 
In spite of the fact that anticompetitive practices, 
particularly in respect of the transfer of technology, have been 
practised in Glana ever since independence in 1957 it \'.8S not until 
recently that the basis to deal with this phenoJrenon was laid by the 
Constitutent Assembly Which was charged with the drafting of the third 
Republic's constitution. 
The absence of the regulation of these anticompetitive practices 
may be attributable to the style of industrialization initiated after 
Glana becarre independent and practised until very recently. This 
style of industrialization has as its primary aim the production of 
finished goods for domestic consumption. It put emphasis on 
importation of both technology and raw materials suited to the forJreI. 
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The rrost significant feature that characterised this style of 
industrialization is the overwhelming emphasis which ms plt on 
inexpensive iIrported technology mich \'as usually brought in. project 
packages. On the contrary, this style of industrialisation as 
practised in Ghana did not, in spite of its significance, accord ecpal 
importance to the technology acquisition considerations mich inclu de 
the terrrs and conditions under which technology is accpired. 
All this may be a reflection of the total absence of a concrete 
and coherent technology policy during that period. It may be 
mentioned that despite the efforts initiated during the third Republic 
there are not at the rrorrent any integrated technology policies of 
either a general or sectoral nature. It is, therefore, not surprisiI¥j 
that there have not up till now been any regulations over the term 
am conditions under which technology is acquired. This, clearly, is 
an unfortunate shortcoming in the technology acquisition process of 
Ghana because such terms and conditions have a considerable effect on 
the development of indigenous technological capabilities. 
Ho~ver, after more than too decades of unprogramned inports of 
technology there has now been an increasing awareness and need for a 
sound technology progranme as ~1l as the need to regulate the terms 
and conditions of technology brought into the country. The 
Constituent Assenbly which was charged with the responsibility of 
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drafting the constitution of the third Republic seemed to have taken 
cognisance of this development which is reflected in the 1979 
Constitution of the said Republic. 
In order to streamline the science and technology policies and 
programmes of the country Article 73(4) (a) of the third Republic's 
constitution provided for the establishment of the National 
Development Commission, the functions of which, inter alia, is to 
study and make nreconnnendations on the contribution of agriculture, 
industry and science and technology in general to the national 
development ••• n• Within this COmmission, which was set up after the 
Constitution had come into force, is the Science and Technology sector 
Corrani ttee, the wing of the Corraniss ion responsible for science and 
technology policies. The Committee is the main body responsible for 
the country's strategy for technological development and has been 
advocating for policies in that respect. For instance, in its 19B1 
Report the Committee among other measures advocated for the nselective 
and controlled importation of science and technologyn. It is part of 
all this, that is, the need to regulate technology transfer contracts 
and more influentially to attract foreign investments in Ghana that 
culminated in the promulgation of the Investment Code, 19B1, Act 437 
and the establishnent of the Ghana Investments Centre. 
:InvestJrent COde 19B1 CM 437) and the (})ana Tnyffitm'lts centre 
The Investment Code, 19B1 (Act 437) by S.l established the Ghana 
Investment Centre (GIC), the body responsible for the regulation of 
technology transactions and the general administration of the Code. 
Act 437 consolidated and re-enacted the then existing legislation 
relating to investments in Ghana such as the capital Investments 
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Decree, 1973 (NRCD 14) and the Investment Policy Decree, 1975 (NRCD 
329) with such amendments as to attract large-scale investments in the 
country. 
Until 1981 when the Code was enacted there was no centralised 
effort to regulate the inflow of technology. Hitherto, action in this 
respect has been undertaken on a sectoral and ad hoc basis, and 
earlier legislation has essentially been concerned generally with 
foreign investments and especially the foreign exchange aspect of the 
investment transaction as noted earlier. The Code which covered a 
broad spectrum of activities pertaining to the promotion and 
regulation of investments sought to rectify this practice by including 
the technology element involved in the investment package. 
It is instructive to note that the approval and registration of 
technology transfer contracts relating to investments in Ghana was 
only one of the twelve clearly spelt out functions of the Centre (See 
S.l~). Generally, in deciding to process or approve of investments, 
the Centre had to have regard to the potential of the investment to 
contribute to the importation at reasonable cost and transfer of 
technology and technical skills to and absorption thereof by Ghanaians 
(S.ll). These criteria for investments approval are very crucial 
since they are directed towards the acquisition and absorption of the 
necessary foreign technology by nationals. 
So far as the regulation of technology transfer is concerned 
S.l~ (2) (k) vested in the Centre the power to napprove and register all 
technology transfer contracts relating to investments in Ghanan• The 
main provision of the Code which dealt with approval and registration 
of technology transfer contracts is S.29. The raison d'etre of this 
section, it will appear, was to depart from theentire practice whereby 
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approval of especially foreign investments was confined to the foreign 
exchange element and to realise the important aspect of the 
investment, that is, the rreaningful and effective transfer of the 
technology involved in the transaction. 
The provisions of S.29 are as follows: 
(1) The Centre shall have power to approve and shall also 
maintain a register of all technology transfer contracts 
in Ghana. 
(2) Regulations made under Section 41 of this Code may 
prescribe -
(a) that a technology transfer is invalid if not 
registered under this section; 
(b) the form of application for approval and 
registration under this section and the particulars 
and docurrents to be submitted with each application; 
(c) the fees to be paid in respect of any application, 
approval or registration; 
(d) the circlJIllStances in which an application rust be 
refused; 
(e) appeals from the refusal of an application; 
(f) any other matter that appears to the Centre to be 
reasonably necessary to be prescr ibed in relation 
thereto. 
S.29 clearly prepared the grounds for controlling the inflow of all 
technology into the country which could encompass the exclusion of the 
prevalent restrictive practices which still take place in technology 
transactions involving enterprises in the country. It is regrettable 
to note, however, that so far the regulations called for in S.4l of 
the Code were not made up till the time the Code was repealed on 17 
July 1985. The Centre did not, therefore, during the period the Code 
was in force, have any legal coherent criteria and rrethodology for the 
evaluation, screening, ratification and registration of tecmology 
transfer agreements. 
The continuing absence of these regulations as well as the 
general reservations made about the Code and the political climate 
that followed its enactment (see the next Chapter for discussion on 
these) did not only affect the functions of the Centre which included 
the regulation of the transfer of technology, but also the entire 
operation of the Code. This naturally necessitated a second look at 
the Code by the government of the Provisional National Defence Council 
(P.N.D.C.) which has culminated in a new Investment Code. 
TnyP§t]nmt Code, 1985, PeNeDeCeLe 116 
P.N.D.C.L. 116 is essentially a revised version of its 
predecessor, Act 437. The revision process took, inter alia, the for.m 
of public debates which involved quite a number of Ghanaians from all 
walks of life. Finally, the new draft code was presented and defended 
by senior officials of the GIC set up by Act 437 before a panel of 
Ghanaian economists, lawyers and other professionals. After the 
entire revision exercise the new investment code was promulgated on 17 
July 1985. 
'!he Glana Inyestnmts Centre (GIC) 
The new investments code, P.N.D.C.L. 116, by 5.1 re-establishes 
the Ghana Investments Centre (GIC) which is to be responsible for 
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encouraging, promoting and co-ordinating investments in the Ghanaian 
economy. It is to be headed by a Chief Executive responsible for its 
day-to-day administration and the implenentation of its Board's 
decisions (S.6(2». The Board shall be the main governing body of the 
GIC and shall be responsible for the discharge of the business and 
functions of the Centre. It shall consist of a Chairman and six other 
persons, including a Vice-Chairman and a Chief Executive all of wham 
shall be appointed by the government (the PNDC) taking into 
consideration their sound knowledge or practical experience of matters 
pertaining to investments in Ghana, or both. 
An interesting and useful provision relating to deliberations of 
the Board is provided by S.4 (4) • This section vests in the Board a 
discretion to co-opt any person to act as adviser at any neeting of 
the Board. Though any person so co-opted shall not have the right to 
vote on any matter corning before the Board for decision, the provision 
is still significant for the fact that it will enable the Board to 
avail itself of the expertise of any person which may be relevant and 
useful to issues that corne before it. A similar useful provision is 
that of S.5 which provides that nthe Board may for the discharge of 
the functions of the Centre appoint Committees of the Board comprising 
members of the Board or non-nernbers or both and may assign to them 
such functions as the Board may determine". This provision equally 
makes available to the Board skills which it may lack. 
'Ille GIC and its FUnctions 
The Code assigns to the GIC a wide spectrum of functions 
relating to both foreign and domestic investment activities within the 
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country (See 5.2). Among these are (i) the collection, collation, 
analysis and dissemination of information about investment 
opportunities and sources of investment capital, and the advice upon 
request, on the availability, choice or suitability of partners in 
joint venture projects, (ii) the identification of specific projects 
and invitation of interested investors for the implementation of such 
projects, (iii) the granting of approvals for the establishnent of 
enterprises as specified under the Code, and (iv) the oonitoring and 
enforcement of compliance with the terms and conditions of approvals 
granted under this Code. In addition to all this the GIC is also nto 
approve and keep record of all technology transfer agreements relating 
to investments under this Coden6 (S.2(i». 
It is significant, because of the intertwining of the issues 
of the transfer of technology and foreign investment, that the Code 
dovetails the regulation of technology transfers into the entire 
investment regulatory functions of the GIC. This approach which is 
similar to the Andean Pact's (see Decision 24) has the merit of 
enabling the GIC to adopt a more comprehensive approach to the issue 
of controlling technology transfer which is after all an integral part 
of the subject of foreign investments. In this way it may be possible 
to examine, in correlation, the components or subjects relating to the 
whole investment package, such as the relevance of the project 
6. This Code does not cover investment activities relating to both 
petroleum and mineral industries. In the case of the petroleum 
industry it is governed by the petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) Law, 1984 (P.N.D.C. Law 84) while a different law is 
to be promulgated for investment activities concerning mineral 
exploitation. 
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involved to the entire national econo~, the foreign exchange element 
involved, the suitability of the technology and the relevant 
provisions to ensure its efficacious absorption and possible 
adaptation. It my be mentioned, however, that the ability of the 
Centre to accorrplish this will depend on whether it has all the 
necessary expertise to undertake the required thorough examination of 
the above issues and whether some of these issues may not be over-
emphasised to the detriment of the others. In the event that the 
Centre should lack expertise to examine sane aspects of the entire 
investment project it may seem reasonable to assign such aspects to 
other institutions best suited for that purpose. The other 
alternative will be to ensure that such expertise is made easily 
available to the Centre. It may also seem reasonable that the various 
issues are given equal and adequate attention so that the technology 
transfer aspect is not relegated to a secondary place in the 
examination process. 
'lhe GIC and 'l'eclmology Transfer Regulation 
The examination and approval of all technology transfer 
agreements in the country (see footnote 6) are entrusted to the GlC. 
This is governed by Part V of P.N.C.D.L. 116. According to 5.40(1): 
Technology Transfer Agreement means any agreement 
relating to an enterprise approved under this Code 
involving:-
(a) the assignment, sale and use of foreign patents, 
trademarks or other industrial property rights: 
(b) the supply of foreign technical know-how or 
technological knowledge: 
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(c) foreign technical assistance, design and 
engineering, consultancy or other technical 
services in whatever form they nay be supplied; 
(d) foreign managerial, narketing or other services: 
provided however that an agreement shall not be 
regarded as a technology transfer agreement for 
the purposes of this Code if its duration does 
not exceed a period of eighteen months. 
It will be noticed that the above definition does not include 
agreements covering plant, machinery and equipnent which epitomize 
embodied technology. Consequently, agreements covering the sale or 
import into the country of hardware technology involving enterprises 
approved under the Code nay not be subjected to any examination by the 
GIC. This means that the inclusion of any restrictive practices in 
such agreements is likely to go unchecked, and this certainly 
represents a major shortcoming of the Code. 
For the proper regulation and monitoring of technology transfer 
transactions the GIe must maintain a record of all technology transfer 
agreements, including amend:rrents thereto (5.27 (1» • In this respect 
all technology transfer agreements concluded and in force in relation 
to a Ghanaian enterprise before the commencement of the Code are to be 
submitted by the parties to the GIC within a period of six months of 
the commencement of the Code (5.29(1». In addition, a record of all 
amendments to such agreements must also be maintained by the Centre, 
and no such agreements may be renewed without its approval. Moreover, 
the Centre may advise the parties regarding any existing technology 
transfer agreements, particularly as to the suitability of the 
technology and the level of renruneration for the transfer (5.29 (4» • 
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In the case of an approved enterprise7 where there is involved a 
technology transfer agreement the GIC shall evaluate such agreement, 
advise the investor with regard to the choice and suitability of 
technology, and monitor and ensure compliance with the terms and 
condi tions of such agreement (5.27 (2» • These functions are very 
significant and represent a major departure fram the earlier approach 
where the foreign exchange element used to be the main consideration 
in respect of foreign investIoonts in the country (Supra). Through the 
process of approving enterprises intending to invest in the country, 
and evaluating and monitoring related approved technology transfer 
contracts at the same time the Centre is, thus, seeking to identify 
the technology element of the investIoont package and to ensure its 
effective transfer to the country. 
Where a technology transfer agreement has been approved by the 
GIC, a certificate of such approval is issued to the approved 
enterprise. Without this approval, no such agreement relating to 
enterprise requiring the ratification of the Centre shall cone into 
effect (5.28(2». This means that any such agreement may be invalid 
and cannot be enforced in the courts. The effect of non-approval 
under the Ghanaian law which is similar to the Mexican (See Art. 11 of 
the Law on the Control and Registration Transfer of Technology, 16 Dec 
7. 5.43 (1) defines an "approved enterprise" as "an enterprise to 
which approval has been granted by the Centre under this Code". 
And enterprise is defined as "an industry, project, undertaking, 
or business or an enlargement of any such industry, undertaking, 
project or business, or any part of any such industry, 
undertaking, project or business". 
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1981) is more far-reaching than, as we shall see in Chapter 6, the 
Niger ian where the only sanction attached to the non-approval of 
technology transfer agreerrent is the denial of foreign exchange 
transfers by Nigerian Banks in favour of technology suppliers. 
An important provision of the Code which seeks to address the 
question of restrictive practices involved in technology transfer 
transactions, which as the next chapter will reveal are still in vogue 
in Ghana, is S.3~. It provides that: 
The Board may make regulations in respect of any of 
the following: 
(a) criteria for the approval of technology transfer 
agreements; 
~) remuneration for technology transfer and 
reasonableness of fees; 
(c) reasonableness of duration of agreement; 
(d) restrictive business practices; 
(e) transfer and absorption of technology; 
(f) form and procedure for approval and roonitoring 
of technology transfer agreements; 
(g) any other matter relating to technology transfer 
agreements that appear to the Centre to be 
reasonably necessary. 
S.30 gives the Board a discretion to make regulations to enable the 
GIC to adopt an uniform and coherent criteria in its functions of 
ratifying technology transfer contracts as well as combatting 
anticompetitive practices in such agreerrents. With the benefit of 
hindsight, that is, the non-adoption of any such regulation by the 
Centre as called for by the preceding Code (i.e. Investrrents Code, 
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1981) and despite the fact that it was given the discretion to adopt 
one (SUpra) it will seem appropriate to have made the adoption of 
these regulations mandatory on the Board. Nevertheless, with the 
current enthusiasm for controlling the transfer of technology into the 
country it is hoped that the Board will adopt the appropriate 
regulations called for by 5.313. At the time of writing some 
guidelines of a sort have been presented to the Centre by an expert 
from the UN Centre for Transnational CorpOrations (tJNC'l(:) which may 
assist it in formulating the regulations. These guidelines cover 
issues such as criteria for approval of technology transfer contracts, 
remuneration for technology, duration of contracts, prohibition of 
restrictive practices, confidentiality obligation, training of 
Ghanaians, and application and procedures. 
Part V of the Code reinforces the spirit of the preceding Code 
which is the centralisation, apart from the petroleum and mineral 
industries, of investments and technology transfer regulations under 
one institution. The effective execution of the Code and the adoption 
of the necessary legally enforceable regulations backed by an adequate 
monitoring system may ensure the expunction of the prevalent 
anti-competitive practices in technology transfer transactions and the 
possible efficacious transfer and absorption of technology by 
indigenous Ghanaians. It may be nentioned that despite sone of its 
major shortcomings, such as the exclusion from examination by the GIC 
of hardware technology transfer agreements and others not covered by 
the study P.N.D.C.L. 116 appears to be an improvement on earlier laws 
relating to regulations of investment activities as well as the 
transfer of technology. 
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Conclusion 
It is clear from the above that Ghana has no autonoIOOUS and 
comprehensive patent law of its own and still operates a colonial 
ordinance which was amended in 1972 to exclude phar.maceutical products 
from patentability. The operation of this ordinance as we endeavoured 
to demonstrate could, in addition to other factors such as inadequate 
resources for R&D and R&D engineers and scientists (see next 
chapter), hinder indigenous inventi ve activity. Moreover, the lack of 
any provisions to check patent abuses including non-working could also 
affect the role of the Ghanaian patent system in transferring 
technology to the country. 
It nay also be added that the inadequacies of the patent system, 
as will become clearer in Chapter 5, are exploited by patentees to 
impose on Ghanaian enterprises anti-competitive practices. It is in 
this respect that the enactment of Act 437, the first Investments 
Code, was significant. However, the non-adoption of the relevant 
regulations, among others, did not enable the GIC set up under that 
Act to function successfully. The promulgation of the P.N.D.C.L. 116 
is, therefore, seen as an attempt to rectify the then existing 
situation. P.N.D.C.L. 116 re-establishes the GIC and entrusts it with 
the power to promote and regulate investments in the country. 
FUrthermore, it is, at the same time, anpowered to regulate technology 
transfer agreements which is quite meritorious in view of the 
interrelation between the transfer of technology and foreign 
investments. It is hoped that the regulations called for by S.3~ will 
be mde as early as possible so as to arm the GIC to undertake the 
thorough regulation of technology transfer transactions in the 
country. 
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Though P.N.D.C.L. 116 was recently promulgated (i.e. July 1985) 
and this makes it difficult to assess its effect on the regulation of 
the transfer of technology it may be possible to evaluate the results 
of the other enactments. Accordingly, we shall, in the next chapter, 
examine the impact of cap. 179 and N.R.C.D. 81 on patenting activity 
in and the transfer of technology to Ghana and that of Act 437 on 
technology transfer regulation. 
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0IAPl'ER 5 
mE GJANl\IAN PATENI' SYS'.lD! AID 'lmnq1X;Y TRANSFER: PBl1C'l'ICE 
Introcilctioo 
It will be recalled that cap. 179 and NlO> 81 are the rrain 
legislation which govern the administration of patents in Ghana. The 
former has been in force for a period of 60 years and the latter over 
13 years. We shall, in this chapter, endeavour to ascertain both 
their individual and conbined effects on patenting activity in and the 
transfer of technology to the country. Similarly, we shall also 
examine how far the technology transfer regines as well as related 
governmental policies and institutions have been able to contribute to 
a genuine and effective technology transfer to Ghana. 
Cap. 179 and Patenting I\ct:ivity 
It does appear that besides other factors such as the paucity of 
R&D resources and skilled technical and scientific personnel cap. 
179 has considerably contributed to the dearth of domestic inventive 
and patenting activities by Ghanaian inventors. By virtue of cap. 
179, as has already been mentioned in the preceding chapter, every 
Ghanaian inventor who desires a Ghanaian patent for his invention must 
first of all obtain a U.K. patent grant for it and thereafter apply 
for the registration of the latter in Ghana. It is only after going 
through this process that one can obtain a Ghanaian patent grant. 
This process, as explained in Chapter Four, could be costly and 
tedious and it is this cost and tedium which have contributed to 
preventing a nurrber of indigenous inventors from applying for and 
obtaining patent grants for their inventions. 
163 
Among the inventions for which patent protection has been sought 
from the Registrar-General' s Department (RGO) - the department in 
charge of the administration of patents in Ghana - but for which none 
could be procured because of the said cost and tedium include a camera 
made out of a small sized kerosene can. This camera, it is believed, 
was once used in taking a snap of the inventor and the late Prime 
Minister of the second Republic of Ghanal • However, because the 
former, a poor technician, could not in particular afford to meet the 
expenses involved in d:>taining a U.K. grant his invention has not up 
till now been subjected to any test of patentability2. Consequently, 
no patent grant for it has been made. The IIOst recent indigenous 
inventions which have not up to date received any Ghanaian patent, 
particularly because of the cumbersome procedure which is inherent in 
cap. 179 (SUpra), include a mchine and the process for making burnt 
bricks on site developed by the Building and Road Research Institute. 
Another is the developnent of a modem television aerial with two 
antennae by the General Manager of Akasanoma, the electronics division 
of the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation (GIHOC) 3. 
As confirmed by the RGD most of the inventions for which 
protection has been sought at the department appear to be 
economically useful4• However, the present patent regime has not mde 
it possible for the RGD to grant patent rights for these inventions. 
As one official observed, most indigenous inventors who 
1. Interview with an official at the RGO, Accra, October 1984. 
2. same interview. 
3. Interview with the Registrar-General, Accra, October 1984. 
4. same interview. 
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come to enquire about the possible patenting of their inventions 
always get disappointed when they are told that the RGD could not 
register their inventions until they have produced evidence of a prior 
U.K. grant.5 On the question of the patentability of these inventions 
the state of the law has left unresolved whether these inventions 
would be patentable anyway. 
A major detrimental effect of all this is that such indigenously 
developed inventions, most of which are abandoned, do not contribute 
to providing a source of technical knowledge for further R&D since 
they invariably die with their inventors. Moreover, they do not 
contribute to public welfare because they are often not worked which, 
besides inadequate resources for their exploitation, may be due to the 
lack of legal protection. It may be argued that inventors of such 
inventions could proceed to exploit them even without patent grants if 
they had any rerits. This nay be true, but the point to be nade here 
is that the patent system of Ghana in its present structure cannot 
favour the indigenous inventor with the legal protection that the 
patent system is generally known to give to inventors. 
To date there is only one indigenous Ghanaian invention which 
has so far been registered in the country. This is the "mashing 
machine" developed by a Ghanaian engineer called samuel Kwasi Anane. 
The main function of the invention is for the making of paste, 
popularly known in west Africa as fufu, from root crops such as yams, 
cocoyams, cassava, and also plantains after they have been softened by 
boiling in water. The invention eliminates almost all the traditional 
laborious process involved in the preparation of this dish. 
5. Interview with an official at the RGD, Accra, October 1984. 
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The invention comprises a circular bowl with sloping sides and a 
"central frustoconical-shaped core" into which the food to be treated 
is placed, two arms, the lower ends of which arms are of similar 
cross-section to that of the lower part of the circular channel, means 
for reciprocating the arms in vertical planes into and out of the 
channel, and means for rotating the bowl relatively to the arms. The 
whole mechanism is assenbled into a compact unit. In operation the 
products to be pounded or worked, that is, yams, cocoyams, cassava and 
plantains are placed in the bowl and the mechanism is operated, for 
instance, by switching on an electric motor, or by turning a wheel by 
hand. The bowl revolves at only a slow speed of about three to four 
revolutions per minute. At the same time the arms move with 
alternating, reciprocating motion into and out of the channel in the 
lower part of the bowl. The ends of the arns "break up the products 
placed in the bowl by crashing and squeezing them between their 
rounded V-shaped ends and the walls of the channel in the bCMI which 
are of similar shape". The material, that is, the flesh of the yam or 
cassava, is "squeezed out and gradually taken on to the location of 
the other arm" where the operation is repeated. After a short time "a 
very homogeneous, well mixed paste is obtained". If desired mixing 
may be ameliorated by installing one or more "fixed curved blades in 
the bowl". As the paste in the channel rotates it is forced against 
the blade and the curvature of the latter causes further mixing. 
To secure a Ghanaian patent grant for this invention, Anane 
after being apprised of the cumbersome procedure by the RGD first 
travelled to the U.K., engaged the services of a patent agent, one 
N.F. Baker, who prosecuted the necessary application and eventually 
procured a patent for the invention there before returning to Ghana to 
register the U.K. patent in Accra for the Ghanaian grant. TOOugh 
Anane obtained a certificate of registration in January 1975 rrost 
officials did not, until recently, know that the invention has since 
then got the Ghanaian registration. This is not surprising since in 
the Ghanaian Patent Register, the U.K. is recorded as the country of 
origin of the invention and the inventor himself described not as a 
Ghanaian but as a British subject. The fact is that Anane eventually 
managed to get a Ghanaian patent for his invention only after he had 
obtained a U.K. grant for it and registered the same with the roo. 
The question, however, is did he really need to go through that 
process at all, and how many other Ghanaian inventors can afford or 
are prepared to go through the same process? This process which is 
prescribed by a colonial ordinance is currently rrost irrelevant and 
ought to have been laid to rest long ago. It does seem, based on 
available evidence, that most Ghanaian inventors either cannot afford 
or are not prepared to go through this process, and the earlier a much 
simpler mode of obtaining a Ghanaian patent is conceived the better 
for indigenous inventive activity. 
other consequences of cap. 179 include the fact that it does 
permit, as earlier observed, the inflow into the country of patented 
products or technology of minimal economic significance or none at 
all. As mentioned above, the wholesale registration of U.K. patents 
has made possible the registration in the country of an invention such 
as plastic cigarette containers for which Philip Morris Inc. of U.S.A. 
has obtained a monopoly right. Finally, the absence of 
in-built-checks in Cap. 179 against patent abuses as well as 
non-working account for the fact that most Ghanaian patents are not 
worked and patent abuses are prevalent (infra). 
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NIO> 81 and its Effects on Patenting Activity and the phaJ"Pf¥Wtical 
~-D! 
NRCD 81 is the other patent enactment which together with Cap. 
179 governs the administration of patents in the country. It excludes 
from patentability pharmaceutical products. On the basis of available 
evidence, it is clear that the effect of this enactment has been far 
greater than anticipated. The Decree which is a response to a High 
Court decision in a patent infringement suit has not only succeeded in 
freeing the state organisation involved in that suit from the effect 
of the said decision but has also contributed to a considerable 
reduction of the total volume of patents registered in the country, 
and more importantly to an increased direct participation of foreign 
patentees in the domestic pharmaceutical industry. 
The coming into effect of NRCD 81 accounted, to a considerable 
extent, for the significant reduction in the scale of patenting 
activity in the country. As table 5.1 illustrates, pharmaceutical 
inventions, before their exclusion, constituted a very great 
proportion of all inventions for which patents are registered in 
Ghana. For example, in 1970 pharmaceutical inventions alone 
constituted over 52 per cent of all inventions registered in that 
country. Consequently, with their withdrawal from registration it is 
no surprise that the total volume of inventions for Which patents were 
sought, as demonstrated by table 5.2, waned from the period the Decree 
came into force. 
It may be added, however, that the content of p:1tent legislation 
is only one of a set of factors that are likely to influence the size 
and nature of patenting in a given period and in a given country. 
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With this in the background we should remenber that there nay be other 
factors which could be responsible for this reduction. However, the 
sudden drop in the total volune in patent applications irmediately 
after the promulgation of the Decree suggests that it is an important 
factor which explains this development. 
Year of 
Patent 
Grant 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
197" 
1971 
1972 
Total 
Patents 
Granted 
75 
76 
8" 
62 
7" 
8" 
97 
62 
Table 5.1 
N\4W\.bQ.f' of 
PbarDBceuticals, drugs 
and D£dicines 
36* 
21 
27 
23 
13 
42 
43 
17 
Percentage of 
Pharmaceuticals, 
drugs & nedicine 
48% 
27.63% 
33.75 5 
37."9% 
18.57% 
52.5% 
44.32% 
27.41% 
Source: Based on information provided by the Registrar-General' s 
Department, Accra, Ghana 
Note: * = approxlrration 
The other crucial consequence of the promulgation of NRCD 81 is 
the sudden direct participation by foreign pharmaceutical companies, 
most of which were patentees of various pharmaceutical inventions, in 
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the dorestic pharmaceutical industry. In line with popularly held 
opinion and the empirical evidence presented in Chapter one that the 
pharmaceutical industry is very sensitive to patent protection one 
would have expected that the abrogation of protection for 
pharmaceuticals would have been discooraged, and thus led to a 
complete decline in the number of foreign pharmaceutical firms 
undertaking any investment in the country. However, the contrary 
seems to have been the case. It is instructive to note that before 
NRQ) 81 IOOst foreign patentees of pharmaceutical products hardly 
exploited their inventions in the country. Instead, their patents 
were utilized solely for the importation of their products into the 
country by their respective agents. 
Nevertheless, after NRCD 81 had effectively cancelled and 
withdrawn all patent monopoly privileges for pharmaceuticals a 
considerable number of foreign patentees comrrenced domestic working of 
their inventions in the country, and those which could not, entered 
into licensing and other manufacturing arrangements with same of these 
foreign firms or indigenous pharmaceutical firms to m::lnufacture 
domestically products over which they used to hold monopoly rights. 
Aroong the foreign companies which conunenced domestic production of 
medicines in the country after the introduction of the Decree include 
Danafco Company Limited and Pharco Laboratories Limited. Hoechst' is 
the latest company which would have started domestic exploitations of 
their inventions, but as one official renarked, n the recent coup 
d'etat (1981) threw everything out of gear and we will have to wait a 
while and start allover againn • 6 Others which did not directly 
invest in the industry but have entered into agreements for the 
6. Interview with an official at Hoechtl~ (Ghana) Ltd., Accra, 
Novenber, 1984. 
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domestic manufacture of drugs over which they held Ghanaian patents 
include Beecham laboratories, whose drugs are IImlufactured on their 
behalf by Major & Co (Ghana) Limited, an Arrerican conpany, called A.H. 
Robbins whose drugs and medicines are manufactured by Pharco 
Laboratories, and a Danish company, called Dumex whose phaonaceutical 
inventions are exploited on their behalf by Danafco. 
The other foreign companies which entered into contractual 
arrangements for the domestic production of their drugs include l-1erck, 
Sharp and Dhome, and May and Baker. These companies entered into a 
manufacturing arrangement with the biggest indigenous phaonaceutical 
firm, GIHOC Phaonaceuticals, which is state owned, for the working of 
their inventions. It is interesting to note that aroong the drugs 
being produced by Gmoc Pharmaceuticals on behalf of May and Baker is 
Flagyl, the subject-matter of the infringement suit between 
Rhone-Poulence and Another v the GNTC. These arrangements have, inter 
alia, necessitated the on-going extension and renovation works 
currently being undertaken by GIHOC Pharmaceuticals.7 
Clearly, the period after the abolition of patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals saw increased foreign investment and participation in 
the Ghanaian pharmaceutical industry. Though limited in scale it may 
not be wrong to compare the situation here with the Brazilian where in 
spite of the fact that from 1969 onwards patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals as a whole was effectively abolished FDI in the 
Brazilian pharmaceutical industry still rose, between 1971 and 1979, 
from $11.4 million to $646.5 million (UNCTAD, 1981, 33). Similarly 
Kirim's study on Turkey also reveals that n ••• even in the absence of 
7. Interview with a top official at GIHOC Pharmaceuticals, Accra, 
Novenber, 1984. 
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patent protection in the pharmaceutical industry, the anount of 
foreign capital investment rose considerably ••• n (1985, 226). All 
this appears to suggest that the lack of patent protection does not 
constitute a discouragement for foreign investments, and that besides 
patents there may be other compelling factors which are more likely to 
induce FDI than patent monopoly rights. 
1be Market Factor 
As observed earlier on, the legal guarantee and security 
provided by patent rights encourage patent and know-how licensing as 
well as FDI. This, as discerned in Chapter One, applies forcefully to 
pharmaceuticals. However, paradoxically, the abolition of patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals in Ghana resulted in increased foreign 
licensing arrangements and investments in the industry as shCMn above. 
This clearly contradicts some of the observations, particularly 
relating to pharmaceuticals made in Chapter One. It may, therefore, 
be asked if the abolition of patent monopoly privileges instead of 
discouraging rather leads to an increased foreign participation in the 
local pharmaceutical industry, then what other consideration coold 
have contributed to this development? 
The abolition of monopoly rights for pharmaceuticals created a 
no-man • s land so far as the Ghanaian market for these products is 
concerned. This, therefore, made the ground very fertile for piracy 
in pharmaceutical products in the country which hitherto was on a 
limited scale. For example, even before the Decree came into effect 
imitated drugs were finding their way into the Ghanaian market. The 
case involving Rhone-Poulence and the GNTC is clearly denonstrative of 
this. The latter was selling in its shops drugs over which the former 
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held the Ghanaian patent but rraIlufactured by International Generics 
Limited of London which was neither the patentee nor a licensee of 
Rhone-Poulence. Similarly, during the same period GIHOC 
Pharmaceuticals were imitating and producing the drugs called valium 
and librium for which they held no licence. 
It may, therefore, appear that the desire of foreign patentees 
to forestall, in the absence of legal protection, the possible 
escalation of pharmaceutical piracy contributed to the subsequent FOls 
in the local pharmaceutical industry, and the resultant patent and 
know-how licensing arrangements between foreign licensors and domestic 
licencees. Another significant contributory factor in this respect is 
the determination of foreign patentees to maintain their share of and 
grip over the Ghanaian market. 
That the market consideration is very significant in relation to 
this development is evidenced by the only licensing and manufacturing 
agreement the author was able to lay hands on. For example, in that 
agreement besides the absolute export restriction imposed on the 
indigenous licensee firm, the agreement went further to share the 
Ghanaian market between the two parties, that is, the foreign licensor 
and the local licensee. According to the teDmS of the agreement, the 
local firm is responsible for only "the sale to the Government of 
Ghana and Government Agencies for use in Ghana" of the products 
manufactured under the agreement while the entire domestic private 
sector as well as foreign markets are taken over by the foreign party. 
An interesting aspect of this arrangement is the different labelling 
and packaging of the same products rraIlufactured by the domestic firm 
for the two parties. They are done in such a way that one may easily 
be made to believe that they are rraIlufactured separately by different 
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firms. This arrangerrent is important for the foreign party in 
forstalling the complete erosion of its share of the Ghanaian market. 
As the General Manager of the local licensee firm remarked, "by this 
arrangement the foreign party is constantly assured of a foothold in 
the pharmaceutical industry and, IOOre inportantly, the indigenous 
pharmaceutical marketn.8 
It does appear, therefore that the Ghanaian market has served as 
a better bait for foreign participation in the indigenous 
pharmaceutical industry than patent protection. This is consistent 
with Kirim's study (1985) on the abolition of patents and the 
pharmaceutical industry in 'I\1rkey, and the findings of UOCTAD (1981) 
in a review of recent trends in patents in developing countries. 
Having assessed the individual effects of cap. 179 and NBCD 81 
it may now be appropriate to examine their effects on the evolution of 
patents in Ghana. 
Patenting 1\ctivity 
So far as patenting activity in Ghana is concerned it is 
predominantly dominated by foreign patentees. As Table 5.2 reveals, 
there is not a Single registered invention, according to the patent 
register, which originates from the country. However, as rrentioned 
earlier, there is one invention, the mashing machine of which the 
author is aware was developed locally by a Ghanaian engineer but the 
U.K. was registered as its country of origin. 
Table 5.2 illustrates the domination of patenting activity in 
Ghana by the industrialised countries. Out of the total volume of 
8. Interview with the General Manager of GIHOC Pharmaceuticals, 
Accra, November, 1984. 
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TABLE 5:2 
RmISl.'RATION OF PATEm'IS 1949-1985 
------------------
----------------------Countries Year of Regist[ation 
of Origin 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
-----
----------------------------------------------------
United Kingdom 24 26 13 6 7 12 8 8 8 4 3 4 3 2 
U.S.A. Ul 25 12 18 7 14 6 25 9 7 2 5 4 5 
West Germany 17 24 15 4 15 9 12 22 14 6 3 2 3 2 
SoIitzerland 14 6 7 12 11 7 1 4 3 2 2 1 
Netherlands 5 2 4 1 2 3 1 1 
France 3 1 4 1 1 2 3 1 8 2 1 
Italy 1 5 4 2 2 2 3 1 
Japan 2 1 2 3 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 
Australia 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 
Belgium 2 1 1 2 1 
Canada 3 3 1 1 
Hungary 1 2 1 1 1 
China 1 
South Mrica 2 1 
Bahamas 1 
Poland 1 1 
Denmark 1 1 
Yugoslavia 2 1 
Greece 1 1 
Malaya 1 
Ivory Coast 1 1 
Sweden 1 1 
Lebanon 1 
Hong Kong 1 
Republic of Korea 1 
Nigeria 2 
Austria 1 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
'IDl'AL 80 97 62 44 41 53 43 75 39 37 17 19 19 14 
Source: Registrar-General I s Department, Accra, Ghana. 
inventions registered in the country between 197e and 1983 they alone 
accounted for about 95.95 per cent with the u.s. taking 23.28 per 
cent, followed by West Germany with 23.13 per cent and the U.K. with 
2'" per cent. These three countries alone account for over 66 per cent 
of all inventions registered in the country. In contradistinction, 
the total share of East European countries amounts to only 1.87 per 
cent and that of the LOCs including Greece stands only at 2.18 per 
cent. The percentage of all African inventions registered in the 
country during that period is only 1.e9. Clearly, the share of 
African participation in patenting activity in Ghana is minimal. This 
may be attributable to the paucity of skilled R&D scientists and 
engineers in the continent and possibly the difficult and complicated 
procedure required by the Ghana patent law in securing patent 
protection in that country. This, therefore, can adversely affect 
transactions in technology between Ghana and the various African 
countries. 
Industrial Sectors and Registration of Patents 
An examination of the inventions registered in the country 
between 1979 and 1983 (see table 5.3) shows a clear bias in favour of 
organic chemistry and chemical treatment, for exarrple, disinfection of 
soil or living plant material: pesticides or herbicides. This is 
followed by the agricultural sector. It would have been expected that 
Ghana being an agricultural country would have given priority to 
inventions coming under the agricultural sector in its grant of 
nonopoly privileges. It must, however, be realised that inventions 
falling into the category of organic chemistry and chemical treatment 
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TABIE 5;3 
PATERr APPLICATIORl FIIm,; ARRAtOD BY ~HNICAL UNITS BASED ON TIlE !PC (Fm TIlE PERIOO (l)VERDl; 1979-1983} 
AID BY axfl.ll« (F RESIDErCE 
Applicant's Technical (hits 
Country of 
Residence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 19 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 29 21 22 
France 4 2 I 2 I I 
Ivory Coast I 
W. Gerrray I 2 I I 7 I I 
Japan I I 3 3 
U.S.A. I 2 I I I 7 2 I I 
U.K. I 2 I I I 7 2 
Switzerland 3 I 8 
Austria 
Hungary 2 
Canada I 
Netherlands I 1 
Australia 2 
Belgium I 
I 
Hong Kong I 
Rep. of Korea 
Nigeria 2 
Bahamas 1 
--- ------------------
Total Ie 7 I I I 3 4 2 I 6 37 I 4 6 2 3 2 
----------------------------------------
Source: Registrar-General's Departrrent, Accra, Ghana 
Note: for interpretation of the table see Annex 1. 
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 39 31 32 
I I 
I 
I 5 
I 
I 
I 
------
I I I I 8 
which took the lion share of patent grants in the country during the 
period under consideration service mainly the agricultural industry 
and therefore very relevant for the latter. Other inventions for 
which a fair number of patent grants were made cover electricity, 
foodstuffs and tobacco, chemistry dominated by manufacture of 
fertilisers and metallurgy. 
It is instructive to note that during the period 1979-1983 very 
limited nunbers of inventions were registered in the country for 
machines or engines and engineering in general. In fact, inventions 
relating to this sector account for only 1.94 per cent of the total 
inventions during that period. Even if the number of inventions here 
are added to that of mechanical metal-working without essentially 
removing material, punching netal, castings, powder netallurgy and 
machine tools the percentage share of total inventions still stands at 
only 5.82. This is crucial in view of the fact that the development 
of a local machine and capital goods sector is pivotal for the 
generation and diffusion of technological change (supra). This could 
be accomplished through the mechanism of the patent systen. For a 
country like Ghana which does not have adequate expertise and 
resources for the developnent of this sector it could encourage the 
inflow of IOOre technical knowledge and investments in this sector 
through incentives and IOOre favourable patent monopoly privileges 
until the time that it will be self-reliant. Thereafter, it could 
start to discourage further inflow by measures including the exclusion 
of further monopoly privileges for inventions in respect of the 
sector. In using the grant of patents in this manner Ghana would be 
employing its patent system as a tool of economic measure. 
It is clear from the above that not many inventions relating to 
the capital goods sector are registered in Ghana. The above 
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discussion also reveals, in the case of Ghana and confirms in respect 
of other case studies carried out in the third world, that the 
najority of domestic patents are owned by foreign patentees. The 
major concern in this regard is the use to which these foreign 
dominated grants are put. Instead of being worked domestically they 
are used to introduce restrictive and anticompetitive practices in 
patent and technology transfer transactions which adversely affect the 
inflCM of technology into most LOCs including Ghana. 
Restrictive Covenants in Technology Transfer Transactims 
Available evidence suggests that the inclusion of 
anticompetitive practices in patent and technology licensing 
transactions involving Ghanaian licensees still takes place. AIrong 
these practices are export prohibitions, tie-in clauses, field of use 
restriction, unduly-long duration of contracts, no-challenge clauses, 
restriction on adaptation and excessive controls of licensees' 
operations. 
Table 5:4 manifests foreign jurisdictions clauses as the 
dominant. It does appear from the agreements studied that these 
clauses are very comnon in services agreements. In JOOst cases the 
contracts are governed by and construed according to the laws of the 
home countries of the foreign parties, normally the licensors. In the 
case of arbitration in times of disputes some agreements settled for 
the arbitration procedure and fora provided by the arbitration laws of 
the foreign licensors' countries while others adopted international 
procedure and fora such as those of the International Chamber of 
CoImnerce in Paris or other international bodies. It is important to 
point out in this respect that PNOCL 116 has adopted the United 
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Nations Commission on International Trade Law for the purposes of such 
disputes. This, as we shall see in due course, is in 
contradistinction to the Nigerian approach which adopts Nigerian 
jurisdiction to govern all investment or technology transfer 
agreements and disputes settlement. 
Table 5:4 
Nature and Frequency of Restrictive Clause in Licensing Agreements 
Between ~ FiDIIS and Overseas !R:B. 
'!ype of Restriction No. of Agreements eubody- PerC8ltage 
ing restrictive clauses of total 
1. Foreign Jurisdiction 19 47.5 
2. Export Restrictions 13 32.5 
3. Tie-in 7 17.5 
4. unduly long duration 5 12.5 
(113-213 yrs) 
5. No challenge clause 2 5 
6. Field of use restriction 3 7.5 
7. Grant-back (unreciprocal) 1 2.5 
8. Restriction on R&D 1 2.5 
9. Excessive control of 
licensee's operation 11 27.5 
Source: Based on analysis of 413 agreements provided by the Bank of 
Ghana. 
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It is interesting to note that a significant number of the 
agreements which adopted the Ghanaian jurisdiction to govern 
agreements and dispute settlements involved small indigenous private 
enterprises while a good number of government enterprises or firms in 
which government has interest submitted their agreements and 
transactions to foreign jurisdictions. This contradicts the popularly 
held view that because government institutions or enterprises are 
backed by the state machinery and, thus, have a better bargaining 
power they are less likely to be inflicted by restrictive practices 
than private enterprises. 
The second most prominent restrictive practice is export 
prohibition. This restriction is found to be very common in 
agreements which involve the manufacture of consumer goods and to some 
extent consumer durables. Almost all the export restriction clauses 
embodied in the agreements studied are absolute. The only exception 
is that relating to one agreement involving the garment industry. In 
this instance, the Ghanaian licensee is permitted to export the 
products covered by the agreerrent to some specified west African 
countries which are Upper volta (now Burkina Faso), Mali, Ivory Coast, 
Togo and Dahomey (now Benin). TWo of the agreements studied embody a 
further export restriction which is novel and more restrictive, and is 
what I refer to as internal market-sharing restriction. In addition 
to the absolute export prohibition imposed on the Ghanaian licenses, 
these two agreements, one of which involve a wholly government owned 
enterprise, went further to divide the licensee's home market between 
the latter and the licensors. The first of these two agreements 
relates to the pharmaceutical industry which has already been referred 
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to (SUpra). The other involves the tobacco industry. OrDer this 
agreement the foreign licensor's share of the Ghanaian market covered 
all "sea or air stores for ships or aircrafts engaged in international 
traffic to or from" Ghana as well as "duty free shops (other than the 
Duty Free shops at Accra Airport and Ghana Airways) diplomatic corp 
embassies consular services or international organisations such as the 
United Nations" which may be located in the country. The remainder of 
the Ghanaian market was left for the licensee. Thus a further 
diminution of market for the products of the licensees. It may also 
be noted again that fully owned government corporations and those in 
which government has proprietary interest are also victins of export 
restrictions. 
However, as already hinted, export restrictions per se may not 
necessarily harm Ghanaian enterprises. As observed earlier, it is 
only when a licensee has the capacity and potential to export if given 
the chance that such restrictions mayor can have adverse effects on 
its operations. In the case of Ghanaian licensee firms export 
restr ictions may not have Imlch significant iIrpact on their export 
activities for a number of reasons. 
In the first place, as the Economic Recovery Programme 1984-1986 
tersely stated: 
A large number of the manufactur ing industr ies in 
Ghana depend on imported raw materials and spare 
parts. The import intensity of these industries can 
be gauged by the fact that in 1979 the imported raw 
materials accounted for 68 per cent of all raw 
materials used by the manufacturing industries as a 
whole. In view of the foreign exchange constraint 
facing the economy, these industries have been unable 
to obtain their import requirements of raw materials 
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and spare parts to keep their plants operating at 
reasonably high levels of capacity. Capacity 
utilization in the sector is est!nated at an average 
of about 3B per cent and it has even fallen as low as 
lB per cent for some industries. (1983, 47).9 
So that as a result of heavy reliance by Ghanaian manufacturing 
licensee firms on foreign inputs and the domestic foreign exchange 
constraints which makes it difficult to procure these inputs in 
reasonable quantities these firms are not in a position to satisfy 
both their home and foreign markets. The present position in this 
regard is neatly summed up by the Deputy Managing Director 
(Operations) of the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation (GIHOC). In 
answer to the question whether GIHOC's chain of industries experience 
export restrictions in its technology transfer transactions he 
observed that: 
Hardly, do we experience such restrictions in our 
technology agreements. However, even if we do they 
may be quite harmless to our operations since we are 
not always able to procure all required inputs because 
of foreign exchange problems. Consequently, we have, 
9. Further evidence of the under-capacity industrial production is 
given by the Secretary of State for Industries, Science and 
Technology who in his address to the Ghana manufacturers 
Association in Feb. 1982 estimates that most factories operate 
nat very uneconomic levels of about 20 per cent full capacityn. 
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for a considerable period of time, not been able to 
satisfy the Ghanaian narket and this makes it quite 
unrealistic for us to wor~ about exports. le 
Moreover, according to the same document, that is the Economic 
Recovery Programme 1984-1986, high tariff barriers as well as 
quantitive import controls and the monopoly enjoyed by some domestic 
industries have affected their efficiency eventuating in high cost 
production and production of poor quality goods. Obviously, these 
industries do not seem to have the potential to export even if given 
the change. Consequently, export restrictions may not necessarily 
have any adverse effects on the operations of most Ghanaian licensee 
firms. 
Nevertheless, as has been observed, the presence of export 
restrictions may in the longer run discourage investments in new 
production facilities and perhaps render unit costs higher than would 
otherwise be the case through the restriction of production confined 
to the allocated narket. 
The non-prohibition of exports nay, therefore, be a necessary if 
not a sufficient condition for export capabilities of licensee firms. 
In addition, there nay be the need for the institution of other 
measures and incentives to increase the export potentials and 
capabilities of indigenous licensees. An attempt in this direction 
seems to have been made by the Investment Code, 1985. In the first 
place, the export manufacturing industry has been classified, inter 
alia, by the Code as npriority areas of investmentn entitled to 
special benefits in addition to the guarantees provided for all 
enterprises approved under the Code (See part 3 of the Code). 
Ie. Interview with the Deputy Managing-Director, GHIOC, Accra, 
November, 1984. 
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These special benefits available to both new and existing 
enterprises manufacturing or processing products for exports (See Part 
2, 5.12(1» include: 
(a) requisite permission for iIItX>rting essential 
machinery and equipment required for the 
enterprise, 
(b) exenption from the payment of customs iII{X>rt 
duties in respect of plant, machinery, 
equipment and accessories iII{X>rted specifically 
and exclusively to establish the enterprise 
once approved7 
(c) investment allowance of seven and a half per 
cent~ 
(d) depreciation or capital allowances of 4" per 
cent in the year of investment and 2" percent 
in subsequent years. 
In addition, these enterprises which are essentially foreign exchange 
earning enterprises "may be permitted by the Bank of Ghana to retain 
in an external account under the supervision of the Bank of Ghana a 
portion of their foreign exchange earnings for use in acquiring spare 
parts and other inputs required for the enterprise which would 
otherwise not be readily available without the use of such earningsn 
(5.14) • Similar provisions were also provided under the preceding 
Investments Code of 1981. All these appear to be useful measures to 
encourage Ghanaian licensee firms - which include both indigenous 
Ghanaian and foreign subsidiary firms - to expand their export 
activities. However, the continuing inclusion of export prohibitions 
in technology agreements involving Ghanaian licensees as well as the 
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continuing absence of any domestic regulation to control such 
restrictions may stultify these and other measures aimed at improving 
the export potentials and capabilities of Ghanaian licensee firms. 
Other restrictive clauses embodied in technology agreements 
involving Ghanaian enterprises include excessive controls of 
licensee's operations. This restriction covers the non-usage by 
transferees of inputs not approved by the licensors in their 
manufacturing operations, the non-engagernent of the expertise or 
services of third parties, and the non-manufacture of third parties' 
products during the term of the agreement. 
Tie-in clauses that were encountered featured prominently nainly 
in agreements relating to the manufacture of consumer goods and 
durables. In JOOst cases they covered both the raw material intxlt and 
machinery and equipment. In one of the agreements studied the tie-in 
clause was so conprehensive that it tied up the Ghanaian conpany to 
the foreign licensor for almost every conceivable item the forner 
needed for its operation. Clause 11 of this agreement states: 
The Ghanaian company will buy from or through the 
English Conpany: 
(a) all materials (except materials produced in 
Ghana) and/or all finished or partially finished 
products and goods required by the Ghanaian 
conpany for sale within Ghana; 
(b) all materials or goods either finished or 
partially processed required by the Ghanaian 
company for the production of finished goods or 
further processing or packing: 
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(c) all plant and components including plant 
machinery and equipnent required by the Ghanaian 
company; and 
(d) any other thing whatsoever required by the 
Ghanaian company. 
SUb-clause (a) appears to provide an exception and thus gives the 
Ghanaian company a leeway in respect of certain materials. This 
exception is unavoidable because the nain naterial conterrplated by the 
sub-clause is cocoa which is the major export crop of Ghana, which 
until recently was the world's leading producer of this crop. It 
would, therefore, be absurd to require the Ghanaian company to buy 
from either another country or the English company which also buys the 
crop from Ghana. Moreover, it does appear fran this agreerrent and 
others that even where the licensor is neither the direct producer, or 
supplier of a particular input it takes upon itself to procure such 
input for the licensee, thus denying the latter of any partial freedom 
to look elsewhere for sorre of its own rnanufacturi~ inputs. The only 
instance where such freedom may be forthcoming is where the licensor 
or nits nominated agents are unable to supply •••• within a reasonable 
tirnen such in~ts. 
Another restrictive covenant the occurence of which, as Table 
5:4 illustrates, is minimal is limitation on R&D. As already 
indicated, this restriction may not have much significant inp;lct, 
especially where, as it is the case of Ghana, there does not exist the 
necessary pool of scientific and technical personnel and adequate 
resources to undertake research on foreign technology with the aim of 
adapting it to the local environment. In an attempt to increase the 
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science and technical manpower resources the government is undertaking 
a programme of expansion of the science and technical institutes in 
the country. Furthermore, in order to stimulate scientific research 
in certain industrial sectors all enterprises with priority status 
which undertake or support a programme of scientific research for the 
development or advancement of the enterprise shall be entitled to have 
the capital expenditure in respect of such research fully deductible 
(S.12(2) of PNDCL 116). 
Table 5:5 
Restrictive clauses according to type of ownership of the technology-
receiving enterprises in amna 
Type of Restriction 
(1) 
Export 
Post Expiration 
Excessive Control 
Tie-in 
Field of use 
No-challenge 
Grant-back 
Nature of Foreign Participatim 
Subsidiaq 
(2) 
7.69 
14.28 
100 
Minority 
capital (3) 
7.69 
50 
14.28 
50 
Licence 
Agreement (4) 
84.62 
50 
100 
71.42 
100 
50 
SOurce: Based on Analysis of 40 Agreements provided by the Bank. of 
Ghana 
The remaining restrictive practices that were encountered in the 
agreements studied include unduly long duration of agreements which 
ranged from 10 to 20 years, post expiration restrictions which relate 
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mainly to the non-disclosure of secrets and confidential information, 
no-challenge, and grant-back clause all of which apart from the latter 
were embodied in agreements in which government enterprises or 
enterprises in which government has proprietary interest are also 
parties. 
A further examination of the occurrence of these clauses 
indicates, as demonstrated by Table 5:5, that they are most pronounced 
in agreements with non-affiliate Ghanaian enterprises, that is 
enterprises which are neither subsidiaries of licensors nor in which 
they have equity participation. This is followed by cases in which 
foreign licensors have a minority participation in equity. In this 
class there is one particular agreement that involving Firestone 
International and Firestone (Ghana) Limited (now Bonsa Tyre Company 
Limited) which accounted for most of the restrictive practices. 
Though the former had 60% shares in the latter (and the Ghana 
Government 40%) the licensing agreement between then accounts for 
almost all the restrictive practices under the minority capital 
category (though in this case the foreign licensor had the majority 
capital). 
In the case of the restrictions under column 2 they are 
accounted for by the agreement between Cadbury (Ghana) Limited and its 
parent company. In addition to the export prohibition included in the 
agreement there is the strange provision that the parent company shall 
not, without the consent of its Ghanaian subsidiary, engage in the 
importation into or sale in Ghana of any finished products which the 
Ghanaian company should be manufacturing or processing except by way 
of sale or supply to the latter. This provision appears to provide a 
refined mode for the parent company to partake in the Ghanaian market, 
thus sharing it with its subsidiary and making up for excessive demand 
that may occur in the market. The same agreement accounted for the 
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tie-in and the grant-back under column 2. It is the only agreement in 
which a grant-back covenant is embodied. This may be due to the 
reason that licensors do not anticipate Ghanaian licensees making any 
meaningful improvements or contribution to their technologies. 
However, this particular agreement covers the food industry, and since 
the latter does not necessarily involve very sophisticated technology 
valuable contribution by licensees cannot be ruled out completely. It 
is, therefore, not surprising that grant-back is included in this 
particular agreement. The inclusion is also important for the simple 
reason that any improvement made in Ghana could be useful for the 
licensor's markets in other parts of Africa and the third world. 
Tecimology Transfer Regulations in Ghana 
In view of the fact that restrictive practices still occur in 
technology transfer transactions involving Ghanaian licensees it may 
be relevant to ask how effective the measures devised under Act 437 
and PNDCL 116 have been in dealing with these practices, and how can 
they be ameliorated to make them more effective in accomplishing their 
desired goals. However, since the latter was promulgated only in July 
1985 and has not been in existence long enough to merit any meaningful 
evaluation of its effect we shall examine the effects, if any, of the 
former. 
Act 437 like PNDCL 116 created the GIC (1981-1985) to regulate 
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foreign investments as well as the transfer of technology to the 
country. The Act made provisions to control technology transfers and 
called for regulations under its S.4l for that purpose. However, 
these regulations, between the dal;-as' the Act was prorulgated and -I 
repealed in 1981 and 1985 respectively, were never made, so that 
between these periods the GIC did not have the requisite comprehensive 
and coherent rules to guide it in regulating technology transfer 
transactions. In addition, the absence of these regulations 
considerably restricted the GIC's Technology Transfer Department's 
scope of operation. 
Another unfortunate feature that also affected the Centre's 
function is the presence of the reservations - some genuine but others 
unfounded - made by some sectors and goveDrument officials in relation 
to the merits of Act 437 itself, and the competence and jurisdiction 
of the GIC over technology transfer matters affecting both the public 
and private sectors. It is not surprising, therefore that despite the 
fact that there existed a technology transfer department within the 
then GIC, the Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology (MISI') in 
1981, the same year Act 437 carne into effect, set up the Technology 
Transfer Centre (T.T.C.) within the outfit of the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research (C.S.I.R.) to advise it on matters 
relating to technology transfer. The broad functions of the T. T .C. 
clearly duplicated the former GIC's and still duplicates the present 
GIC's, and there appeared and still appears to be an ongoing rivalry 
between them as to which one is nore competent to regulate technology 
transfer transactions. Similarly, other government institutions such 
as the Public Agreement Board (PAS) 11 and Grnoc which had, before 
11. The PAS was set up by S.42 of PNDCL 42 'and replaces the Public 
Agreement Review Committee whose functions have been taken over 
by the former. The functions of the PAB include the review of 
all public agreements and prescription of procedures and 
criteria for all government agencies or organisations, public 
corporations and other bodies in relation to the negotiation and 
conclusion of public agreements covering contracts for goods and 
services and projects in the mining, industrial, agricultural 
and commercial sectors. 
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the enactment of the Act, been carrying on investment promotions and 
regulations also appeared and are still reluctant to surrender these 
functions to the GIC which they consider new, and nay be, in the case 
of GIHOC, alien to its operations. 
This situation seems to have been exacerbated by the coup d'etat 
of December 1981. The GIC, as one official put it, was in the process 
of settling down to its obligations when the coup took place. This, 
according to the same official, conpletely unsettled the GIC, and 
opposing parties to its technology transfer functions used that 
opportunity to cash in heavily to its detriment by reiterating their 
reservations regarding the efficacy of the Act and the GIC, and 
lobbying members of the new government against it.12 
All this seems to have affected the effectiveness of the 1981 
Investments Code (Act 437), as well as the spirit of the Code which 
was to centralise the investment promotion and regulation functions in 
one central institution. Consequently, the above mentioned government 
institutions as well as private 'enterprises continue, individually, to 
use their own evolved systems, procedures and practices relating to 
technology purchases. For example, GIHOC has not only established its 
own mechanism but has its own qualified personnel for examining, 
screening and procuring its technological requirements, and in the 
private sectors individual enterprises have a free hand in the 
procurement of technology. Government intervention here is only 
related to the approval of licensors' royalties and fees, normally 
expressed in foreign currencies, by the Bank of Ghana. The Bank, in 
the absence of any regulations on this issue, has set up its own 
ceiling for such payments. The payment of royalties by the Bank is 
12. Interview with a senior official at the GIC, Accra, October, 
1984. 
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calculated on the basis of at most 4 per cent of total turnover.13 It 
must be noted that this is only an administrative practice the 
application of which, as observed by one official, has not always been 
very uniforrn.14 
It is in the context of the above that the promulgation of the 
new Investments Code, PNDCL 116 becomes relevant. The enactment of 
this law preceded a process of re-examination of the then existing 
legal regime as well as other institutional measures relating to 
technology transfer control, and generally seeks to correct the 
inadequacies of the preceding enactment. Though PNOCL 116, as 
already hinted, has some weaknesses (supra) it, nevertheless, appears 
to be an irrprovernent over the previous code. 
It is imperative to point out, however, that irrespective of its 
quality PNOCL 116 may suffer a similar fate as Act 437, particularly 
in connection with its control over technology transfers if the 
regulations called for in s. 30 of the former are not made as early as 
possible. Without such regulations the GIC may not have any 
consistent criteria to guide it in either approving or disapproving 
technology transfer transactions. As already observed, it would have 
been much preferable, based on the experience of Act 437, to have made 
the adoption of these regulations by the Board mandatory and also 
within a specified time period. This would enable the timely adoption 
of the regulations which would, in turn, eliminate any undue delay by 
the GIC in the execution of its technology transfer regulatory 
functions. It is important that the adoption of these regulations 
should be accompanied by the development of a monitoring system which 
13. Interview with a senior official at the Bank of Ghana, Accra, 
October, 1984. 
14. Same interview. 
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will ensure their compliance. It may also be added that the question 
should not only be one of the timely adoption of any regulations as 
such but the relevance of such regulations to the government's entire 
technology acquisition and developnent prograrrme which clearly and 
necessarily calls for a well articulated technology strategy. 
Furthermore, it may also be advisable to avoid the unnecessary 
duplication of institutions for regulating technology transfer and the 
ensuing rivalry as is presently the case in Ghana. This does not only 
lead to the dissipation of human resources but also to increased 
goverrunent expenditure, especially for running such institutions. 
Accordingly, it may be reasonable to bring together the functions of 
regulating the transfer of technology and possibly its developnent 
within one organisation. This will help to ensure consistency and 
optimun benefit in technology transfer and developnent policies and 
plans. It must be emphasised, however, that the organisation does not 
need to be a physically centralized facility with all functions 
centralized under one roof. It may have various units or divisions 
under different roofs but must have the authority to co-ordinate and 
supervise the units. So that instead of the PAB, GIHOC, TIC and GIC 
competing with each other it rnay be reasonable to bring under the 
authority of either the GIC as the government is apparently but 
passively doing or any of the above institutions the functions 
relating to the transfer into and developnent of technology in the 
country. 
Having assessed the effects of the individual patent statutes 
and the technology transfer regime being developed to counteract, 
inter alia, anticompetitive practices including those discussed above 
we shall now proceed to evaluate the general impact of the patent 
system in the transfer of technology to Ghana. 
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'11le Ghanaian Patent System and the Transfer of technology 
In evaluating the success of the Ghanaian patent system in the 
transfer of technology to the country the factors that may be taken 
into consideration will include the efficacy of the system in the 
disclosure, spread or diffusion of new technical knowledge, its 
influence on the inflow of patented goods, and its effects on patent 
licensing, FDls and joint-ventures. 
If the disclosure or spread of new technical information is to 
be considered as technology transfer, then one can argue that the 
Ghanaian patent system has not been effective in that regard. Besides 
the limited usefulness of patent disclosures which can be attributed 
to the patent system as a whole (supra) the very set up of the Patent 
Office within the outfit of the ffiD bas not made the Ghana Patent 
Office very useful as a data bank for technical information. Since 
its establishment it has been performing the function of only 
registering inventions and ignoring the crucial role of serving as a 
technology data base. It is surprising to note that apart from the 
registration of inventions the Patent Office in Accra never publishes 
any inventions. In fact, it has never published a journal or anything 
that contains the inventions it has been registering since its 
inception. Similarly, after inventions have been registered by the 
Office the relevant files are shelved in such a way that they are in 
some cases never traced again and even if traced it is usually with 
very great difficulty. For example, besides the experience of the 
author, a top government pharmacologist at GlIDe Pharmaceuticals 
corrplained that his visits to the RGD, Patent Division to acquaint 
himself with the development of certain drugs led him nowhere because 
the Office could not trace for him the relevant files. All this has 
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contributed to the ineffectiveness of the Ghanaian patent system in 
disseminating technical information. 
This state of affairs at the Patent Office is blamed by 
officials on succeeding governments' neglect of the Office. According 
to the complaints of these officials the Office lacks money for 
printing purposes and adequate office space and resources for the 
effective performance of its functions. It may be mentioned in this 
respect that in spite of the present government's overt pronouncement 
of cornrni trnent to the development of the country's technolog ical 
infrastructure the neglect of the Office as well as other institutions 
connected with technology development still persists. Though this 
continuing neglect by the present regime may not necessarily be 
deliberate it is, nevertheless, a reflection of the degree of the 
government's said corranitrnent or its inability to identify the true 
national agents for technology development and thus provide adequately 
for them. It seems to be the case that until the Patent Office 
receives the necessary resources and attention from the government, 
and in addition develops and maintains it as a technical information 
data base, as opposed to a mere registration centre, it will not play 
any meaningful role in facilitating the transfer and develoF'TIent of 
technology in the country. 
However, if the importation of patented products should be 
considered as technology transfer, then it could be argued that the 
Ghanaian patent system has been successful in transferring technology 
into the country. The greater nurrber of registered patents in the 
country are "worked" only through the importation into the country of 
their patented products. This, however, is not considered by a number 
of LDCs to constitute domestic exploitation. Ghana, like most LDCs, 
is more interested in the domestic working of inventions for which it 
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grants monopoly privileges than the importation of patented products 
or those derived from patented processes. Nevertheless, the majority 
of Ghanaian registered patents are not locally exploited. 
In fact, there is a great number of patents for which annual 
renewal fees are paid yearly in order to keep them alive (see Table 
5:6) but for which no attempts have, since the date of their 
registration to the present, been made to have them exploited. The 
truth of the matter is that most patents are not worked in the country 
and there is neither any urgency nor obligation on patentees to 
exploit their inventions. The Ghana patent law makes no provision for 
dealing with abuses of patent rights including non-working. This 
means that there are no existing provisions under the law to corrpel 
local working of registered inventions. Similarly, there are no 
patent-abuse-checking measures such as compulsory licensing, 
revocation or forfeiture. Consequently, the conduct of patentees in 
respect of their Ghanaian patents will invariably be regulated by 
their business interests and conscience. 
, 
~e 5:6 
Patents in force on 31st Deceuber 1982 
Broken Down by Year of Grant 
Granted in 
Before 
(1962-1971) 
'lUl'AL 
1982 
1981 
1980 
1979 
1978 
1977 
1976 
1975 
1974 
1973 
1972 
1972 
16 
19 
17 
37 
39 
75 
45 
52 
50 
48 
61 
461 
922 
SOURCE: Registrar-General's Department, Accra, Ghana. 
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In assessing the impact of the Ghanaian patent system on the 
transfer of technology to the country through the conduits of patent 
licensing, jOint-ventures and FDls it could generally be said that it 
has not been very effective. Patent licenSing sirrpliciter as a 
vehicle for transferring technology to Ghana is very rare. This may 
be attributable to the lack of competent licensee firms with qualified 
personnel capable of undertaking autonomous exploitation of licensed 
inventions, or the difficulty patentees encounter in getting capable 
licensee enterprises to work their inventions. Consequently, the 
licensing of patents as well as know-how usually go together as part 
of an entire investment package. 
Similarly, it may not be wrong to assert that patents have not , 
on their own, been able to prompt joint-ventures and FDls in the 
country. As has already been observed, the majority of inventions 
which are registered in Ghana are not worked by their owners. 
However, a few of these registered inventions which are known to have 
been exploited or are being exploited have been done or are being done 
as part and parcel of entire investment projects and not sirrply 
because of the protection offered by the patent system. These include 
inventions in the tyre industry registered by Firestone, in the 
intra-venous infusions industry registered by VIFOR S.A. and in the 
food industry registered by Cadbury and Nestles. Moreover, in the 
case of these and other inventions which are being exploited through 
joint-venture arrangements or FDls there are, in addition to patents, 
other more compelling considerations such as the domestic market, as 
demonstrated by the case of the pharmaceutical industry, which induce 
such workings. 
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It is appropriate to mention here that while patent protection 
has not been very effective in transferring technology to Ghana 
through FDls and other conduits its withdrawal or cancellation with 
respect to pharmaceutical products by NRCD 81 has, paradoxically, as 
already mentioned, led to an increased participation by foreign 
patentees in the domestic pharmaceutical industry. This partiCipation 
has been effected essentially through FDls, licensing and other 
manufacturing arrangements involving both foreign and indigenous 
pharmaceutical firms. Available evidence suggests that this 
participation in the local pharmaceutical industry has been very 
beneficial to both the indigenous firms and personnel in the industry. 
The FDls have enabled the domestic labour force to acquire, in the 
course of their employment, useful skills in drug production. With 
respect to patent and know-how licensing and manufacturing 
arrangements they involve the training of the licensees' personnel by 
licensors' teams of experts and the use of the licensors' processes in 
the manufacture of the products covered by the arrangements, and these 
it must be noted, are important modes of acquiring useful skills. 
The usefulness of these modes of technology acquisition is 
appreciated by one of the indigenous firms involved in these 
arrangements. The General Manager of GIlDC Pharmaceuticals, in 
relation to its arrangements with May and Baker, observed that one of 
the advantages they have gained from that arrangement is the 
experience they have acquired from May and Baker's team of experts 
sent to the premises to undertake test runs of the products covered by 
the arrangement. In addition, the provision of technical assistance 
by the foreign party to GIHOC Pharmaceuticals has helped to improve 
the technical skills of its personnel. Finally, GIHOC Pharmaceuticals 
is able, by virtue of this arrangement, to use May and Baker's tablet 
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punches for the production of its own products. All this, according 
to the General Manager, and "our ability to use knowledge and skills 
acquired to improve upon the manufacture of our own products have 
enabled us to offer on both the Ghanaian and other west African 
narkets very competitive products" .15 It may be added that the 
production of drugs by GIHOC Pharmaceuticals under their generic names 
and the practice of drug prescription in Ghana by their generic and 
not trade names do also account for the Corporation's competitiveness 
in the Ghanaian narket. 01 the whole, the NRCD 81' s abolition of 
patent rights for pharmaceuticals can be seen as a significant 
development in the Ghanaian pharmaceutical industry. 
The most Significant lessons emanating fram the promulgation of 
NRC[) 81 and its effects on the pharmaceutical industry, though the 
raison d'etre behind its enactment is utterly different, include the 
fact that countries can, in fact, discriminate between different 
industrial sectors in their patent policy. By excluding 
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pharmaceutical products from patentability the Ghanaian patent system 
is discriminating against the pharnaceutical industry. 
The other important lesson is that the patent regime can be a 
useful mechanism for either the prorootion or discouragement of the 
inflow of foreign technology, and can, thus, be utilized in 
furtherance of government technological policies such as the 
development of indigenous technological capabilities in certain 
technological fields. 
Though limited in scope NRCD 81 has had a significant impact on 
.. 
patenting activity in Ghana and the transfer of technology to that 
country. Nevertheless, the Decree, as the former Chief Justice of 
Ghana, Mr. Justice F.K. Apaloo rightly observed "is no substitute for 
15. Interview with the General Manager of GIHOC Pharmaceuticals, 
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comprehensive indigenous legislation" (quoted in "West Africa", 8 
April 1985, p692). 
The Search for an Indigenous Ghanaian Patent Law 
The need for a new patent law for the country is increasingly 
growing and series of attempts are currently being made in that 
direction. However, efforts so far made have not yielded any fruit. 
The roost recent and concrete endeavour in this respect is that made by 
a renowned retire Ghanaian Appeal Court Judge, Mr. Justice Amissah. 
He was commissioned by the u.s. AID to study the prospects of 
prorrulgating a nE.W patent law for the country. This assignment took 
h~ to Brazil, India, USA, Israel, Kenya and the WIPO. He eventually 
carne out with a draft proposal for the possible enactment of patent 
legislation which did not apparently sean to reflect much of the 
provisions of the laws of the countries he visited. The proposals 
were, in essence, a replica of the ESARIrol6 Hodel Law on inventions 
for English-Speaking African countries, the provisions of which are 
merely guidelines. These draft proposals were eventually rejected by 
a comnittee set up to study than on the grounds that they did not 
reflect the needs of the country. 
After the rejection of these proposals another conmittee has 
been set up to study the issue of a new patent law. In spite of the 
fact that the l\.missah proposals were rej ected because they were 
essentially based on the ESARIOO Hodel Law and did not relate to the 
16. ESARIPO, as already noted, stands for Industrial Property 
Organisation for English-Speaking Africa. 
needs and level of economic and industrialisation development of the 
country, the ne\'l conunittee seerr.s to be falling into the same trap. 
The committee is currently using the ESARIPO Model Law as the main 
basis of its work, and some committee rnerrbers have expressed great 
concern about the extent to which other members are prepared to go in 
adopting the Hodel Law. The discontent of the former has made 
impossible regular committee meetings the absence of which is 
seriously affecting its work and is likely to delay the emergence of a 
new patent law for some time to come. 
Though a number of the provisions of the ESARIPO Model Law17 may 
not necessarily be very useful to the country, there are some 
including that relating to inportation (5.35 (3», which deserve very 
close attention in view of the LOCs' position on importation of 
patented products as working and other aspects of the patent system. 
Consequently, while the use of the ESARIPO Model Law as a basis for 
the Conunittee's work may be an appropriate issue for consideration, it 
may appear to me, however, that the crucial issue the ccmnittee should 
address itself to is whether a new patent law that they nay corne up 
with will be relevant to the country's level of industrialisation and 
economic development, and, in addition, whether it could, anong 
others, be effectively used as an economic instrument for national 
development. 
Accordingly, the provisions of the patent legal regime to be 
devised, particularly those relating to patentability, duration, 
measures against abuses of patent nonopoly and utilization of patent 
fees as a flexible instrument of patent policy must be directed 
towards that goal. 
17. See Chapter 6 for a discussion of some of these. 
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Patentability 
NRCD 81's exclusion of pharmaceutical products from 
patentability demonstrates quite clearly that the patent law of Ghana, 
like many other countries, discriminates between different industrial 
sectors. In view of the impact of this discriminatory policy on the 
local pharmaceutical industry it may be appropriate for the Committee 
to pursue this a little further and examine more carefully how it 
could use this discriminatory element of the country's patent system 
in relation to the country's technological, economic and developnental 
needs. In this respect, the patent system could be used to sieve out 
or block the inflow of any foreign technology, such as the plastic 
cigarette container registered by Philips Inc. USA (supra), which may 
either have very little economic value and, therefore, not contribute 
much to the developmental process, or may have the potential of 
frustrating such process. Accordingly, policies on patentability may 
need to be designed in terms of the country's economic development 
goals. 
Similarly, provisions on patentability may be evolved in 
relation to the development of I.T.C. so that the country can employ 
its patent system as part and parcel of its overall I.T .C. development 
by discriminating between not only industrial but technological 
fields. This will, therefore, require a IOOre selective approach on 
the subject of patentability, and, thus, go beyond discrimination 
between sectors to discrimination within sectors. with this approach 
,-
it will be possible to exclude from patentability certain 
technological fields considered to be strategic or of public interest, 
and still be able to reserve them for indigenous development. 
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It is important to note, however, that because of the principle 
of national treatment enshrined in the Paris Convention Ghana, which 
is a member of the Convention, cannot discriminate between its 
nationals and foreigners. It cannot, therefore, grant patents to its 
nationals in areas excluded from patentability and at the same tine 
refuse foreign inventors the same privilege. However, the effect of 
this approach \'1ill be to prevent the inflow of a given foreign 
technology while, simultaneously, encouraging the local development of 
that relevant technology without any impending outside threat. 
The use of the patent system in this way may, to a considerable 
extent, provide an effective protection for I.T.C. The combination of 
this use with others such as licensing requirement may not only make 
possible the ingress of the very relevant and conplementary foreign 
technology but also the efficacious furnishing of the desired 
protection for I.T.C. since the non-grant of both patent and license 
seals off almost all avenues for the influx of undesirable technology. 
The discriminatory use of the patent system may, therefore, contribute 
immensely to the development of I.T.C. and contribute harmoniously to 
the entire national technological and economic development. 
This discriminatory use of the patent system is possible without 
infringing the Paris Convention. In fact, G.H.C. Bohenhansen, 
Director-General of BIRPI (now w~PO) fram 1963-1973 emphasized that, 
nIn the field of patents ••• the Convention leaves the member states 
entirely free to establish the criteria of patentability, to decide ••• 
whether patents should be granted for products only, for processes 
only or for both and in which fields of industry and for what term", 
(cited in UN, 1975, 44). It is worth mentioning that such a 
discriminatory approach has already been adopted by the Andean Pact 
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(See Article 26 of Decision 24) which makes its policy on 
patentability easier to use to discriminate against technologies the 
indigenous developnent of which may require protection. Ghana nay 
need to consider the usefulness of such an approach. 
Duration of Patents 
Another area where it may be necessary for Ghana to consider 
carefully ~ adopting its own patent law is the duration of patent. 
Instead of adopting the comparatively more reasonable ESARIPO 
recommended uniform duration of initial Ie years and a subsequent 
possible additional 5 years18 (S.35 (1) & (2» it nay be useful to 
consider the adoption of a more flexible duration period which should 
relate to either the merits of the inventions, the sector to which the 
invention relates or the actual exploitation of the patent. The 
adoption of such a flexible approach need not erode the notion of a 
"fair return" (UN, 1975). That is, it should guarantee the patentee a 
fair return on his inventive efforts while at the same time it should 
not sacrifice the public interest. 
It nay be argued that the fact that Ghana finds it necessary to 
exclude the pharmaceutical sector, in some countries more than one 
sector, from patentability suggests that from its point of view the 
optimum term of patents in the excluded sector is deemed to be zero. 
It may, therefore, be inferred that from the standpoint of the public 
interest, the optimum term of patents cannot be regarded as being 
18. COIr[)are this with the BIRPI recommended period of 2" years and 
WIPO's of first 15 years and subsequent 5 years. 
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the same for all sectors and all patents within sectors. It may, 
therefore, be appropriate for the country to endeavour to follow a 
rational policy of granting a flexible and selective duration for 
patents on the criteria of under which sectors they fall, their 
merits, their contribution or impediment to the effective 
implementation of national technology policy, or their exploitation. 
Such an approach has been adopted in some LOCs. For example, in 
India the duration of a patent is, in general, 14 years fram the date 
of the conplete specification. However, the duration for food and 
drug patents is either seven years from the date of the filing or five 
years from the date of sealing, which ever period is shorter (UN, 
1975). Similarly, in Argentina patents are granted for 5, UJ or 15 
years taking into account, inter alia, the merits of the invention 
(.nllii) • Ghana can follow the example of these countr ies in using 
patent as a tool for its technological and economic develotxnent. 
1'Ptent Fees 
Patent fees could also be a flexible instrument of patent 
policy. '/my provisions in a n€W patent law must be realistic. It 
will be recalled that the patent fee prescribed by NRCD 81 is not only 
inadequate to contribute to meeting operational expenditure but it is 
also uniform irrespective of the varying economic significance of 
inventions requiring protection. It may be necessary to introduce 
reasonable criteria in levying patent fees which will need to reflect 
the value and economic significance of the various patents. This will 
permit the utilization of patent policies, like tariffs, towards 
end-specific goals. The introduction of any criteria in levying 
patent fees must also take into account the possibility of making such 
fees either meet or contribute to the cost of running the national 
patent office so that government subventions allocated for this 
purpose could be employed for other purposes such as increased 
resources for domestic R&D. Finally, any national criteria for 
levying patent fees must make it possible for the annual renewal fees 
to weed out patents of less economic significance to both the country 
and the patentee. 
other Measures 
Finally, it my, in addition, be necessary to consider the 
inclusion in a new patent law for Ghana measures such as revocation 
and forfeiture to deal with patent abuses, and compulsory licence to 
ensure the domestic working of registered patents. This will 
definitely rectify the present state of the law where no measures 
exist to combat non~vorking and other abuses of patents. The efficacy 
of these measures, particularly compulsory licence, have been found to 
be questionable (supra) and it is the responsibility of the committee 
to devise ways and means to ensure their effectiveness. 
COnclu§jQn 
It does appear, especially from the discussion on the effects of 
Cap. 179, that the time has come for Ghana to abrogate the existing 
patent law and in its place adopt its CM11 independent and authentic 
legislation which will reflect its peculiar level of technological and 
economic development. This will not only make it more relevant to the 
country's needs but it will also avoid the unnecessary tedious 
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procedure and cost associated with the present patent regime. In 
addition, this could, in turn, increase indigenous R&D, furnish 
inventors with the required legal protection, and nake possible the 
effective transfer of technology to the country. 
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In evolving its own patent law the country nay need to learn 
from the significant effects of the promulgation of NRCD 81, 
particularly regarding the pharmaceutical industry as well the patent 
regimes of other LDCs, and, thus, endeavour to utilize patents as a 
tool for economic development. In this respect serious consideration 
will have to be given to issues such as patentability which should be 
used harmoniously with governrrent technology strategy either to 
encourage the inflow of technologies needed to contribute to I.T.C., 
or to discourage the inflow of those which may endanger its 
development. Similarly, issues such as patent duration, fees, and 
others must be used as economic measures for end-specific goals. It 
may also be added that the patent office to be established by a new 
patent enactment must not only seek to give effect to such enactment, 
but must, in addition, serve as an effective agent for the 
dissemination of new technical knowledge. 
For the patent systan to be successful as an econanic policy 
measure and in transferring relevant technologies to the country it 
will need to be backed up by other related regimes and institutional 
measures. Consequently, the Investment Code, 1985, the regulations to 
be adopted to control technology transfer transactions and the GIC all 
have a contr ibution to make in this respect. As discerned from the 
above, restrictive practices in patent licensing and other technology 
transfer transactions still occur in Ghana, and the enactment of the 
previous and present Investments Codes (Act 437 and PNDCL 116 
respectively) could be seen as an atterrpt to corrbat such practices. 
The failure of Act 437 to expunge these practices during the period of 
its operation ordains the early adoption of the necessary regulations 
called for by S.30 of PNOCL 116 if the latter is to accomplish its 
goals. These regulations must necessarily fit into government 
technology plans and policies in order to ensure their continuous 
execution. Finally the regulations will need to be supported by a 
well developed monitoring scheme which will ensure their conpliance. 
In this way, the above measures could contribute to the effective 
transfer of technology to Ghana and its subsequent indigenous 
development to satisfy the needs of its people. 
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ClIAPl'ER 6 
mE NIGERIAN PATml' SYSTRt AND 'l'HE TMNSFER OF '1'fXlIN)UX;Y: IRf 
Introduction 
It will be recalled that the main patent legislation which 
governed the administration of patents in Nigeria before 197~ was the 
Registration of U.K. Patents Ordinance of 1925 as amended by the 
Patent Rights (Limitation) Decree, 1968. '!be 1925 Ordinance, as 
already indicated, incorporated the then Nigerian patent system into 
the U.K.'s and made the procurement of patents in Nigeria dependent on 
prior U.K. grants. 
There was, however, in 197~ a najor departure in the patent law 
and system of Nigeria which was brought about by the promulgation of 
the Patents and Designs Decree, 197~ (Decree No. 6~). The Decree came 
into force on 1 December 1971 and repealed the Registration of U.K. 
Patents Ordinance 1925, the Patent Rights (Limitation) Decree, 1968, 
and (in so far as they were in force in Nigeria) the U.K. Patents Act, 
1949 and amendments thereof. Decree No. 6~ of 197~ set up an 
independent patent system for Nigeria and sought to disentangle it 
from the colonial arrangement that preceded it. The Decree, unlike 
the preceding Ordinance, nade possible the direct procurement of 
patents in Nigeria without any prior recourse to the U.K. Patent 
Office. 
The Decree is IOOdel1ed on the BIRPI1 Model Law for Dpeloping 
1. BIRPI stands for the International Bureau for the Protection of 
Intellectual Property and was the predecessor of the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). 
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Countries on Inventions published in May 1965 (hereinafter referred to 
as the BIRPI Model Law). The roodelling of the Decree on the BIRPI 
Model Law, it may be noted was not founded on any national planning 
policy consideration, in particular any coherent and corrprehensive 
national technology plan because none existed at that time. It is 
only recently that a committee has started working on a corrprehensive 
technology policy for the country. It may, however, be pointed out 
that the structuring of the Decree on the Model Law is by no means a 
matter of accident. The adoption of the latter by Nigeria, it does 
appear, must have been influenced by the active participation of that 
country's then Acting Registrar of Patents in the various proceedings 
that eventually resulted in the birth of the BIRPI Model Law. A 
reading of the provisions of both the Decree and the Model Law reveals 
striking similarities between them. 
PrQVisioos of Decree No. 68 of 1978 
Decree No. 6riJ of 197riJ makes corrprehensive provisions concerning. 
the grant and administration of patents. These provisions cover 
issues such as patentability of inventions, applications for and grant 
of patents and patent licenses. 
Patentable Inyentions 
According to S.l(l) of the Decree an invention is patentable if: 
(a) it is new, results from inventive activity and 
is capable of industrial application, or 
(b) if it constitutes an improvement upon a patented 
invention and also is new, results from 
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inventive activity and is capable of industrial 
application. 
S.l (2) goes further to explain the concepts of novelty (which is 
world-wide), inventive activity and industrial application all of 
which seem to have been copied from Sections 2, 3 and 4 respectively 
of the BIRPI Model Law. The definitions given to these concepts by 
the Decree do not generally seem to differ from those of other 
convention countries. 
The significance of the definition of patentable inventions as 
offered by S.l (1) of the Decree which is based on S.l of the BIRPI 
Model Law is the inclusion of ilrprovements on a patented invention. 
This may be especially beneficial to Nigeria and other LDCs because it 
could stimulate indigenous inventive skills to either improve upon or 
adapt foreign inventions to the local environment and conditions or 
otherwise render them readily usable in their own country. It rust, 
however, be borne in. mind that the procurement of patents for such 
improvements must, according to 5.1(1) (b), satisfy the requirements of 
novelty, inventive activity and industrial applicability. This 
requirement copied by the Decree from the BIRPI Model Law (see 5.1(2» 
represents the Model Law committee's position on the issue as well as 
its rejection of the suggestion that because of the possible advantage 
for LDCs they should be allowed to grant patents of improvements for 
relative silrple rrodifications of inventions or techniques even when 
"inventive activity" was lacking (BIRPI, 1965, 19). 
The provisions of S.l(l) (b) of the Decree as well as the Model 
Law Committee's stand on the issue do appear to be in corrplete 
conformity to the definition and logic of patentability. It nay be 
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suggested for Nigeria and other LDCs that they could, in the case of 
simple but useful irrprovements which may not be able to satisfy the 
requirement of patentability, make provisions under their patent laws 
for the grant of rights such as nutility modeln or npetty patentn for 
which only a lower novelty requirement is needed and which offers 
protection at a much lower financial and administrative cost in return 
for a shorter duration of protection. 
It is important to note that despite their possible usefulness, 
particularly with respect to the adaptation of foreign technologies to 
the peculiar environments of LDCs which could involve a high degree of 
novelty, inprovements on patented inventions are not includErl in the 
definition of patentable inventions as contained in the ESA][PO Model 
Law for English-speaking African countries on patents (hereinafter 
referred to as ESARIPO Model Law). It may also be noted that the 
revised version of the BIRPI Model Law as contained in the WIFO l-Iodel 
Law for developing countries on inventions published in 1979 does not 
similarly include improvements in the definition of patentability. 
Non=Patentahle Inymtions 
Under the Decree, a patent cannot be obtained for plant or 
animal varieties, or essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals except for rrdcrobiological processes 
and their products (S.1(4) (a». In addition, a patent will be refused 
for any invention whose publication or exploitation would be contrary 
to public order or morality (S.1(4)(b». These exclusions are based 
on those of S.5(a) and (b) of the BIRPI Model Law respectively. 
Finally, principles and discoveries of scientific nature are also 
excluded from patentability by the Decree (S.1(5». The Significance 
of these exclusions is that the Nigerian law, like the Ghanaian, by 
virtue of its provisions on patentability and non-patentability does 
in fact discriminate between the various types of inventions which can 
qualify or not for Nigerian patents. It may be added, however, that 
the discrimination here is not one of economic policy. This is not 
surprising since the Decree, as already observed, was not promulgated 
within the context of any technology policy. 
19>1ication for and Right to Patent 
Any person whether the true inventor of an invention or not can 
apply for a Nigerian patent, and the right to the latter is vested in 
the statutory inventor.2 S.2(1) of Decree No. 60 defines the latter 
as n... the person who whether or not he is the true inventor, is the 
first to file, or validly to claim a foreign priority for, a patent 
application in respect of the inventionn• Clearly, S.2(1) following 
S.8(3) of the BIRPI Model Law establishes an nirrebutable presumption 
of inventorshipn, and enables the person who first files a patent 
application or validly claims the earliest priority for an application 
relating to the same invention to be considered to be the inventor. 
2. See the introduction to Chapter 2 (Right to Grant of a Patent) 
of the BIRPI Model Law. 
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Two merits seem to be associated with this provision. First, it 
may help to encourage the earliest possible disclosure of the 
invention to the public by rewarding the person who first publishes it 
through his application for a grant. It rust, lx>wever, be J;X>inted rut 
here that the presurrption of inventorship nay not necessarily be in 
favour of the first applicant for an invention in Nigeria woo may be a 
Nigerian because if there is another applicant whose claim of priority 
and the date thereof precedes that of the filing of the first Nigerian 
application he will obviously have the right to the patent. Tbe 
second merit as indicated by the comnentary on the corresponding BIRPI 
Model Law provision is that the presurrption makes it possible to avoid 
litigation on the nfrequently very controversial question of woo is 
the true ownern (BIRPI, 1965, 27). 
Nevertheless, S.2(l} of the Decree is liable to abuse. For 
example, a person who happens to learn of another's invention can, if 
he is the first to apply for a grant relating to the same invention in 
Nigeria, obtain a monopoly right for it unless and until his claim to 
the invention is challenged or contested. Similarly, the first and 
true inventor of an invention already filed in a convention country 
can have his patent monopoly right eroded by a person who first 
applies for a patent protection in Nigeria for the same invention if 
the former does not also take the necessary steps to protect his 
rights in that country. 
To safeguard the possible abuse of the provisions of S.2(l}, 
S.2 (2) provides, however, that the true inventor or owner of the 
invention is entitled to be named in the patent whether he is the 
statutory owner or not. This entitlement, according to the Decree, 
cannot be modified by contract. Moreover, S.2(3) adds that where a 
person, without the consent of the inventor or his successor in title, 
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applies for and obtains a patent for the invention then all the rights 
emanating from the application and the patent grant shall be deemed to 
be transferred to the inventor or his said successor. 
In spite of these safeguards it is doubtful whether S.2(1) can 
be free from abuse. For instance, it nay still be difficult to 
discover the true owner of an invention, especially if he does not 
find a Nigerian patent attractive, and thus, does not apply for one. 
It may not be unreasonable to suggest that the provision could breed 
patent piracy. It is, therefore, not surprising, that the provision 
of S.2(1) of the Decree derived from the BIRPI Model Law has been 
rejected by the WIPO Model Law3 which is a revised version of the 
former, and also has, to a greater extent, not been adopted by the 
ESARIPO Model Law. 4 
The latter two IOOdel laws like the BIRPI Model Law adopt the 
first-to-file rule which is sirrple to apply as it is not always easy 
to prove the date on which an invention was developed. The difference 
between them and the BIRPI Model Law, however, is that their first-to-
file rule, unlike the latter's, relates to only the true inventors 
where they are two or more, and have made the same invention 
independently. In such a case the first true inventor to awly, 
contrary to the BIRPI Model Law where the first applicant mayor may 
not be the true inventor, is entitled to a right to a patent. This is 
made very clear by both S.113(3) of the ESARIPO Model Law and the 
corrmentary thereon (See WIPO, 1978, 32), and in the case of the mIO 
Model Law by the corrmentary on S.119 (WIPO, 1979, 64). 
3. See S .119 of the WIPO Model Law. 
4. See S.ll3 (3) of the FSARIPO Model Law. 
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Though the then Registrar of Patents, Trademarks and Designs of 
Nigeria was among the eminent experts who advised and assisted the 
WIPO on the preparation of the FSARIPO Model Law, the Nigerian law on 
the issue has not been altered to reflect the former and still 
continues its adoption of the BIRPI Model Law provision, which as we 
noted earlier on could encourage patent piracy. However, this could 
be minimised if the examination of patent applications covered both 
form and substance whereby it might be possible to reveal the true 
owners of inventions as well as inventions already published. This, 
unfortunately, is not the case under the examination systen adopted by 
Decree No.6". 
R@mination of Patent lq:plicatioos 
The 197" Patent Decree confines the examination of patent 
applications to the form only and does not cover substance. 
Consequently, in the process of examination the Registrar only ensures 
that an application satisfies the statutory requirements prescribed by 
S.3. These are the inclusion in every patent awlication of the 
applicant's full name and address, and if that address is outside 
Nigeria, an address for service in that country, a description of the 
relevant invention with plans and drawings where necessary and a claim 
or claims. In addition, the application nust be accorrpanied by a 
prescribed fee. It is instructive to note that the patent fees 
prescribed under Nigerian law, like the Ghanaian, are uniform (see 
Patent Rules 1971, L.N. 96 of 1971, Schedule 1) and do not relate in 
any way to the varying economic importance of the invention covered by 
the patent, the value to the patentee of the national narket or the 
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related industrial field of the inventions. Clearly, as we found rut 
in the case of Ghana, the utilization of patent fees as an instrument 
of economic policy is yet to be adopted in Nigeria. Moreover, a 
patent application, where appropriate, must include a declaration 
signed by the true inventor requesting that he be mentioned as such in 
the patent and giving his name and address, and a signed power of 
attorney if the application is made by an agent. All these are 
covered by S.3 (1) • Another requirement provided by 8.3 (3) is that 
every application must relate to only one invention. 
There is, however, a further formal requirement which an 
inventor has to satisfy, but which the Registrar, as we shall see 
shortly, is relieved from examining. This requirement is provided by 
8.3(2). According to its provisions the description of an invention: 
•• ••• shall disclose the relevant invention in a 
manner sufficiently clear and complete for the 
invention to be put into effect by a person skilled 
in the art or field of knowledge to which the 
invention relates, and the claim or claims •••• shall 
define the protection sought and shall not go beyond 
the limits of the said description. 
This provision, particularly the aspect relating to full disclosure, 
is very important where there is provided a system of conpu1sory 
licensing as is the case under Nigerian law. In such a situation full 
disclosure of an invention is relevant in order to enable an applicant 
for a compulsory licence to work a cOnpllsorily licensed invention, 
especially where the necessary co-operation of the patentee may not 
be forthcoming. In addition to the system of compulsory licensing 
adequate disclosure is also relevant to ordinary patent licensing 
transactions if licensees are to be able to exploit efficiently and 
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independently licensed patents. Moreover, it is important for the 
general use of inventions after they have entered the public domain. 
Finally, complete and adequate disclosure of inventions is necessa~ 
if patents are to serve as useful sources of new technical 
information. However, since tmder the Decree, patent applications are 
not substantively examined to assess the adequacy and completeness of 
the description of inventions the impact of the above provision may 
not be substantial. 
In respect of an awlication based on foreign priority the 
statuto~ requirement is that the applicant must append to his 
application a written declaration indicating the date and number of 
the earlier application, the count~ in which it was first made and 
the name of the person who made it (S.3(4) (a». Furthermore, the 
applicant must provide the Registrar, within three months of the 
lodging of the application, with a copy of the earlier application 
certified correct by the relevant office (S.3(4) (b». Any such 
application must be lodged with the Registrar before the expiration of 
12 months fram the date of the prior application (S.27(2) (a». This, 
clearly" is in conformity with article 4(A) (1) of the Paris 
Convention. 
In conducting the examination of patent applications these are 
the things the Registrar concerns himself with. Depending on which 
statutory requirements have been satisfied and which have not, the 
Registrar may grant the patent, reject the application (S.4 (1) (a) ) , 
request amendment (S.4(1) (b» which if not conplied with will result 
in the rejection of the application. In the case of an application 
based on foreign priority the non-conpliance with the statutory 
requirements entitles the Registrar to disregard any claim for 
priority (5.4(1) (c». 
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The most significant provision in respect of the examination 
system adopted by Nigeria, it will seem, is that of S.4 (2) • It 
provides that: 
~·fuere the examination mentioned in Subsection (1) 
above shows that a patent application satisfies the 
requirements of Section 3 (1) and (3), the patent 
shall be granted as applied for without further 
examination, and in particular, without examination 
of the questions:-
(a) whether the subject of the application is 
patentable under Section 1, 
(b) whether the description and claims satisfy the 
requirements of Section 3(2), and 
(c) whether a prior application, or an application 
benefiting from a foreign priority, has been 
made in Nigeria in respect of the same 
invention, and whether a patent has been granted 
as a result of such an application. 
S.4(2) obviously reiterates the registration system adopted by 
Nigeria. It is based on S.18 of the BIRPI Model Law, and the Decree 
thus adopts "Alternative A" of the BIRPI forms of examination which 
relates to the grant of a patent without examination as to the 
substance of the application. 5 The underpinning rationale for this 
type of examination is that the Patent Office is not equipped to 
examine, and will, therefore, not evaluate issues such as the 
-----------
---,------------
5. The other alternatives p.lt forward by the BIRPI Model Law are 
the grant of patent after preliminary examination of the 
substance of the application, and the grant of patent subject to 
deferred examination of the substance of the application. 
220 
patentability of an invention, whether the description of the 
invention is adequate and conplete, whether the claims define the 
protection sought and do not exceed the contents of the description, 
whether the same invention has already been the subject of an earlier 
application or has been patented in the country, and when a priority 
is claimed, whether this claim is justified because it is founded on a 
prior application for the same invention. The adoption by Nigeria of 
a system of registration may obviously be explained by the paucity of 
technical personnel and other resources required to undertake 
effectively the examination of the above issues. 
Though 5.4(2) and the adopted examination system excludes from 
the Registrar's consideration the above fundamental issues they do 
appear to have some merits for Nigeria and other LDCs which adopt the 
registration systen. First, it is less time-consuming, inex:fensive 
and makes it easier for both domestic and foreign inventors to 
register their inventions. In addition, because the system of 
examination as to form does not put every patent application under 
close scrutiny it relieves patent offices of the eX:fense and burden of 
having to engage and maintain persons with high technical 
qualifications and experience who are not available in reasonable 
numbers. Finally, it also relieves the patent office from examining 
patent applications which in any event may, because of the less 
commercial potentials or prospects, eventually be abandoned. This 
certainly saves the office some valuable tine and resources which 
would otherwise have been committed to the examination of such 
applications. 
Nevertheless, the registration system may have sane demerits 
which could affect the patent systen of countries, including Nigeria, 
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which adopt it. In the first place, it does not in any way guarantee 
that patents are granted solely for deserving inventions, that is, 
those which meet the requirements of patentability as provided by the 
law. Moreover, it does not, unlike the preliminary examination 
system, make any contribution to the training of the engineering and 
scientific staff of a country which adopts it since they do not 
examine and thus learn from new inventions filed at the Patent Office. 
Furthermore, because inventions, under the registration system, are 
not substantively examined in order to ascertain their industrial 
applicability inventors may not be adequately apprised of the actual 
value of their inventions before they embark on their exploitation. 
Similarly, examination as to form does not, unlike substantive 
examination, provide adequate certainty for other inventors or 
researchers about which areas or field of knowledge patents have 
already been granted in, so that they can proceed with research in 
other unexplored areas. This demerit could also result in their 
inventive activities rendering them liable to infringement suits. 
In respect of the specific issues raised by 5.4(2) it could be 
argued that the non-examination of an invention to determine its 
patentability may result in the grant of patents for dubious and 
doubtful inventions whose novelty, inventiveness and industrial 
applicability may forever remain unprobed. It is very doubtful 
whether indigenous Nigerian inventions such as the "Nairawise 
trinming-set", which is a canbination of razor and corrb, and others 
for which Nigerian patents have been granted would have passed the 
test of patentability if they had been subjected to a substantive 
examination. It is equally doubtful whether such inventions are of 
any industrial significance to that country. 
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In addition, the non-examination of the description or 
disclosure of the invention (S.4(2)(b» to ensure that it is 
sufficiently clear and complete to enable the invention to be worked 
by a person skilled in the art to which the invention relates may 
encourage the practice of excluding, fran patent specifications, 
essential and concise details as well as the accorrpanying know-how 
relevant to the exploitation of the invention in Nigeria. It is 
instructive to note that even in cases where adequate description of 
inventions is legally ordained and enforced, it is possible for 
inventors either to omit essential details, or to blur or cloud the 
description with unnecessary and excessive details (Supra). 
Consequently, it will not be wrong to infer that 5.4(2) (b) may result 
in the filing of either inadequate or blurred patent specifications 
which may make it difficult for indigenous Nigerian technical 
personnel to learn from and be able to work registered inventions. 
This obviously defeats some of the essential functions of the patent 
system, that is, the disclosure and spread of technical knowledge, and 
the transfer of technology. In the case of foreign registered 
inventions, particularly those based on foreign priority, it could be 
argued that the foreign applicants are likely to register patents on 
which they have priority from an earlier registration and which 
therefore might have had a full examination. 
It may be pointed out, however, that inventors woo do not 
disclose their inventions adequately and completely may stand the risk 
of falling victims to patent piracy or the practice of "patenting 
around patents". This practice can provide third parties with the 
opportunity to study such incomplete disclosed or confused inventions 
and thus clarify them and make the necessary addition or omission and 
223 
then file subsequent applications. Consequently, prior inobscurely 
described inventions may cease to have effective legal protection. 
This fear of losing protection over such inventions may, despite the 
provisions of 5.4(2) (b), urge inventors to file complete and adequate 
specifications. The registration system, it may, therefore, be 
surmised, relies on the goodwill and the self-interest of the inventor 
to make a full disclosure of his invention for the risk of losing his 
protection. 
Finally, the non-examination of the claims to ensure that they 
give a precise definition of the monopoly right sought and to limit 
this right to the invention as described may encourage wild claims for 
undeserved monopoly right and eventually result in the proliferation 
of patent litigation.6 
While all these may easily be associated with the registration 
system, it may, however, be noted that the preliminary examination 
system may not totally be devoid of some of the above defects such as 
the granting of patents for inventions which do not satisfy the 
requirements of patentability. It is the case that even in countries 
including the U.K. where patent applications are examined as to 
substance patents for certain inventions have at one time or another 
been revoked because they were not patentable.7 The difference 
6. See the British Patent System: report of the Committee to 
examine the patent system and patent law, Chairman MAL Banks, 
Cmnd, 44~7, July 197~. 
7. For example see the case of Horville Engineering Co. Ltd. v 
CIa res (Engineering) Ltd [1976] RPC 411 C.A. where the 
plaintiffs I patent for a load-carrying device consisting of a 
mobile pallet was revoked on the grounds of obviousness. See 
also Polaroid Corporation (Land's) Patent [1981] RPC 111 C.A. 
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between such countries and Nigeria, however, is that while the former 
examine the substance of patent applications and thus endeavour to 
prevent or minimise the occurrence of the above situation the latter 
does not. It nay, therefore, not be surprising that the patent grant 
of preliminary examination countries may be of much "higher 
presumptive validity" than those issued under the registration system 
as operated by Nigeria. 8 Decree No. 61a, however, endeavours to 
rectify some of the above defects associated with the Nigerian system 
of examination by its provision for nullity of patent. 
Rlllity of Patent 
S.9(1) of the Decree following S.47(1) of the BmPI Model Law 
attempts to nullify patents granted for inventions which are either 
not patentable or suffer from defects associated with the registration 
system. S.9(1) provides that: 
Subj ect to this section, on the application of any 
person (including a public officer acting in the 
exercise of his functions) the court shall declare a 
patent null and void -
(a) if the subject of the patent is not patentable 
under Section 1, or 
(b) if the description of the invention or the claim 
does not conform with Section 3(2), or 
(c) if for the same invention a patent has been 
granted in Nigeria as the result of a prior 
application or an application benefiting from an 
earlier foreign priority. 
8. The British Patent System, OPe cit. p.2 
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Though it is inescapable or absolutely necessary to provide in any 
patent law that patents which do not meet the requirements of 
patentability or the provisions of the relevant law shall, on request, 
be invalidated or declared null and void, 5.9(1) is, howe\1er, of 
particular significance to Nigeria which operates a registration 
system. Under this system, as the commentary on the BIRPI Model Law 
rightly put it, "the risk that patents will be granted which do not 
satiSfy the requirements of the law is ruch greater than in a system 
with examination as to the substance of the applicationsn. (BIRPI, 
1965, 68-69). 5.9 (1), therefore, becomes necessary to invalidate 
patents which do not meet the requirements of Decree No.6". This 
invalidation, as contemplated by the section, is to be undertaken by 
the courts. 
This exercise by the court is expected to be initiated by the 
general public and by government officials. While this may be 
significant since it is in the public interest that patents are 
granted for only deserving inventions, it is doubtful if the provision 
as a whole will be able to accomplish the desired goals for a number 
of reasons. 
First, it must be noted that while public officials, such as 
public prosecutors singled out in the commentary on 5.47 of the BIRPI 
Model Law, with the support of the State and with adequate resources 
may be in a position to engage in patent litigation they hardly ever 
litigate over patent rights. The rare occasion on which public 
officials get involved in patent proc~edings are when the government 
or a government department is sued by a patentee for having allegedly 
infringed his patent monopoly right. 
On the contrary, members of the general p.ililic nay not have the 
necessary resources to sustain a prolonged and expensive patent 
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litigation. In addition, their participation in ensuring the validity 
of patent is also limited since the Decree confines ~rsons taking a 
nullity action only to those who have material interest in making the 
application. 9 
In addition, S.23 (3) (b) accomplishes a further reduction of this 
public participation by the possible prohibition of patent licensees 
from contesting the validity of patents. While S.23 (3) renders any 
clause in a licence agreement null and void if it imposes any 
restrictions not derivable from the patent (infra), S.23(3)(b) 
excludes from such restrictions "obligations imposed on the licensee 
to abstain from all acts capable of prejudicing the validity of the 
patentn. Certainly, such acts may encompass legal contesting of 
patent validity. Consequently, by virtue of S.23(3) (b) licensees, 
who, besides patentees, have considerable material interest in the 
relevant patents, could possibly be prohibited from challenging the 
validity of their licensed patents, and thus excluderl fran the general 
public in the initiation of an action to invalidate unrneritor ious 
patents. This exclusion, as already observed in Chapter 1, seems to 
be in accord with the common law doctrine of estoppel whereby a party 
to a contract, particularly in respect of patents is estopped from 
challenging the validity of the agreement which he freely enters into 
while at the same time he enjoys the benefits derived thereunder. 
However, as we explained in the same chapter, this no-challenge 
provision is anti-competitive and enables patentees to enjoy 
9. S.9(5)(c) provides that the court nshall dismiss an application 
under subsection (I) above if the applicant (not being a public 
officer) fails to satisfy the court that he has a material 
interest in making the applicationn• 
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privileges that extend beyond those provided by the patent monopoly 
grant. Clearly, the provision is most unfortunate, especially in 
terms of the nullity provision under the Decree, because as the U •• S. 
SUpreme Court rightly reasoned: 
Licensees may often be the only indi vi duals with 
enough economic incentive to challenge the 
patentability of an inventor' s discovery. If they are 
muzzled, the lXlblic may continually be required to pay 
tribute to would-be monopolists without need or 
justification. We think it plain that the technical 
requirements of contract doctrine must give way before 
the demands of the public interest in the typical 
situation involving the negotiation of a licence after 
a patent has issued.l~ 
All this ma.y render the shift to the p.1blic of the cbligation to 
ensure that patents are granted for only deserving inventions not very 
effective, and S.9(1) may therefore not be able to rectify 
sufficiently the defects already discussed above. It may be inferred 
that most Nigerian grants, apart from those which may be invalidated 
through legal actions of other patentees, are likely to continue in 
force throughout their entire life span. 
l~. Lear v Adkins, 395 US 653, 23 L. Ed. 6H:'l at 623. See also the 
E.E.C. Cornnissions decision on the subject in the cases of AOIP 
v Beyrard [1976] CMLR D14, Re Agreements of the Davidson Rubber 
co. [1972] CMLR D52 and Raymond v Nagoya Rubber Co. [1972], CMLR 
045. 
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Grant and nIration 
On the satisfaction of the statutory requirements, the Registrar 
grants a patent to the applicant by the issue of a document containing 
the nunber of the patent in the order of the grant, the name and 
address of the patentee and, if that address is outside Nigeria, an 
address for service in Nigeria, the date of the patent application and 
the grant, the description of the invention and the claims, and where 
appropriate, the name and address of the true inventor (S.5 (1». In 
cases where foreign priority is claimed the document must, in 
addition, contain an indication of that fact, as well as the number 
and date of the application on which the claim is based and the name 
of the country where it was made (.iQi.g.). 
The duration of Nigerian patents is uniform and does not 
discriminate between the varying types of inventions registered in the 
country. The life span of all Nigerian patents is twenty years from 
the date of the filing of the relevant invention (S.7(1». 
Nevertheless, it shall lapse before the twentieth year if fees and any 
surcharges are not paid within the prescribed period. In the case of 
grants based on foreign priority the twenty year period is reckoned 
from the date of the prior application. For all this period while the 
grant is in force the patentee enjoys all the monopoly rights 
emanating from the grant. 
Rights Conferred by Patent 
A Nigerian patent confers on the patentee a Jronopoly right 
restricting others from exploiting the invention except of course 
licensees who are duly permitted by the patentee to do so. This is 
provided by S.6(1) which specifically states: 
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A patent confers on the patentee the right to preclude 
any other person from doing any of the following acts 
(a) where the patent has been granted in respect of a 
product, the act of making, importing, selling or 
using the product, or stocking it for the purpose 
of sale or use, and 
(b) where the patent has been granted in respect of a 
process, the act of applying the process or doing, 
in respect of a product obtained directly by means 
of the process, any of the acts mentioned in 
paragraph (a) above. 
The above provision is derived from S.2l of the BIRPI Model Law which 
is adopted by S.32 of the ESARIPO ~lodel Law am continued by S.135 of 
the WIPO Hodel Law. It is interesting to note that the ESARIPO 
commentary on this provision which is very close to' the WIPO 
commentary makes specific reference to the similarity between S.32 of 
the ESARIPO Hodel Law and the above Nigerian provision (WIro, 1978, 
84). 
The provisions of S.6 (1) (a) and (b) of the Decree are in 
corrplete conformity with articles 5 (A) (1) of the Paris Convention, 
which makes importation of patented products not liable to forfeiture 
(supra), and 5 quater of the same convention, which extends patent 
monopoly rights to the process of manufacture and the products 
therefrom, respectively. By virtue of S.6(1) (b) the Decree also 
extends monopoly rights to processes and products derivable therefrom. 
The latter, as was explained in Chapters One and TWo, has the effect 
of extending the irrport monopoly of patentees. To prevent this 
extension of the irrport monpoly some LOCs including Brazil have 
excluded processes for the manufacture of some products from 
patentability. 
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Limitation of Rights 
Three kinds of limitation appear to affect the rronopoly right 
conferred by a Nigerian patent. First, S.6(3) (a) seems to water down 
a patent monopoly right by the fact that it limits it to acts done for 
industrial or corranercial purposes. So that the use of a patented 
invention for scientific research, educational FUrposes or strictly 
personal use is not covered by the exclusive right. Secondly, it does 
not cover acts done in connection with a product covered ~ a patent 
after it has been lawfully sold in Nigeria. (S.6(3)(b». This is to 
enable the unhindered circulation of patented products in the country. 
By the adoption of the doctrine of "exhaustion" the patentee cannot, 
after the sale of his product, prevent anyone else from hlying up that 
product and selling it in Nigeria or any other country. However, if a 
provision for a special application of the product is mde ~ the 
patent then the said special application shall continue to be reserved 
to the patentee. The provisions of S.6(3) are based on S.23 of the 
BIRPI Model Law and continued by S.136 of the WIPO' s. 
The third possible significant limitation is provided ~ S.6(4) 
of the Decree which is derived fran S.24 of the BIRPI Model Law. The 
former provides that: 
Where, at the date of the filing of a patent 
application in respect of a product or process or at 
the date of a foreign priority validly claiIred in 
respect of the application, a person other than the 
applicant -
(a) was conducting an undertaking in Nigeria, and 
(b) in good faith and for the purposes of the 
undertaking, was nanufacturing the product or 
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applying the process or had made serious 
preparations with a view to doing so, 
then, notwithstanding the grant of a patent, there 
shall exist a right (exercisable by the person for the 
time being conducting the undertaking, and not 
otherwise) to continue the manufacture or application, 
or to continue and complete the preparations and 
thereafter undertake the manufacture or application, 
as the case may be, and in respect of any resulting 
products to do any other act mentioned in subsection 
(l) above. 
The raison d'etre of this provision is to avoid prejudicing any local 
industrial investment by a person for the exploitation of an invention 
which, subsequently, becomes patented by another person (See BIRPI, 
1965, 46 and WIPO, 1979, 86). S.6(4) seeks to forestall the situation 
whereby a third party having invested so nuch time and lOOney in a 
given project, who was already in good faith exploiting or about to 
commence the exploitation of a given invention should be frustrated or 
denied any rewards simply because a statutory inventor or an applicant 
claiming priority was first to file an application for it. It thus 
endeavours to give some protection to industrialists who may 
contribute to the economic and technological development of Nigeria. 
It is instructive to note, as the commentaries on the relevant 
provisions of both BIRPI and WIPO Model Laws (infra) rightly indicate, 
that if at the appropriate date, that is, at the filing, or where 
appropriate, the priority date, the invention was disclosed to the 
public either by its use or in any other way in the country, then the 
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invention cannot be considered novel any longer and thus not qualified 
for a patent. However, if the use preceding either the filing or 
priority date was non-public use, that is, the invention was not made 
available to the public within the meaning of 5.1, then the novelty 
will not be affected and a patent may be granted. It must be noted 
that in both cases, that is public or non-public use, 5.6(4) protects 
the "prior user" if he was of good faith. As regards IXJblic use the 
provision enables him to continue the exploitation of the invention 
without having to institute nullity proceedings under 5.9 of the 
Decree. In the case of non-public use the provision again allows the 
"prior user" to continue this exploitation notwithstanding the 
validity of the patent. In other words, as the commentaries on the 
two Hodel Laws (that is the BIRP and WIPO's) put it "as far as the 
'prior user' is concerned, it is a matter of indifference whether 
there is a valid patent or not: his right to continue the use is the 
same in both situations". 
For the purposes of 5.6 (4) a prior user shall not be deemed to 
have acted in good faith if he procured the information concerning the 
invention without the permission of the applicant or, although having 
got the information with the applicant's authorization, did not also 
obtain the latter's permission to commence the working of the 
invention. 
The acts which enable a person to benefit from the provisions of 
5.6(4) are those of manufacturing a product and utilising a process as 
well as preparation for these acts. They do not cover the acts of 
merely importing, offering for sale, selling, using, or stocking of 
products since the objective of the provision is to protect domestic 
industr ial investment. It is imperative to note that the rights 
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derived from prior manufacture or use do not only permit the 
beneficiary to manufacture locally the product but also to sell and 
use the product so manufactured. S.6(4), as already mentioned, is 
derived from S.24 of the BIRPI Model Law which has been continued by 
S.137 of the WIPO Model Law. It is surprising that the provision 
which appears to be quite useful especially for lOCs is not adopted by 
the FSARIPO Model Law. 
Transfer of Rights in Technical Knowledge 
The Decree provides for certain modes through which a patentee 
can transfer either all or some of his rights to another. These 
include assignment (S.24), licences of right (S.l~), compulsory 
licences (Schedule 1, Part 1), and contractual licences (S.23). The 
provisions in the Decree on all these do not present any major 
striking dissimilarities between the patent law of Nigeria and that of 
other convention countries. Nevertheless, there are some provisions 
under contractual licences which do not only raise a number of 
fundamental issues but depart from the approach adopted by some 
convention countries as well as other countries with a patent system. 
In respect of contractual licences S.23(3) of the Decree rightly 
declares any clause in such licences which imposes on the licensee in 
the industrial or commercial field restrictions not deriving fram the 
rights conferred by the patent null and void. This implies that the 
licence agreement as a whole and other clauses in the agreement are 
not, as a rule, void. It nay, however, anerge that the clauses liable 
to be declared null and void are so fundamental to the contract that 
without them it cannot subsist. In that case the entire contract nay 
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be invalidated by the courts on the basis of the general rules of the 
law of contract. It must be noted that the section contains only a 
general rule prohibiting certain restrictions some of which include 
tie-in, export restrictions not necessitated by limitation of existing 
patents and restrictions on licensees not to sell competing products 
not infringing the licenseed patentll • 
5.23 (3) is based on 5.33 (1) of the BIRPI Model Law. The Model 
Law committee apparently devoted particular attention to this section 
and it was observed, during discussion, that countries which already 
had adequate anti-trust regulations to carbat restrictions on free 
competition would not need in their patent laws such a provision. On 
the contrary, for countries, including a number of LOes, which did not 
have any anti-trust regulations it was advised that they could include 
the provision in their patent law. (BIRPI, 1965, 56). So Nigeria did. 
However, 5.33 (2) of the BIRPI Model Law adopted by the provisos 
to 5.23 (3) of the Decree permits restrictions which are considered 
unlawful in a number of developed countries including the U.5. and 
member countries of the E.E.C., as well as some LOCs, but considered 
by the BIRPI as lawful restrictions which are most usual. 
The first proviso to 5.23 (3) permits in a licence agreement 
nlimitations concerning the scope, extent, territory or duration of 
the exploitation of the patent ••• or the quality or quantity of the 
products in connection with which the patent ••• nay be exploitedn• 
The second proviso relates to the possible permission of a 
no-challenge clause (supra). Finally, the third proviso also enables 
the licensor to introduce into a licence agreement nlimitations 
justified by the interest of the licensor in the technically efficient 
11. These are some of the examples contained in the CClTIIrentary on 
5.33(1) of the BIRPI Model Law (See BIRPI, 1965, 56). 
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exploitation of the subject of the patent ••• n. 'I11ough this proviso 
may appear justified it is too broad and general, and stands the 
possible chance of abuse. Clearly, some of these limitations are 
anti-competitive and others could be convenient back-doors for 
licensors to introduce other limitations not anticipated by the Decree 
but which they may consider necessary. It does not seem surprising to 
find such restrictive provisions in a patent law in view of the 
monopoly nature of patent. In fact, they express the problem of 
rronopoly grant. 
It is clear from the above that the Nigerian patent law conpared 
with the Ghanaian may appear more acceptable, especially in respect of 
its provisions for the domestic application and procedure for 
obtaining a patent in Nigeria, and the ease with which Nigerian 
inventors are able to procure patent grants. 'I11e Decree also provides 
a comprehensive patent law for the country and makes provisions for 
measures such as compulsory licences. Despite this comprehensiveness 
and the provisions to check patent abuses the majority of patents 
registered in Nigeria, as we shall see in Chapter 7, are not worked, 
and the patent system, as we shall also see in the same chapter, is 
employed to include restrictive practices in patent licensing and 
technology transfer transactions. It is in this regard that the 
relevance of 5.23 (3) is brought into question. Section 23 (3) of 
Decree No. 6~ which before 1979 seemed to be the only relevant legal 
provision on patent licensing appears, besides the few exceptions, to 
have encouraged the inclusion of a number of restrictive practices in 
licensing agreements involving Nigerian licensees. It is, therefore, 
a welcome relief that the National Office of Industrial Property 
Decree 1979 was introduced that year to corrbat these anticampetitive 
practices. 
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l@tional Office of Industrial Property Decree 1979 (Decree No. 71) and 
Technology Transfer Regulation in Nigeria 
The birth of both the National Office for Industrial Property 
Decree 1979 (Decree No. 7~) and the National Office for Industrial 
Property (NOIP) set up by the Decree is the result of the canbined 
efforts of both the United Nations Developnent Programme (UNDP) and 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). 
In the wake of the increased influx of foreign investors and 
inflow of foreign technology into Nigeria spurred by the country's oil 
boom in the mid-197~' s the UNDP came to recognise the need for that 
country to regulate the activities of these investors, particularly 
the terms and practices associated with the transfer of technology. 
While the UNDP provided the expert ise and developed the necessary 
modalities and proposals in this direction, the influential UNECA 
served as the channel through which all these were funnelled to the 
Nigerian government. The latter in considering the rrerits of the 
proposals vis-a-vis the country's balance of payment position, which 
had then started to reflect the extra pressures on it which included 
fees and royalty payments to foreign technology suppliers, accepted 
these proposals and the need to set up a centralised office to control 
technology transfer to Nigeria. 
Consequently, Decree No. 7~ of 1979 was promulgated on 25 
September 1979 and came into effect in 198~. The Decree, it has been 
suggested, particularly with respect to its provisions on the 
evaluation and registration of licence agreements, is an adoption of 
the Volume II of the WIro Model Law for Developing Countr ies on 
Inventions (Date-Bah, 1981, 89). While there is, in fact, a very 
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close similarity between the Decree's provisions relating to the 
examination and registration of licensing contracts and the WIPO Model 
Law's corresponding provisions this does not, oowever, seem to be the 
case because the Decree was promulgated in 1979, a year before the 
WIPO Model Law was corrpleted and IXJblished. It may be appropriate, 
nevertheless, to mention that the Decree seems to follow very closely 
the 1972 Mexican law on the transfer of technology which has now been 
repealed by the 1981 law on the subject. In fact, the similarity 
between the two laws in terms of content and statutory arrangement is 
so close that it makes it difficult to avoid the inference that the 
Decree could possibly have been greatly influenced by the Mexican law. 
The roIP Decree is the main law which provides both the legal 
and institutional framework for regulating the transfer of technology 
to Nigeria. It established the National Office of Industrial Property 
(NDIP) as the main administrative authority for this purpose. It is 
instructive to point out here that the Decree does not cover FDls. 
Unlike the Ghanaian approach, FDls in Nigeria are regulated by 
separate enactments and policies, and administered by different bodies 
created by these enactments and policies. Among these are the 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees 1972 (No. 4 of 1972) and 1977 
(No. 3 of 1977), a series of Five-Year Development Plans and other 
industrial policies and strategies. This means that the inte:jrated 
regulatory approach for both FDI and the transfer of technology is not 
practised in Nigeria. 
The Establishnent and Functions of the Office of Irdlstrial PrqJerty 
lmIP) 
Section 1 of Decree No. 70 of 1979 establishes the roIP. The 
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latter is governed by a body known as the Governing Council (5.2(1». 
This Council is responsible for the fornulation of IX>licy for the rolP 
and for the discharge of other functions conferred on it by the 
Decree. It is conposed of a Chairman who shall be the Pernanent 
Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Industries or any such officer of 
that Ministry not below the rank of Principal Secretary as may be 
designated by the Permanent Secretary, one representative each from 
the Federal Ministries of Economic Development, Finance, Internal 
Affairs, Justice, Trade, and Works and Housing. Also included in the 
composition of the Council is one representative from the National 
SCience and Technology Developnent Agency, and, in addition, one 
representative each of the Universities, and polytechnics and Colleges 
of Technology in Nigeria, both appointed by the Federal Camnissioner 
of Industries after the requisite consultations. The Director of the 
NOlP who is its chief executive officer is also a member of the 
Governing Council (5.2(2». It may be added that 5.2(3) of the 
5chedule to the Decree permits the Council to co-opt any person whose 
advice it may desire on a particular matter for such period as it 
thinks fit. Similarly 5.3 (2) of the SChedule nakes it IX'ssible for 
cormnittees of the Council to be composed of persons who may not be 
members of the Council. Both provisions are significant in the sense 
that they may make available to both the Council and possibly the NOIP 
itself expertise which they may lack in the execution of their 
functions. 
The functions of the rolP as provided by 5.4 of Decree No. 7(3 of 
1979 include the encouragement of a more efficient process for 
identifying, selecting and acquiring foreign technology, the 
developnent of the negotiating skills of Nigerians entering into 
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agreements involving the transfer of foreign technolCXJY, and the 
provision of a nore efficient process for the adaptation and use of 
imported technology. Another ~rtant function of the NOIP is the 
registration of all contracts which at the date of the coming into 
force of the Decree are still valid as well as those entered into 
after the Decree came into effect.12 SUch contracts must wholly or 
partially concern the use of trademarks, licence to use patented 
inventions, the supply of technical expertise, basic or detailed 
engineering, or machinery and plant, the provision of staff or 
managerial assistance and the training of personnel. Finally, the 
NOIP also monitors, on a continuous basis, the execution of such 
registered contracts. 
It is obvious that the NOIP appears to concentrate its efforts 
on the core issue of the technology aspect, its effective transfer and 
adaptation in all licensing transactions. The effective execution of 
the above functions may, however, be impeded by factors such as 
inadequate personnel and resources. Nevertheless, it is significant 
that the Decree highlights the need to undertake the above exercises 
which nost LDCs relegate to the background. It may be mentioned here 
in respect of the registration exercise that a NOIP guideline excludes 
from such exercise purchase agreenents involving the imIX>rts of 
machinery and equipment unless foreign personnel are used in their 
12. According to S.5(1) and (2) all the pre-Decree contracts entered 
into by any person in Nigeria are to be registered within six 
months from the commencing date of the Decree while the 
IX>st-Decree contracts entered into by any person in Nigeria and 
outside it are to be registered within 6a days from the date of 
their execution or conclusion. 
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execution. This exclusion may seem to be inappropriate because of the 
practices associated with such agreements whereby clauses such as 
tie-ins are included. This may therefore encourage the embodiment of 
these clauses in such agreements and the roIP may need to have a 
second look at the guideline. 
Criteria For Evaluation of OOreEUe'lts by roIP 
In evaluating all technology transfer agreements subrrdtted for 
registration, the NOIP is guided essentially by the criteria laid down 
by S.6 of the Decree. Though other economic and technical 
considerations may influence the exercise. The section empowers the 
Director of the roIP to refuse registration of any agreement which 
does not conply with the said criteria. S.6 (2) (a) provides that the 
Director shall refuse the registration of any agreement which seeks to 
transfer technology which is freely available in Nigeria. This 
undoubtedly is to avoid the unnecessary duplication of technology 
which already exists in the country, and possibly the destruction in 
particular of indigenous technology by sophisticated foreign 
technologies.S.6(2) (a) is very sirrdlar to article 7(1) of the Mexican 
law on transfer of technology (1972) which is continued by Article 
16(1) of the 1981 law. According to S.6(2) (b), which is alrrost the 
same as Article 7(ii) of the 1972 Mexican law, any agreement in mich 
the price or other valuable consideration is not commensurate with the 
technology acquired or to be acquired will equally be refused 
registration. In the same vein, agreements which impose excessive and 
unreasonable controls on transferee's operation (S.6(2) (c) (h) (i) and 
(k» as well as those which oblige the acquiring party to submit to 
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foreign jurisdiction for dispute settlement (S.6(2)(r» are also not 
entitled to be registered. 
Other mandatory requirements which are to be met by all 
technology transfer agreements before they can be registered by the 
NOIP include the exclusion from such contracts of limitations on R & 
D, grant-back clauses, tie-ins and export restrictions. 
S.6(2)(e) forbids the inclusion in technology transfer 
agreements involving Nigerian licensees of any covenant which has the 
prime aim of restraining them from undertaking further research and 
development regarding the licensed technology. Similarly, the same 
provision prohibits any covenant which requires the consent of the 
licensor before any adaptation of the technology to local conditions 
could be carried out. Though the occurence of such clauses in 
technology agreements involving Nigerian licensees is, as we shall see 
in the next chapter, minimal it is important that the Decree should 
seek their entire expunction fram technology agreements because of the 
inhibiting effect they may have on licensees' research directed to the 
adaptation and nodification of foreign patented technology to the 
domestic environment and the fact that such consent could be 
unreasonably refused. 
It is important to note, however, that any debilitating effect 
of these clauses on industrial activities of licensees and on the 
economy of Nigeria would be crucial only if there existed in the 
country the requisite pool of technical personnel to undertake the 
required R&D and nodification and adaptation of the licensed 
technology to the needs of the country. 
In addition, grant-back clauses are also excluded from 
technology transfer agreements by the NOIP Decree. S.6 (2) (d) of the 
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Decree, like Article 7(iv) of the Mexican law on transfer of 
technology and Article 2~ (e) of Decision 24 of the Andean Pact, 
prohibits grant-back or improvanent clauses. This means that any 
licensing agreement involving a Nigerian licensee which embodies such 
clauses will not qualify for registration. While the Nigerian law, 
though it is not always so in actual practice as we shall see in the 
next chapter, rejects grant-back clauses generally, a number of LDCs 
including Argentine, Brazil and the Philippines, as well as the WIoo 
Model Law on the subject (See S.3~5(vii) of moo Model Law, Vol. II) 
consider it reasonable as long as it is reciprocal or it includes 
appropriate consideration. The close similarity between the Nigerian 
law and the 1972 Mexican law is made clear by the provisiOns of 
Article 7(iv) of the latter which obliged the Ministry of Irxlustry and 
Trade no~ to register agreements "where patents, trade-names, 
trade-marks, innovations or irrprovements cbtained by the technology 
buyer are required to be transferred with or without compensation, to 
the technology supplier". This provision has, however, been modified 
by Article l5(ii) of the 1981 law on the control and registration of 
the transfer of technology and the use and exploitation of pitents and 
trade-narks which permits grant-backs only on the condition that 
"there is reciprocity or a benefit" for the technology acquirer in the 
exchange of the information. 
Similarly, it is instructive to note that any inhibiting effect 
of grant-backs on the industrial activities of Nigerian licensees and 
other LOCs will be crucial only if there exists a sufficiently 
competent technical expertise in these countries capable of 
undertaking the necessary R&D in order not only to modify and adapt 
foreign technology to the environment and needs of the respective 
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countries but also to make sufficient improvement to the licensed 
teclmology as well as to develop new ones. 
Another restrictive covenant which is not permitted by the 
Decree is the tied-purchase clause. S.6(2) (f) of the Decree, like 
Article 7(vi) of the 1972 Mexican law continued by Article l5(iv) of 
the 1981 law, makes it unacceptable for a transferer of technology to 
obligate a Nigerian licensee to acquire other inputs exclusively from 
him or his designated source. Similarly, S.6 (2) (q) prohibits any 
requirement for the licensee to accept from the licensor additional 
teclmology which he does not require. All these are contained in the 
WIPO Model Law and the corresponding provisions are S.305 (i) (iii) 
(xiii) and (x) respectively. It may be noted that while the Mexican 
laws prohibit tied-purchase clause they, unlike the Nigerian law, do 
not go further to provide explicitly on the issue of unrequired 
additional technology. 
The frequency of tie-in clauses in licensing transactions 
involving Nigerian licensees is not, as will be discerned in Chapter 
7, alarming. Nevertheless, its elimination by the Decree is very 
significant if Nigerian enterprises are to be able to operate freely 
within the international technology market without being hindered by 
the obstacles inherent in such clauses (supra). 
Finally, the Decree by virtue of S.6(2) (g) forbids transferors of 
technology to impose any export restrictions on their Nigerian 
recipients. This provision follows that of Article 7(vii) of the 1972 
Mexican law which is continued by Article l5(v) of the 1981 law. The 
Nigerian law, it will appear, prohibits export restriction entirely. 
However, in actual practice, as will become clear in the next chapter, 
this is not the case. SO that while the IDIP Decree may in this 
respect differ theoretically from the WIPO Model Law provision (S.305 
(i) (ix)) it may not be so in actual practice. 
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From the above it is evident that Nigeria, like some third world 
countries including Mexico, Brazil, the Andean pact countries am 
India, has explicitly outlawed restrictive practices in international 
technology transfer transactions involving its nationals. It, 
therefore, approves only of agreements which do not embody any of the 
above mentioned restrictive practices and for which a certificate of 
registration is issued. 
Certificate of Registration 
A certificate of registration is issued in respect of agreements 
which are not only free of the above mentioned restrictions but 
conform to the criteria provided by S.6(2) of the Decree. This is, 
however, subject to S.6 (3) which enables the issuance of a certificate 
to an applicant notwithstanding any convergence between the terms and 
conditions of an agreement and the specifications laid down in S.6(2) 
if it is in the national interest so to do. SUch a certificate is 
denied to agreements which do not conform to the said specifications 
and thus not approved by the NOIP. The significance of this 
certificate is brought out by S.7 of the Decree. According to the 
section: 
••••• no payment shall be made in Nigeria to the 
credit of any person outside Nigeria by or on the 
authority of the Federal Ministry of Finance, the 
Central Bank of Nigeria or any licensed bank in 
Nigeria in respect of any payments due under a 
contract or agreement mentioned in Section 4 (d) of 
this Decree, unless a certificate of registration 
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issued under this Decree is presented by the party or 
parties concerned together with a copy of the 
contract or agreement certified by the National 
Office in that behalf 
Clearly, the non-issuance of certificates of registration to any 
agreements means that no payments in foreign currency can be made in 
respect of such agreements or parties thereto. This non-authorisation 
of foreign currency payment which seems to be the only sanction 
attached to the anbodiment of restrictive practices in technology 
transfer contracts demonstrates one of the underpinning considerations 
for the prorulgation of the Decree. This is in contradistinction to 
the sanction provided under the Ghanaian law (supra) and both the 
previous and current Mexican laws (Articles 6 and 11 of the 1972 and 
1981 laws respectively) which render the entire contract null and 
void. This means that such contracts in the latter countries cannot 
be enforced in the courts of law. This does not, however, seem to be 
so under the Nigerian law. 
Nigeria, unlike Ghana, has, since 197~, ceased to operate under 
the colonial patent ordinance which it inherited after independence. 
Instead it promulgated in that year its own autonomous and 
comprehensive patent law which governs the administration of patents 
in the country. This law, as has already been mentioned, is rrodelled 
on the BIRPI Model La~ which has been revised by the WIPO Model Law, 
and Nigeria may not only need to revise its law so as to catch up with 
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recent developments in the field as reflected in the provisions of the 
WIPO Model Law and those of the ESARIPO, some of which it need not, 
however, bother to consider (supra), but to nake them m:>re relevant to 
its situation. 
In the area of technology transfer regulation a significant 
development took place in 1979 with the promulgation of the N)IP 
Decree. This decree, whose enactment was contributed to by foreign 
exchange consideration, set up an administrative authority, the NOIP, 
to administer it as well as to regulate, independent of FOIs, the 
transfer of technology into Nigeria. It, accordingly, established a 
criterion to be used in the approval of technology agreements by the 
NOIP. This criterion seeks to exclude fram approval and registration, 
and, thus, the denial of a certificate of registration all technology 
transfer agreements which embody certain defined restrictive practices 
and those which do not, in general, meet the said criterion. It is 
the !nplernentation and the effects of this decree as well as those 
relating to patents which we intend to assess in the next chapter. 
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0IAPl'ER 7 
"l'BE NIGERIAN PATm1' SYS1'R11\NP 'I'RB TRl\NSFER (F '1'fX]]tI)UX;Y: PRlC.l'ICE 
Introduction 
In this chapter we shall endeavour to evaluate some of the 
consequences of the Nigerian patent regime which will include its 
effects on domestic patenting activity, as well as the effects of the 
NOIP Decree. In addition, we intend to examine their efficiency in 
transferring technology to Nigeria. The assessment of the effects of 
the NOIP Decree and activities of the NOIP in the regulation of the 
transfer of technology will also be nade. 
Effects of Decree No. 68 of 1970 
The main effect of Decree No.6" is that it has contributed to 
an increased participation by residents in patenting activity in the 
country. Ttx>ugh there may be, in this respect, other contributing 
factors such as increased R&D personnel since 197" when the Decree 
was promulgated, the change in the then existing system (supra) which 
has made it much easier and less costly, especially for Nigerian 
inventors, to obtain a Nigerian patent could be argued to be the major 
factor responsible for the increased participation in this activity by 
residents of the country. Tables 7:2 and 7:3 as compared with table 
7: 1 demonstrate that the domestic inventors' share of Nigerian 
patents, though minimal, generally increased after Decree No.6" came 
into force. 
It is irrportant to note that some of these domestic Nigerian 
inventions are of great industrial and agricultural Significance and 
have also succeeded in procuring patents in other countries including 
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Table 7:1 
Patents Granted 
YEAR ~FN1'S R»-~Em'S PElCENl2\GE 
1964 124 Nil 
1965 122 Nil 
1966 145 Nil 
1967 188 Nil 
1968 136 Nil 
1969 3 131 2.3 
---
'lUI'AL 3 846 0.35 
SOURCE: Based on information provided by the Office of Trade-narks, 
Patents and Designs, Lagos 
YEAR 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
11 
11 
11 
6 
Table 7:2 
Patents Granted 
211 
446 
344 
411 
PElCENl2\GE 
5.2 
2.5 
3.2 
1.5 
----------------.----------------------------------
'IUl'AL 39 1412 3.1 
SOURCE: Based on information provided by the Office of Trade-marks, 
Patents and Designs, Lagos 
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YFAR 
1978 8 
1979 13 
198" 8 
1981 8 
1982 12 
1983 18 
1984 19 
86 
Table 7:3 
Patents Granted 
448 
438 
448 
591 
54" 
468 
377 
3,31" 
1.78 
2.96 
1.78 
1.35 
2.22 
3.84 
5."3 
2.59 
SOURCE: Based on information provided by the Office of Trade-marks, 
Patents and Designs, Lagos 
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the U.K. and Ghana. Examples of these inventions include the 
"portable planter" developed by Moses Ige which is used for sowing 
grain and is well suited to the use of small-scale farmers and 
researchers in agricultural institutions, and the "device for planting 
stem cuttings" developed by one C~riel Makanjoula which is used for 
planting stem cuttings, in particular cassava stem cuttings and those 
of plants similarly propagated. Patents for both inventions were 
obtained by the University of Ife, Nigeria. 
However, a critical examination of some of the domestic 
inventions, such as the "Nairawise self-service hair trinming set" 
already referred to, the "4 in ONE Mattress", and the "bed seater" 
reveals that a significant number of them are not only of no 
industrial applicability and inventive step but are equally of no 
great industrial importance, and, thus, reduces the significance of 
the Niger ian share of inventions registered in the country. The 
ability of such unmeritorious inventions to secure patent grants is 
essentially due to the adoption of the registration system of 
examination by that country. 
The adoption of this system of examination by Nigeria nay, as 
already indicated, be attributable to the dearth of technical manpower 
available to undertake the necessary investigations. However, the 
answer, it will appear, is not the complete renunciation of a thorough 
examination function. Though Nigeria may not abound in nanpower 
resources it has, nevertheless, at least a sufficient technological 
capacity to enable selective examination of patent applications as to 
substance. In the case of inventions which it cannot examine as to 
substance it could assign them for examination to say an international 
preliminary examining authority like the one established under the 
Patent Co-operation Treaty 
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(P.C.T.) or possibly to the Austrian and other Patent Offices, which 
carry out a nurrber of searches for developing countries free of 
charge. In effect, we are suggesting that on the basis of the above 
Nigeria should be able to examine as to substance all inventions 
registered in that country. 
Accordingly, it will be proposed for the possible adoption by 
Nigeria of the ESARIPO's recommendations on the subject whereby a 
minister or possibly any corrpetent body nay be authorised to direct by 
legislative instrument that applications for patents relating to a 
specified technical field or fields or indeed all patent applications 
are to be subjected to examination as to substance (See S.23 of the 
ESARIPO f.iodel Law and the commentary thereon). This will obviously, 
give the Minister or the competent authority a desirable degree of 
flexibility in dealing with the thorny issue of patent examination, 
taking into consideration the available facilities and manpower 
resources. Similarly, it will also give the Patent Office the right 
to transmit a patent application to any authority, as may have been 
designated in regulations covering the matter, to undertake a 
preliminary examination of the patentability of the invention claimed. 
The authority envisaged here in the case of Nigeria could be the 
Nigerian Council for Industrial and Scientific Research or the various 
science, engineering or technology departments of its universities. 
The other authority or bodies envisaged by the l10del Law could be the 
Regional Office of ESARIPO based in Harare, Zimbabwe which is yet to 
start serious work in respect of patent examination or an 
international preliminary examining authority such as the one 
established by the PCT. 
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The adoption of such an approach would enable the Nigerian 
Patent Office to exclude all unmeritorious inventions, and, thus, 
enable it to reward only the inventions which could contribute 
significantly to the industr ialisation process of the country. In 
addition, it nay also assist the Patent Office to sieve out from 
registration foreign inventions which nay either not constitute a 
generative technology transfer or may fall under certain excluded 
technical fields. 
Another consequence of the introduction of Decree No. 6l3, it 
will seem, as illustrated by both tables 7: 4 and 7: 5, is the increased 
volume of patent applications nade in Nigeria. During the four year 
period immediately preceding the promulgation of the Decree the total 
number of patents filed was only 6133 as compared with 1456 patent 
applications filed within the first four years after the Decree had 
come into effect. Though other possible factors could have 
contributed to this increase the ease with which patent applications 
can now be nade which is attributable to the Decree and the adopted 
registration system of examination which enables every conceivable 
invention which satisfies the statutory requirements to obtain a 
patent grant seem to offer a much better explanation for this 
increase. 
In spite of the increased volume of registered patents and 
importantly the growth in the share of Nigerian inventors the Decree 
has not been sufficient to reduce the dominant position of foreign 
inventors in the patenting activity in the country. 
Patenting Actiyity 
On the whole, patenting activity in Nigeria, as revealed by 
tables 7:1, 7:2 and 7:3, is dominated by foreign inventors. Table 7:6 
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Table 7:4 
Patent Aw1ications Filed 1964-1969 
Country of Origin 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
U.K. 39 36 68 85 44 39 
U.S.A. 36 3~ 36 43 42 46 
SWitzerland 12 16 9 11 11 11 
w. Germany 6 1~ 3 12 12 1~ 
Italy 1 7 1 3 2 
Bahamas 6 2 2 3 3 1 
Netherlands 12 1~ 19 8 11 9 
Ireland 1 1 1 1 
Australia 3 3 1 4 
canada 2 1 1 2 
SWeden 1 1 1 1 
France 4 2 1 5 3 2 
Channel Islands 1 1 
Belgium 1 1 4 
Luxembourg 1 1 
Spain 2 1 
Greece 1 
Norway 1 1 
Japan 1 3 3 1 
Panama 1 1 
r-Ia1aysia 2 2 2 
Austria 1 
South Afr ica 1 1 
Ivory Coast 1 
Nigeria 3 
'lUI'AL 124 122 145 188 136 134 
--
SOURCE: Based on Information provided by the Office of Trade-l'arks, 
Patents and Designs, Lagos. 
Table 7:5 
Patent 19>1ications Filed 1972-1975 
Country of Origin 1972* 1973 1974 1975 
U.K. 48 157 7" 76 
U.S.A. 92 1"8 1"6 118 
SWitzerland 3 37 38 34 
w. Germany 2" 35 47 54 
France 15 19 17 59 
Italy 13 22 4 1" 
Netherlands 9 26 14 1" 
Nigeria 11 11 11 6 
Belgium 2 4 3 7 
Poland 1 1 1 
Hungary 2 3 2 2 
Japan 3 14 8 12 
Spain 3 1 1 3 
Canada 5 Hl 9 
SWeden 1 5 
Lebanon 1 
Portugal 2 
Panama 1 
Norway 1 4 4 
Yugoslavia 2 2 
l-ialaysia 5 2 1 
Greece 1 1 
Israel 1 
Hong Kong 2 1 
Liechenstein 1 2 
S. Mrica 3 1 
Mecariques 1 
Australia 2 3 
Ivory Coast 1 
Senegal 2 
-Bahamas 2 
Austria 2 
Denmark 1 
Bulgaria 1 
'lUI'AL 222 457 355 422 
OOURCE: Based on information provided by the Office of Trade-marks, 
Patents and Designs, Min. of Trades & Commerce, Lagos. 
Note: * Due to the inconp1eteness of the available information 
provided the data here should be considered only as an approximation. 
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Table 1;§ 
Patent Af.p1ications Filed 1978-1984 
Country of Origin 1978 1979 1989 1981 1982 1983 1984 
U.K. 93 83 79 HJ3 98 106 62 
U.S.A. 108 140 144 201 190 180 156 
SWitzerland 38 40 40 35 22 30 39 
w. Germany 44 35 29 54 69 28 17 
France 60 35 59 44 55 40 39 
Belgium 6 6 2 10 9 1 3 
Netherlands 29 15 17 19 14 19 20 
Norway 1 1 2 1 3 1 
SWeden 6 3 4 15 14 13 9 
Denmark 3 3 2 3 4 3 
Japan 12 13 6 11 8 6 5 
Italy 22 11 17 46 16 6 4 
Bahamas 2 6 5 
Nigeria 8 13 8 8 12 18 19 
Spain 1 8 1 6 9 4 
Ivory Coast 2 1 
Hungary 1 3 7 14 3 2 4 
Channel Islands 1 1 3 
Panama 6 3 6 1 5 5 6 
Finland 1 1 1 1 1 
Poland 1 2 1 
Austria 1 2 3 3 
Hong Kong 1 1 1 
Brazil 1 1 3 1 1 
U.S.S.R. 1 6 3 1 
Liechtenstein 1 2 
Hexico 1 4 2 2 
Australia 1 4 1 4 1 4 3 
Luxanbourg 1 1 2 
Ireland 2 
Canada 1 11 4 2 5 4 5 
Malaysia 1 1 1 1 
Bermuda 1 1 1 
Israel 1 3 1 
Cayman 1 1 
Argentina 1 
Cuba 2 
Taiwan 1 1 1 
N. Zealand 1 1 
~ 1 
Brit. west. Indies 2 2 
S. Korea 1 1 3 2 
Zimbabwe 1 1 1 
China 1 
Portugal 1 
Yugoslavia 4 
f'lauren 1 
Jamaica 1 
Greece 1 
South Africa 1 
Bulgaria 1 
'lUl'AL 456 451 456 599 552 486 396 
SOURCE: Based on Information provided by the Office of Trade-narks, 
Patents and Designs, Lagos. 
as well as tables 7:4 and 7:5 illustrate the sources of the inventions 
registered in the country. As the tables deroonstrate the two ma.jor 
countries which account for patents filed in Nigeria are the U.K. and 
the U.s. The three tables make a very interesting revelation in this 
respect. It will be discerned from table 7:4 that between 1964 and 
1968, that is, before the introduction of the 1970 Patent Decree, the 
U.K. filed more patents in Nigeria than the U.s. However, from 197r3 
onwards after the dependent legislation was repealed and substituted 
by an autonomous one, the U.s. began to file roore patents than the 
U.K. This development could possibly be explained by the ease and 
simplicity with which U.s. inventors are able, with effect from 1970, 
to procure patent grants in Nigeria. It could also be possibly 
attributed to U.s. technological superiority. All this may not, 
however, adequately explain this development. 
The dominance by the U.s. and the U.K. in patenting activity in 
Nigeria is illustrated by table 7:6. As the table deroonstrates both 
countries accounted for over one half of all patents filed in Nigeria 
between 1978 and 1984. In fact, they took between than a total share 
of 51.32% of all inventions filed during that period, with the U.s. 
being responsible for as much as 32.95%. Thus the latter alone 
accounted for almost one third of all inventions filed in Nigeria 
during the period under consideration. It is also pertinent to note 
that out of a total of 51 countries that filed inventions in the 
country during that period 5 western industrialised countries, namely 
the U.S., U.K., France, west Germany and Switzerland accounted for 
76.41% of all inventions registered. This is almost tantamount to a 
monopoly by these countries of the patenting activity in Nigeria. 
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On the contrary, all the African countries which filed patents 
in the country during the period under consideration took a total 
share of only 2.76%, with Nigeria, the host country, accounting for 
2.53%. Though the Nigerian share appears to be minimal it is an 
:inprovernent upon the pre-1970's. It does seem, however, from its 
share that though the Decree has made it easier for the procurement of 
patents in the country the necessary infrastructure for stepping up 
domestic inventive activity seems to be either lacking or not 
adequately provided for. It may be observed that the percentage share 
of other African countries (excluding Nigeria) which filed inventions 
in Nigeria beoveen 1978 and 1984 stood insignificantly at 0.23. This 
is demonstrative of the almost non-existent technological trade and 
co-operation between African countries which may be explained by 
poverty in technical manpower resources and R&D infrastructures 
which is characteristic of these countries. 
It is clear from the above that patenting activity in Nigeria is 
dominated by foreign patentees, particularly those of western Europe. 
Nevertheless, in spite of this and the limited participation by 
Nigerian inventors in this activity the totality of inventions 
registered in the country may still contr ibute to assist in the 
transfer of technology to the country and it will be relevant to 
evaluate the success of the Nigerian patent system in this respect. 
IJhe Nigerian Patent System and the Transfer of Teclmology 
In assessing the success of the Nigerian patent system in the 
transfer of technology to that country the factors that n~y be taken 
into consideration \-lill include the efficacy of the system in the 
disclosure, spread or diffusion of new technical knowledge, its 
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influence on the inflow of patented goods, and its effects on FDIS, 
joint-ventures and patent licensing. 
In considering the dissemination of technical knowledge as 
technology transfer, it could be argued that the Nigerian patent 
system has not been very successful in that respect. This may not, 
necessarily, be blamed on the patent system itself but mainly on the 
administration of the system by the Nigerian Patent Office. Since its 
establishment the latter, like the Ghanaian, has been performing the 
function of only registering inventions and ignoring the crucial role 
of serving as a technology data base. For example, it does not 
publish any patent journal giving the details of new inventions to the 
general public. Instead, the office sinply publishes, in most cases, 
in the Government gazette details such as patent registration numbers, 
title of inventions, date of the grant, and names and addresses of 
patent attorneys who prosecuted them. In some few cases, as 
discovered by the author, sorre of these published details vary from 
those in the patent register. Moreover, a search at the Lagos Patent 
office, like Accra's, will hardly lead one anywhere because the files 
are, similarly, in the najority of cases, poorly filed or as in the 
case of fairly old ones generally dumped somewhere to rot. 
As was nade clear to the author by a number of officials in the 
Lagos Office, succeeding governments have neglected it to the extent 
that it lacks the necessary resources to perform the functions for 
which it was set up. For exanple, at one tirre when the Office'S seal 
for trademarks and patents got spoilt it could not, for a period of 
two months, issue any certificates or grants because it did not have 
the money to carry out the repairs on the seal until a senior private 
legal practitioner came to the rescue of the office by providing the 
money for the repairs.l In addition to financial resources, office 
-----------------------------
1. Interview by the author with the Senior Legal Office, Office of 
Trademarks, Patents and Industr ial Designs, Lagos, Decerrber 
1984. 
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space is the other problem confronting the patent office. This 
problem according to the same officials adversely affects the proper 
filing and storage of documents covering registered inventions. 2 It 
will, therefore, seem that until the Office receives the necessary 
resources and attention from the government, and in addition, develops 
and maintains it as technical information data base it will not be 
able to play any meaningful role in facilitating the transfer of 
technology to and its diffusion in Nigeria. 
However, if the importation of patented products is accepted, 
as we endeavoured to indicate, as technology transfer, then the 
Nigerian patent system can be said to have transferred technology into 
the country. The majority of the registered patents in the country 
are "exploited" only through the inportation into that country of 
their patented products. This, however, is not deemed by a number of 
LDCs to be exploitation of a patent. In fact, a great number of LDCs 
including Nigeria are more interested in the domestic working of 
inventions for which they confer patent monopoly privileges than the 
rr~re importation of patented products or those derived from patented 
processes. Nevertheless, the bulk of Nigerian registered patents are 
not locally exploited. Though there exist laws and regulations 
dealing with the domestic working of patents they are rarely applied. 
It may be noted that there are feN patents which have been 
exploited or are being exploited either through FDI or joint-ventures 
as in the case of Dunlop Nigerian Industries Limited and Michelin 
~ 
Limited. This, however, cannot be attributed rrainly to the rrerits of 
the legal protection offered by patents. SUch exploitations are, in 
fact, part and parcel of an entire investment package grounded on more 
compelling factors such as the large size of the Nigerian market. So 
-----------,-----------,-------
2. Interview with senior offiCials, including the Senior Legal 
Officer, at the Office of Trademarks, Patents and Designs, Lagos, 
December 1984. 
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that patents per se have not been sufficient to splr on foreign 
inventors to exploit their inventions in Nigeria, and it could 
therefore be argued that they have not been very successful in 
effecting either through FDI or joint-ventures a transfer of 
technology • 
Finally, patent licensing as a conduit for transferring 
technology is not very popular in Nigeria. In fact, licensing of 
patents as an independent transactions is very rare, and this may be 
explained by the dearth of technically competent indigenous Nigerian 
enterprises capable of working foreign patents independently. 
Consequently, any such transaction comes only as part of a rore 
wide-ranging one which may encompass the licence of know-how as well 
as technical and management services agreements. The very few 
independent patent licensing transactions that take place in Nigeria 
are mainly those between foreign parent companies and their 
subsidiaries in that country. 
Nevertheless, patents are used by foreign licensors to introduce 
into technology licensing agreements involving Nigerians restrictive 
and anticornpetitive practices. As indicated by table 7:7 these 
practices are still embodied in technology transfer agreements 
involving Nigerian licensee firms, and it is in this respect that we 
enbark on the examination of the performance of the NaIP since its 
establishment in eliminating these practices as well as the general 
regulation of the transfer of technology. 
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'!be National Office for Industrial Property (IDIPl and Regulation of 
'Ibe Transfer of Technology 
Before the establishment of the NOIP there had not been any well 
defined control over technology transfer contracts in Nigeria, other 
than broad policy guidelines in respect of appropriate levels of 
payments for technical services, and royalties for use of industrial 
property rights including patents. This state of affairs has, since 
the birth of the NOIP, been considerably altered. The latter has, 
since its establishment, been examining technology transfer contracts, 
besides the consideration therefor, in terms of the technology content 
and the inclusion of anticornpetitive practices which hinder the 
effective transfer of technology, and has, accordingly, rejected 
contracts which contain such practices. 
It is the objective of the NOIP, within the ambit of Decree No. 
7" of 1979, to expunge all restrictive clauses as far as possible. 
The NOIP, as we shall see very shortly, seems, to a considerable 
extent, to have succeeded in this direction, but has on occasion in 
view of the technological and economic significance of certain 
projects, confined itself to rejecting the least acceptable 
restrictions. This is permitted by S.6(3) of the Decree, and closely 
follCMs the practices in and laws of ~Iexico and the Philippines. The 
National Office has, for the same reason, on rare occasions registered 
some agreement which embody serious restrictive practices. Similarly, 
on equally rare occasions the NOIP, as one senior official admitted, 
has been pressurised to approve of agreements which included 
restrictions prohibited by the Decree but of no particular 
technological or economic importance~ 
3. Interview with a Senior Official at the tnIP, Lagos, December 
1984. 
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In carrying out the legal criteria laid down by the Decree the 
IDIP has in particular refused to accept restrictions on R&D in 
relation to the licensed technology. These restrictions, as table 7:7 
reveals, are r.d.ninal. However, it is significant, in view of their 
inhibiting effects, that the National office should seek their 
exclusion from such transactions. It is instructive to note, as has 
already been observed, that any adverse effects of these restrictions 
on the industrial activities of licensee firms and on the econo~ of 
Nigeria would be significant only if there existed the necessary 
technical manpower and other related resources to undertake R&D 
directed to the needs of the country. 
Available evidence, however, suggests that these clauses may not 
have rruch real adverse impact on indigenous enterpr ises ' R&D and 
adaptation of foreign technology because of the country's weak 
technical and scientific manpower base. For example, out of a total 
population of 66,628,000 as estimated in 1977 (See UNEOCO Annual 
Statistical Yearbook, 1978/79) there were only 35,126 potential 
scientists, engineers and technicians and only 3,545 actually engaged 
in R&D during the same year (UNESCO, Annual Statistical Yearbook, 
1983) which is almost equivalent to one-third of the number of such 
personnel engaged in R&D in Ghana (9,819 as estimated in 1976 • .l.hlQ) 
whose population is about one-seventh of Nigeria's. Similarly, in 
1970 (the year for which figures are available) Nigeria spent only $33 
million on R&D which was equivalent to 0.3% of its rnP. This 
clearly falls short of the target of 0.5% as recornrrenaed by the 
International Development strategy II (IDSII). It may be added that 
out of a total projected capital expenditure of about N82 billion 
covering the fourth national development plan, 1981-1985 only N543,45 
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million, which represents 0.66% of the latter was earmarked for R&D 
(Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1981). Though these figures virtually 
say nothing about the deployment capability of these numerical 
resources,4 and, in addition, because of the limited period they cover 
and the fact that they, apart from those relating to the projected 
capital expenditure, are not very recent may not adequately reflect 
the country's R&D potential they are, nevertheless, demonstrative of 
it. 
In recognition of the country's weak R&D potential the 
government has decided to give priority to high quality scientific 
education, and to equip adequately schools, colleges, technical 
institutions and the universities to provide the necessary manpower 
requirements (Fed. Rep. of Nigeria, 1980). In addition, the 
government has decided to evolve a system of technical training aimed 
at enabling young people to nimbibe the technological culturen• 
Accordingly, it is revamping and reorganising the Industrial Training 
Fund (I.T.F.) established by the Industrial Training Fund Decree No. 
47 of 1971 to promote and encourage the acquisition of skills in 
industry and commerce with a view to generating a pool of indigenous 
trained manpower sufficient to meet the needs of the country. 
Furthermore, the government is intensifying its efforts to 
encourage R&D as well as to improve continually the quality of 
industrial products and processes. In this respect, it intends, in 
4. For exarrple, as regards scientific and engineering nanpower 
resource, u~aegbu (1985) has demonstrated that, because of the 
absence of requisite infrastructure and equipment, available 
manpower resources are heavily under-utilised. So that the 
numerical strength of this resource may not mean very much. 
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addition to established government research institutes, to encourage 
each industrial establishment to maintain an efficient R&D division 
(iQiQ.) • While this is laudable it is doubtful whether it can be 
effectively accomplished without difficulties in view of the resources 
required in setting up such units and the present economic problems 
confronting the country. It may be possible for some establishments 
to set up such units with considerable assistance from government, but 
it may be doubtful as to how many firms, especially the small ones, 
would be able to avail themselves of this opportunity if it should 
ever be a reality. 
Finally, the government has also provided that expenses on R&D 
of firms which engage in research and development will be tax 
deductible, provided that they provide evidence to justify the purpose 
of the R&D effort vis-a-vis the normal operations of the industrial 
enterprise concerned, the R&D is done in-house or given to a 
recognised Nigerian research or consultancy organisation, and the 
fruits of the research are patented and protected in accordance with 
international accepted industrial property rights. It may also be 
added that the government has, in the same respect, decided to design 
a reward system which will adequately remunerate successful 
researchers, inventors and innovators. (IbiQ.). 
It is difficult to assess the effect of all these measures on 
indigenous R&D since rr.ost of them are yet to be put into effect. 
Nevertheless, it may be surmised that their effective implementation 
in conjunction with the complete elimination of R&D restrictions on 
indigenous Nigerian licensees may improve local R&D potential. 
Moreover, the ~DIP has, since its inception, generally rejected 
export prohibition clauses except in cases where it has been proved 
265 
266 
that other licensees of the licensor have been granted exclusive 
licences in the specified countries closed to Nigeria licensees. 
While this seems to be similar to the Philippines Technology Transfer 
Board's approach it differs from the Nigerian to the extent that 
prohibition to export to certain countries, especially where there 
exist exclusive licensees of the technology supplier, may only be 
permitted to the extent that the laws of the country where exportation 
will be made prohibit such exports (Bautista, 198D). 
Export restrictions, apart from the requirement to submit to 
foreign jurisdiction, occur more frequently in technology licensing 
agreements involving Nigerian firms than any other restrictive 
practices (see table 7:7) and this makes their rejection by the NOIP 
very significant. Their elimination may enable Nigerian enterprises 
to export to the international market. It rust, nevertheless, be 
noted, as pointed out already, that the exclusion of export 
restrictions per se may not automatically result in actual export or 
export potential of Nigerian licensee firms. This can, in fact, be 
impeded by other factors. For example, in Nigeria there are a number 
of restr~ints such as the shortage of inport licence required to 
irrport inputs and other intermediate requirements for manufacturing 
and the consequent low productivity which are seriously affecting the 
export activities of indigenous enterprises. 
As one top official of a manufacturing firm in Lagos remarked: 
LA~rt restrictions do not mean much to us because as 
a result of the present austerity measures, and even 
some years back before their institution, my company 
never got und still does not get the approval for the 
required import licence to bring in the actual volur.c 
of inputs needed for our operations. COnsequently, 
our production is always under capacity and so w'e find 
it difficult to satisfy the home markets which nakes 
us hardly bother about exports. 5 
All this as well as the unduly elaborate and slow bureaucratic 
procedures required of firms wanting to export, the inadequate supply 
capabilities of indigenous enterprises, and, equally inportant, the 
high production cost of domestic products may render the export 
restriction clause to be of little consequenctto most Nigerian firms. 
Nevertheless, the exclusion of export prohibitions may 
constitute a significant step towards the development of export 
capabilities of Nigerian licensee firms. In fact, it sets the stage 
for the meaningful encouragement by the government of manufactur ing 
firms to export. 
The Nigerian government has, in addition to the exclusion of 
export restrictions in technology transfer transactions, adopted, in 
its industrial policy and strategy, a number of steps geared towards 
encouraging firms wanting to export. (See Fed. Rep. of Nigeria, 1980). 
These include the reirrbursernent to an entrepreneur of the whole amount 
of import duty paid on imported materials which are used in the 
manufacture of goods which are eA~rted. This is the nduty drawback 
schemen• By this scheme a refund of irrport duties as ''1ell as other 
locally levied taxes such as excise duty on the raw materials used in 
the manufacture of a product that is destined for export are made 
(Ibid.). One possible merit of this policy is the likely reduction in 
production cost of products destined for export. 
5. Interviel with a Nigerian industrialist, Lagos, Decanber 1984. 
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Further fiscal incentbres adopted to proroote exports are the 
nbank finance for eA~rtn which is to ensure that a minimum level of 
bank credit is made available to the export sub-sector and thereby to 
facilitate short-term financing for pre-shipment and post-shipment 
export operations, and the "approved users' schemen which is aimed at 
stinulating industrial production within Nigeria through relief from 
inport duties and the institution of necessary tariff protection. 
Another fiscal incentive is the "tax incentive for manufacturing 
exporters" the objectives of which are to enable companies to amortise 
expenditure on their assets within the shortest possible period, to 
make them more competitive in international markets, to expand their 
productive capabilities, and to earn more foreign exchange for the 
country (Fed. Rep. of Nigeria, 1979). 
fJIoreover, the Nigerian government in its determination to 
stimulate exports by local firms has set up an Export Development Fund 
to provide direct grants and financial assistance to the country's 
exporters to cover initial expenses regarding their export promotion 
activities (Ibid.). Similarly, an export credit guarantee fund and 
insurance scheme have been set up to provide financial guarantees to 
commercial banks for insurance cover for exports from Nigeria (IQid.). 
Finally, the government has adopted the creation of nindustrial 
free zones" in various localities in the country to encourage certain 
industries to orient their production towards the export market. 
Industries in such zones will enjoy special privileges and produce 
exclusively fer eA~rt. The location of these zones, which will be 
equipped with the necessary infrastructural facilities, will be 
determined mainly by the ra'il material input available in each locality 
(Fed. Rep. of Nigeria, 1980). As part of the industrial free zone 
concept, the Export Prcrotion Council set up by Decree No. 26 of 1976 
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to oversee the country's exp:>rt prograrrmes and activities is to 
co-operate with industries operating in these zones to facilitate the 
sale of their products in non-Nigerian markets (IQig.). 
Clearly, all these are very significant developnents being 
pursued by the government to encourage exports by Nigerian firms. As 
to the efficacy of these measures it may appear too early for one to 
venture an opinion since they are all still in their emb~c stage. 
Nevertheless, it may be asserted that with the prohibition and 
exclusion of export restrictions from technology agreements these 
measures when effectively and judiciously executed coupled with the 
adoption of other related appropriate measures such as the adoption of 
a stable and realistic exchange rate, instead of an overvalued 
currency which could penalise the development of exports, could 
enhance the export potential of and actual export by Nigerian firrrs. 6 
The NOIP, like the Filipino T.T.B •• has also in particular 
refused to accept exclusive grant-back or inprovement clauses. It, 
however, entertains mutual grant-back whereby there is a reciprocal 
exchange of inprovements between the foreign licensor and the Nigerian 
licensee. It has, in addition, rejected any restrictions which 
continue in force after the determination of the agreement. 
Furthermore, it has refused to accept tied-purchase covenants, but has 
so far accepted those which provide for the supply of new materials by 
transferors of technology considered necessary and which explicitly 
state that the prices for the tied goods will be at normal world 
market prices. Table 7:7 indicates the frequency of some of these 
prohibitive covenants. As the table reveals clauses requiring the 
submission to foreign jurisdiction are the most frequent. These are 
6. For further discussion on this and the export incentives see 
Sagagi (1985). 
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Table 7:7 
Nature and frequency of restrictive clauses in agreenents examined 
by the IDIP (January 1983 to May 1984) 
'!YPes of Restriction 
Excessive controls of transferee's 
operation 
Non-reciprocal transmission of 
inprovements, patents, etc. 
Tie-in clauses 
Export restrictions 
Restriction on production volume 
Foreign jurisdiction 
Limitations on R&D 
Price restrictions 
No. of llgreElIBlts % of 
containing restric- total 
tive clauses 
16 
9 
21 
72 
16 
97 
5 
5 
7 
4 
9 
31 
7 
42 
2 
2 
------------------------,-------------------------------------
OOURCE: UNCI'AD, 1984a, p.3 
Note: The same agreement may contain more than one restrictive clause. 
followed by export restrictions. The NOIP has similarly refused the 
inclusion of the former in licensing agreements to which Nigerian 
licensees are parties. In addition, it ensures that Nigerian law is 
applicable in all agreements and that related arbitration takes place 
in Nigeria. 
Other unacceptable practices which the NaIP has had to deal with 
since its establishment include the excessive duration of technology 
transfer agreements (see table 7:8). It has accordingly ensured an 
appropriate reduction in duration of agreements exceeding a period of 
10 years, or other unacceptable term where this is less than 10 years. 
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A number of other LOCs also oppose agreements with an unduly long 
duration. Most of them including Colombia and the Philippines 
normally allow a maximum of five years. This five-year rule is 
subject, in some cases, to exemptions. For example, in the 
Philippines exemptions have been given to agreements exceeding the 
five year period which involve new technology, a royalty free licence 
on trademark use, and a longer absorption period for the technology 
being transferred (Bautista, 1980, 17). However, in others such as 
India and Hexico agreements may last for a maximum of 10 years 
(ONeI'AD, 1980b, paras 105-106). It is pertinent to note that such 
agreements may not necessarily be terminated at the expiration of the 
reduced term. The reduction may, in reality, be aimed at ensuring a 
re-evaluation of the agreement by the corrpetent bodies within a 
reasonable time, in order to ascertain whether they are being executed 
in consonance with the terms as approved by them (ONeI'AD, 1980b, para. 
108). 
Table 7:8 
Nature and frequency of other contractual terms subject to 
legal control (January 1983 to May 1984) 
No. of agreenents % of 
Contractual tenn containing contrac- total 
tual terms 
Excessive payments 209 90 
No provision for training of 
transferee's personnel 88 38 
Excessively long duration (10 yrs 
and above) 97 42 
No provision for specified guarantees 114 49 
Transferee obliged to pay transferor's taxes 56 24 
OOURCE: ONeI'AD, 1984a, p.4 
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In its reaction to other practices contained in table 7: 8 the 
roIP examines every agreement to confirm that it anbodies adequate 
training provisions. This is very i.np:>rtant if the necessary skills 
associated with the i.np:>rted technology are to be transferred to the 
indigenous labour force. Moreover, it ensures that all registrable 
industrial property rights that are licensed are registered in Nigeria 
and that the licensor guarantees and enforces the validity of 
industrial property rights. 
One area where the tDIP has, in its regulation of the inflO\'1 of 
imported technology, been quite successful is that pertaining to the 
payment of royalties and technical fees. The frequency of the 
practice whereby foreign licensors require from Nigerian licensees 
incommensurate consideration as revealed by table 7:8 is very great. 
This practice if left unchecked could adversely affect the country's 
balance of payment position. It is in this respect that one does 
appreciate the efforts of the NOIP. 
The tDIP has endeavoured to reduce the mnnber of technology 
transfer contracts which prescribe payments which are incommensurate 
with the technology to be acquired and has in fact succeeded in 
reducing such payments. The efforts of the National Office, as 
demonstrated by table 7:9 has in the period between January 1983 and 
~~y 1984, resulted in savings of a little over N337 million in foreign 
exchange in respect of 62 agreements approved during that period. 
These savings have been accOIl"plished, inter alia, by the diminution of 
royalty rates to about one per cent of net sales, and one and half per 
cent of profit before tax with regards to technical and management 
agreements as opposed to three per cent of net sales or 
----_.-----------._-_._._._----------.-------
7. N represents Naira, the Nigerian currency. The exchange rate 
before 1986 was about ~~.8469 to $1.0 
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turnover before the intervention of the roIP. In addition, the 
savings can be attributed, on the one hand, to the encouragement by 
the roIP of running royalty payments as against dCMIl and lllItp sum 
payments, and, on the other, to the discouragement of rrdnimum royalty 
payments. 
Sirrdlar savings have been recorded in other LDCs including 
India, Argentina, Brazil, Hexico and the Philippines. The rates of 
royalty payments allowed by these countries normally range between one 
and five per cent. The enforcement of this rate of royalty payments 
has resulted in important savings in some of these countries. For 
example, with respect to Nexico it has been estimated that between 
1973 and August 1975 a saving of $216 million, equivalent to 26 per 
cent of the value of payments that would have been made without 
government intervention was obtained (UNcrAD OPe cit. para 52). 
Similarly, in the Philippines, the estimated foreign exchange savings 
for five years as a result of the T.T.B. reduction of royalty rates in 
48 out of 80 contracts approved will amount to $40 million (Bautista, 
1980,20). 
Table 7:9 illustrates the sectoral breakdown of agreerrents 
submitted to and ratified by the NaIP as well as the sectoral savings 
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it rrade. On the whole a total of N33,041,645 in foreign exchange,saving was 
achieved by the NOIP. Since one of the underpinning rationales for 
government intervention in the technology rrarket is the reduction to a 
more acceptable level of the large payments of royalties and technical 
fees imposed on licensees, these savings can be said to be a 
significant achievement. 
---, 
, 
Industrial 
Sector 
Agro-based 
l-lineral-
based 
Engineering 
Services 
Total 
Table 7:9 
Agreements suOOdtted to the IDIP for awroval 
(January 1983 - May 1984) 
hjreements hJreements 
Agreements Agreements Involving Involving 
SUbmitted Awroved Payment payment 
above Sm under 5m 
Naira Naira 
75 21 36 37 
48 15 28 2" 
89 2" 42 47 
21 6 17 4 
231 62 123 108 
SOURCE: UNCTAD, 1984a, p.2 
Total 
Savings 
Z7 ,797,97" 
2,332,3"" 
2,811,375 
100,""0 
33,"41,645 
H~vever, for this to be fully appreciated there may be the need 
to examine this saving in connection with the explicit payments (i.e. 
royalties) together with the number of implicit costs (e.g. 
overpricing of inputs provided by licensors) which could drastically 
reduce such savings. In this respect it is significant that the roIP 
examines the extent to which parties have employed other means such as 
overpricing of inputs to circumvent government regulations. 
The possibilities of eroploying such channels are, as observed by 
Chudnovsky (1981, 138), to some extent, determined by the clauses of 
the licence agreement. For example, where the contract does not 
provide for any tied-purchases it will be difficult to overprice 
inputs required by licensees to exploit the licensed technology. On 
the other hand, where a clause is arbodied in the contract by which 
the licensee is obliged to purchase the necessary inputs from a 
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source determined by the technology supplier then it nay not be 
difficult for such inputs to be overpriced. Consequently, the 
measures adopted in respect of royalties need to be assessed jointly 
with the entire regulations on prohibitive practices in technology 
transfer contracts. It will, therefore, be necessary to assess the 
gamut of the NOIP activities or success in regulating technology 
transfer transactions if the full significance of the savings achieved 
is to be appreciated. 
The full impact of the savings and the entire roIP technology 
regulatory activities may appear difficult to assess since most of the 
approved agreements are yet to be executed or even if executed they 
must be in their embr~nic stage. Until the execution of the approved 
agreements it will be difficult to assess the current achievements of 
the roIP. This appears to be so because, though evidence is not 
available in respect of Nigeria, the experience of other LDCs 
including Brazil and India has revealed that after scrutiny of 
agreements and the compliance with suggested amendments technology 
suppliers and recipients have subsequently by passed approved terms 
and conditions by other means like "gentlemen I s agreements". (See 
Chudnovsky, 1981, pp144-l47). In other cases, licensee firms have 
opposed government imposed terms and conditions and have taCitly 
accepted some outlawed prohibitive practices (~.), thus 
circumventing government regulations. 
The possible occurence of all these practices in Nigeria can not 
be completely ruled out and the NOIP may therefore have to develop an 
effective monitoring system, which is presently absent, to ensure that 
ratified terms and conditions of technology contracts are complied 
with. In fact, the extent to which the NJlP expect-sparties to corrply 
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with its regulations or directives would not only depend on its 
position on the subject, but also on the entire institutional 
framework within which transfer of technology agreements are 
monitored. It is for this reason that the developnent of an effective 
and cornprehensi ve monitoring system cannot be ignored any longe r • 
Nigeria could possibly, in this respect, seek assistance from UN 
bodies such as UOCTAD and UNIOO, or the African Regional Centre for 
Technology (ARCI') based in Senegal and whose major function is to 
assist its member African countries in matters relating to the 
transfer and developnent of technology. Just like Nigeria, a number 
of IDCs, but excluding India, either have a very weak m:mitoring 
system or none at all, and this clearly is a major weakness in the 
LOCs' technology regulatory regime. 
Furthermore, the extent to which one may expect parties to 
comply with the directives of the NOIP may, as suggested by Chudnovsky 
(1981,143-147), depend on the congruence of the overall interests of 
the government and those of the licensee firms. Where the private 
interests of licensee firms differ from government objectives their 
backing for government intervention may not be encouraging. '.Ibis may, 
particularly, be so where domestic enterprises are able to pass on 
high technology costs to customers. In this case they may not be very 
keen on reducing the costs of technology imports, especially if that 
is likely to affect in any way their technology supplies. In fact, 
they may not hesitate to make further payments in addition to the 
approved royalty. All this may not render the formal foreign exchange 
savings and others as an adequate measure of tile achievements of the 
NOIP. Nevertheless, its intervention has been significant, 
particularly, in respect of the reduction of direct payments and the 
elimination of prohibitive covenants. 
It may be pointed out here that the initial reaction of both 
Nigerian firms and foreign technology suppliers to the implementation 
of Decree No.7'" of 1979 was very unfavourable. The former t:erceived 
it as an additional administrative hurdle which was likely to 
prejudice the influx of technology and, thus, affect their 
manufacturing activities. On the other hand, the latter saw the 
Decree and the activities of the IVIP as a further impedinent which 
could adversely affect their operations, and endeavoured to resist 
them. In some instances, especially in the case of existing 
agreements, some HNCs threatened to withdraw their technical 
assistance after current royalty rates had been reduced. This 
increased government pressure on the NOIP's 0t:eration. 
However, as one roIP senior official pointed out, the initial 
hostile attitude of domestic firms has now given way to a growing 
appreciation of the Decree and the functions of the roIP, and a number 
of these firms now seek informal assistance fran the latter in the 
course of the negotiation of agreements. This according to the 
National Office has significantly helped to improve the quality of new 
agreements submitted for registration. As regards foreign technology 
suppliers, the same official observed that a number of them have also 
come, though quite reluctantly, to accept the need to regulate the 
transfer of technology transactions. This is not surprising since 
most of them have been experiencing either similar or even tougher 
regulation at home. Consequently, as stated by the same official "the 
effect, generally, of the regulatory activities of the National Office 
on the flow of technology into the country has not been negative".8 
----------
8. Interview with a Senior Official at the NJIP, Lagos, Decerrber 
1984. 
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ConclU§.iQn 
In spite of the fact that the 1970 Patent Decree appears to have 
contributed to increased participation by Nigerian invaltors in 
patenting activity in Nigeria this activity still seems to be 
dominated by foreign inventors. It may be added, as has been 
revealed, that a considerable nurrber of the domestic inventions are 
not of any great industrial and economic consequence, and only the 
introduction of an examination relating to substance, which could be 
selective or otherwise, might give some idea about the actual value of 
the increased participation by indigenous inventors. 
It may also be mentioned that so far as the effective transfer 
of technology is concerned the Nigerian patent law and systan have not 
been ve~ successful. It is, therefore, imperative for that count~ 
to appraise the efficacy of its present law and system's contribution 
to the transfer into and developnent of technology in the country, and 
how they can be altered so as to fit harmoniously into current efforts 
to develop a technology policy for the country. In this respect, 
Nigeria may need to restructure its patent administration, and 
particularly the Patent Office so that instead of its continuing 
passive enforcement of the Patent Decree and role of a mere 
registration centre, it could play more active role in the 
dissemination of new technical information. Moreover, there is the 
need to evaluate how the provisions relating to patentability, patent 
duration and fees and abuse checking measures can all be utilized as 
tools for economic development. 
As revealed in Chapter 6, the discrimination by the provisions 
of patentability under the Nigerian law is not grounded on any 
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economic policy. It may, therefore, be necessary, as suggested in the 
case of Ghana, for Nigeria to relate this discrimination to its 
technological and economic developmental needs. In this way, the 
patent system can be used to exclude from patentability foreign 
technologies which may either be economically irrelevant to the 
country or have the potential of blocking the developnent of I.T.C. 
It could also be used to ensure the registration of such technologies 
which will constitute a generative and not a consumptive technology 
transfer. All this will, of course, ordain the adoption of an 
examination system which assesses the substance of patent 
applications. Similarly, the duration of patents as well as patent 
fees need not be uniform for all inventions as they presently are in 
Nigeria. They must, instead, be related to either the merits of the 
inventions, the sector to which they relate or the actual exploitation 
of the patent. Finally, there is also the need for all the patent 
abuse checking mechanisms to be used to prevent patent abuses and to 
ensure the effective exploitation of registered patents. This may 
encompass the simplification of procedures involved in obtaining for 
example, a compulsory licence. 
Despite the fact that the Nigerian patent system has not been 
very successful in transferring technology to the country, it has, 
inter alia, been used by foreign licensors to indulge in 
anticompetitive practices as denonstrated above. The OOIP, as we 
endeavoured to demonstrate, has to some extent, succeeded in excluding 
such practices from technology transfer transactions involving 
Nigerian enterprises. It has, in fact, refused the approval and 
registration of agreements which embody such restrictions, but has, on 
some occasions on economic grounds, accepted some agreements with such 
restrictions. Another success recorded by the NOIP is the saving of 
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N33 ,041 ,645 in foreign exchange made within a period of about 17 
months. While all this can be regarded as a significant achievement 
it is still difficult to appreciate its full and real irrpact since 
there is often the tendency for both licensors and licensees to 
circumvent government regulations, especially where they are likely to 
hurt their business interest. 
It is for this reason that every regulatory regime needs an 
effective back-up monitoring system. In Nigeria, however, an 
efficacious monitoring system seems to be absent, and this represents 
a serious shortcoming in the country's technology transfer regulato~ 
regime. With this shortcoming, it is difficult to confirm whether 
both licensors and licensees have adhered to and not circumvented the 
NOIP approved criteria, and whether, by virtue of their actions, the 
savings recorded by the latter has been affected or not. 
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CBAPrER 8 
<DWARATIVE ANALYSIS AND REXXH1ENIlrmONS 
Introduction 
The last five chapters, which represent the two case studies 
undertaken in this thesis, have examined in a rather detailed fonn the 
patent laws and systems as well as the technology transfer regiIres in 
Ghana and Nigeria which are distinct and yet similar in many respects. 
In this chapter, we shall undertake a comparative analysis of the main 
issues raised and discussed in the two case studies. We shall, in 
this respect, compare and contrast the two case studies in terms of 
the historical development of the patent systems of the two countries, 
their present patent laws and systems and their technology transfer 
regulatory regimes. The chapter will be concluded by offering 
recommendations based on our findings. 
ComParative Analysis 
Historical DevelQgDE!llt of the Patent Systens of Qlana and Nigeria 
As already indicated in Chapter 3, Ghana and Nigeria, both of 
which used to be colonies of Britain, operated, with the exception of 
the differences that took place between 1916 and 1925, similar patent 
legislations and systems from 19~m to 197" when Nigeria after ten 
years of independence from British colonial rule enacted for the first 
time its own autonomous patent legislation. The development of the 
patent systems in both countries can be traced to the discovery of 
large gold deposits in Ghana (then Gold Coast). It was the need to 
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encourage the influx of the relevant foreign technology, particularly 
patented technology, for the exploitation of this resource which 
underpinned the introduction of the patent system in the Gold Coast 
via the enactment of the 1899 Patent Ordinance. Though no specific 
reason was given in the case of Nigerian the 1899 Gold Coast Patent 
Ordinance was adopted almost in its entirety in 19D~ in the then Lagos 
Colony and Southern and Northern Protectorates which together now form 
Nigeria. 
Thus between 19~0 and 1916 the patent laws and systems of the 
two countries were very similar. This similarity between the patent 
laws and systems of Ghana (then Gold Coast) and Nigeria was 
temporarily interrupted in 1916 when the colonial government 
promulgated for Nigeria the 1916 UK Patents Registration Ordinance. 
This ordinance which was necessitated by the dearth of technical 
personnel required to operate the patent system established by the 
preceding ordinance (supra), destroyed the then somewhat independent 
patent system. Instead, it linked the Nigerian pa.tent system to the 
U.K. 's and made the procurement of Nigerian patents dependent on prior 
U.K. grants. This means that the similarity that existed between the 
patent systems of Ghana and Nigeria when they were first introduced in 
the two countries ceased to be so from 1916 onwards. From that year 
Nigeria began to operate a dependent system while the Gold Coast 
continued to operate its independent system until 1925. 
The year 1925 restored the similarity that existed before 1916 
between the patent laws and systems of Ghana and Nigeria with the 
promulgation of the 1925 U.K. Patents Registration Ordinance first in 
Ghana (then Gold Coast) and later in Nigeria. For Ghana, on the one 
hand, it was a major departure fran the then existing patent regime 
because this ordinance, like the 1916 Nigerian ordinance, destroyed 
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the independent patent system then in vogue in the country, and 
instead trade it dependent on the U.K. for the procurement of patent 
monopoly grants. For Nigeria, on the other hand, the 1925 Ordinance 
was essentially a reiteration of that of 1916 and therefore of no 
major effect. In 1970 Nigeria promulgated its own autonomous patent 
law, Decree no. 60 of 1970, which once again introduced dissimilarity 
between its patent law and system and those of Ghana. 
Present Patent laws and Systems of Ghana and Nigeria 
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As revealed in Chapters 4 and 6 there is currently a significant 
difference between the Ghanaian and Nigerian patent laws and systems 
which was brought about by the enactment of Nigeria I s Decree No. 60 of 
1970. This decree, as noted in Chapter 6 provides for a conprehensive 
patent law and creates an independent patent system for the country, 
and has made it possible, for the second time in the patent history of 
the country, for both domestic and foreign inventors to obtain 
monopoly grants directly in the country without any recourse to the 
U.K. Patent Office. 
On the contrary, Ghana still operates under the 1925 Ordinance 
and is consequently dependent not only on the U.K. Patent Office for 
the examination of patent applications before it can issue rronopoly 
grants but also dependent on some aspects of the U.K. patent 
legislation particularly on issues such as patentability of 
inventions, terms and duration of grants. It may, however, be 
observed that as a result of the exclusion from patentability of 
pharmaceutical products by NRCD 81 such products are not covered by 
the provisiOns of patentability under U.K. legislation. 
Another dissimilarity which seems to be derived partly from the 
above divergence between the patent 1a\'ls of Ghana and Nigeria is the 
difference between the volume of patents filed in both countries. The 
total number of patents registered in the latter, for example, within 
a period of six years, that is between 1978 and 1983 added up to 3,000 
while the entire volume of patent grants filed in the former within 
the same six year period amounted to only 145 which represents about 
4.83 per cent of those filed in the latter country. A ntmber of 
factors may appear to be responsible for this wide difference. First, 
the independent patent system of Nigeria, particularly its 
registration system of examination makes it much easier and possible 
for all patent applications to be granted monopoly privileges 
automatically once they satisfy 'the statutory requirements. On the 
other hand, the preliminary examination system as well as the inherent 
tedium and expense involved under the Ghanaian patent system makes the 
procurement of patent grants in Ghana a very onerous task. Another 
factor which may explain this difference is the exclusion of 
pharmaceutical products, which are still registered in Nigeria, fram 
patentability under the Ghanaian law. Finally, the attractiveness of 
the large size of the Nigerian market may also explain the 
registration of more inventions there than in Ghana. 
In spite of the above difference there seem to be some 
similarities in respect of the technological context within which the 
patent laws of the two countries were introduced and the practices 
associated with their patent systems. As already observed, the 
present patent system of Ghana is founded on a colonial ordinance 
prorru1gated in 1925 when Ghana was then a colony and could not have 
possibly developed its own authentic technology policy. On the other 
hand, the patent system of Nigeria is based on Decree No. 60 
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promulgated in 1970, that is ten years after that country's 
independence, but during which period it, similarly, had no 
comprehensive technology policy. All this indicates that the patent 
laws and systems of both countries were developed not within the 
context of any technology policy, and thus not as an integral p:1rt of 
an overall national technology planning. 
In addition, it nay be noted that because Ghana does not at 
present have any coherent technology policy and Nigeria, which is 
presently working on one does not have one yet, both oountries have 
not made efforts to alter, in any significant manner, their patent 
laws so as to reflect some of their identified technological needs. 
The implication of this is that in addition to the fact that the 
patent laws of both countries were introduced in a technological 
vacuum no efforts have since their introduction been made to 
incorporate them into an overall national technology programme and to 
render them more relevant to the economic priorities of both 
countries. 
It is therefore, not surprising, as revealed in Chapters 4, 5, 6 
and 7, that the patent laws and systems of both Ghana and Nigeria have 
not been effectively employed as tools of economic and technological 
policies. It was observed in the said chapters that despite their 
potential to be used as such the provisions on patentability, patent 
fees and duration have not been utilized by the two countr ies as· 
deliberate policy to either encourage the inflow of relevant and 
generative foreign technology or to discourage the transfer of certain 
technologies which may harm the development of I.T.C. 
Another point of similarity between the patent system of Ghana 
and Nigeria which is shOtm by the discussion in Chapters 5 and 7 
relates to the administration of patents in the two countries. It 
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became quite clear in the said chapters that the patent offices in 
both countries have not, generally, been effective in the 
administration of patents. Instead, they have nerely served as patent 
registration centres and do not undertake any other functions expected 
of patent offices. To be specific the two offices do not adequately 
publish new inventions in any patent journal or publication, am thus 
do not help to disclose new technical knowledge to the general public. 
In addition, as a result of very poor filing systems, general 
indifference and lack of adequate resources and governmental support 
the two patent offices have also not been successful as databanks for 
technical information. On the whole, both offices have not 
contributed adequately to the technological and industrial development 
process in their respective countries. 
A further area of similarity between the patent systems of Ghana 
and Nigeria is that of patenting activity. As revealed in Chapters 5 
and 7 the majority of inventions registered in the two countries are 
of foreign origin. The countries which dominate this activity in both 
countries are mainly the countries of Western Europe, and they include 
the U. S., U. K., SWitzerland and West Germany. The two case studies 
showed that these countr ies normally take the lion's share of all 
inventions registered in both Ghana and Nigeria. Another similarity 
in this respect is the small number of other African countries 
participating in this activity in the two countries. During the 
period between 1977 and 1983 all the African countries which filed 
inventions in Ghana, that is, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria and South 
Africa, accounted for only 1.8 per cent of all inventions registered 
there. Similarly, between 1978 and 1984 the African countries, which 
filed inventions in Nigeria, that is, the Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe and 
South Africa, accounted for only 0.23 per cent of all patents 
registered there. 
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This clearly demonstrates that there is not rruch participation by 
African countries in the patenting activity of one another; this 
could partly be explained by the paucity of R&D scientists and 
engineers as well as the inadequacy of R&D infrastructure and 
resources. 
A further examination of the proportion of inventions registered 
in Ghana and Nigeria during the period under consideration in the 
context of West African sub-regional co-operation reveals a very 
depressing picture. Table 5: 5 shows the Ivory Coast and Nigeria as 
the only West African countries which filed inventions in Ghana during 
that period while table 7:5 reveals that the Ivory Coast is the only 
West African country which filed an invention in Nigeria during the 
period under consideration. This has significant inplications for 
Ghana and Nigeria and the EXXMASI of which the two countries are 
members. First, it illustrates the low level of new technical 
developments within the OCOWAS sub-region. Secondly, and more 
importantly, it also demonstrates that the dissemination of new 
technical knowledge ammgst the OCClVAS members is still not very 
popular despite the Community's avowed objectives of increased inter 
co-operation in technical, trade and other activities. It may, 
therefore, be necessary for the Conmunity to establish, among other 
measures, a cornmon legal regime which may be able to encourage 
increased spread of technical knowledge within it. 
1. The EQ)WAS (Economic Comnunity of west African States) is a 
regional economic grouping which comprises all the West African 
countries. 
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An additional similarity which directly follows from the above 
relates to the almost complete absence of participation by Ghana and 
Nigeria in each other's patenting activity. As table 7:6 reveals 
there was not a single Ghanaian invention which was filed in Nigeria 
even after the promulgation of the 197~ Decree which makes the filing 
of inventions in the latter very easy. As observed in Chapters 4 and 
5 some Ghanaian inventors, because of the existing procedure in their 
country, abandoned their efforts to obtain Ghanaian patents. Though 
these inventors could have obtained Nigerian patents for their 
inventions, they have, however, till now made no attempts in that 
respect. It may also be added that the only Ghanaian invention - the 
mashing machine - so far registered in both the U.K. and Ghana has no 
record of its registration in Nigeria despite its economic usefulness 
for that country. The non-participation by Ghanaian inventors in 
Nigeria's patenting activity reflects the low level of technical 
oo-operation between the two countries, and may be partly due to the 
lack of awareness on the part of such inventors of the benefits of 
securing patent rights in as many countries as possible. 
Similarly, the participation in the patenting activity of Ghana 
by Nigerian inventors is, though not totally absent, minimal. It is 
on record that out of a total of 86 Nigerian inventions registered in 
Nigeria between 1978 and 1984 only two have so far been registered in 
Ghana; these are the device for planting stem cuttings and the 
portable planter (supra). The success in obtaining Ghanaian patents 
for these inventions may, in addition to their patentabil ity, be 
attributable to the institutional support they received from the 
University of Ife in meeting the cost involved in first obtaining the 
U.K. patent and subsequently the Ghanaian. The non-filing of the 
remaining Nigerian inventions in Ghana my, it may be ronjectured, be 
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ascribed, in addition to the unawareness of benefits accruing from the 
filing of inventions in many countries, to either their doubtful 
patentability or the inabilities of the inventors to wade through the 
expense and tedium involved in procuring a Ghanaian patent. 
Another striking similarity in the area of patenting activity is 
the level of participation by donestic inventors in this activity in 
their respective countries. In the case of Glana, official records 
indicate that the share of Ghanaian inventors, excluding the mashing 
nachine which the author discovered was developed by a Ghanaian and 
registered in Ghana in 1975, of all patents registered in the country 
is nil. With respect to Nigeria all inventions registered by Nigerian 
inventors constitute a minute proportion of total inventions 
registered in the country. Ho~ver, when the nunber of registered 
Nigerian donestic inventions are corrpared with the Ghanaian a clear 
difference energes. For exarrple, while Nigerian inventors registered 
2.53 per cent of all inventions filed in the country bet~en 1978 arx1 
1984 there was not a single Ghanaian invention registered in Ghana 
dur ing alroost the sane per iod. 
The final similarity between the Nigerian and Ghanaian patent 
system is in respect of the system I s contr ibution to the transfer of 
technology to both countries. The majority of patents registered in 
the t~ countries are usually not ~rked donestically. They have 
instead been exploited by patentees through the iIrportation of the 
relevant patented products or products derived from patented 
processes. The system has not significantly influenced the transfer 
of technology through the other conduits such as FDI and joint 
ventures in both countries. In addition, patent licensing as a 
vehicle for transferring technology, as already observed, is not very 
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popular in either country. In rrost cases they are combined with other 
transactions such as know-how licensing and technical services and 
management agreements. In effect, the patent system per se has not 
been very effective in transferring technology to both countries. 
Technology Transfer Regulatory Regimes in Both Countries 
The other area where the study reveals sharp similarities and 
dissimilarities pertains to the regulatory mechanisms set up by the 
two countries to control the transfer of technology, particularly the 
inclusion of restrictive practices in technology transfer agreements 
involving licensees of both countries. 
Though, as already observed, the patent systems of Ghana and 
Nigeria have not been very effective in transferring technology to 
both countries they have, nevertheless, been employed by patentees to 
impose on licensees in the two countries certain anticompetitive 
practices which have been discussed in the preceding chapters. Even 
though the data in Chapters 5 and 7 as regards these practices in both 
countries tray be restricted in terms of the period they cover they 
help to ~emonstrate the extent of their occurrence. 
A corrparative study of the occurrence of restrictive clauses in 
Ghana and Nigeria reveals some degree of both similarity and 
dissimilarity. The study exhibits foreign jurisdiction as the roost 
frequent of these clauses in both countr ies, followed by export 
restrictions. While the latter is followed in Ghana by excessive 
controls of transferee's operation (supra), they are, with respect to 
Nigeria, followed by tie-in clauses. The least frequent of these 
restrictive practices in Q1ana include grant-backs and restriction on 
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adaptation, while in the case of Nigeria they are price restrictions 
and limitations on R&D. 
While the occurence of these practices seem to indicate that 
they are of the same magnitude in both countries, a further 
examination reveals, however, that they are somehow more on the high 
side in Ghana than they are in Nigeria. For example, while 47.5 per 
cent of technology transfer agreements studied which involve Ghanaian 
licensees embodied clauses relating to foreign jur isdiction the 
percentage recorded for such agreements involving Nigerian licensees 
which embodied the said clause was 42. Moreover, while 32.5 per cent 
of licensing agreements involving Ghanaian licensee enterprises 
included export restrictions that of Nigeria amounted to 31 per cent. 
Though differences do exist here they are so minimal that it may be 
right to assert that the magnitude of the occurrence of 
anticompetitive practices in both countries is similar. 
Nevertheless, an examination of the technology transfer regimes 
of both countries exhibits, though some degree of closeness exists, 
very sharp differences. The first dissimilarity between the two 
regimes pertains to the general approach adopted by the two countries 
to regulate technology transfer transactions vis-a-vis foreign 
investments. As was ooserved in Chapter 4, the regulation of transfer 
of technology transactions in Ghana is carried out as an integral 
aspect of the control of foreign investments in the country. 
Accordingly, the regulation of technology transfer and FDls in general 
is not only integrated but also SUPIX>sed to be governed by one 
enactment and administered by a single authority. The effective 
integration of the controls of both transactions may make IX>ssible a 
very efficient co-ordination of all the related activities. 
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However, in Nigeria, unlike Ghana, the regulation of transfer of 
technology agreements and FOls are not integrated and are, instead, 
undertaken as distinct activities. Consequently, there is, on the one 
hand, a different enactment (the rolP Decree) and body (the roIP) 
which governs and administers respectively technology transfer 
transactions, and, on the other, a number of enactments and programmes 
and institutions which control and oversee foreign investments in the 
country (supra). This clearly represents a divergence in the 
regulatory approach ,adopted by the two countries. 
Another glaring disparity that exists between Ghana and Nigeria 
in respect of technology transfer transactions lies in the 
institutional and administrative machineries set up for that purpose. 
Though the 1985 Investment Code of Ghana, PNDCL 116, like its 
predecessor Act 437, entrusts the GIC with the regulation and approval 
of transfer of technology as well as other related functions they are 
in practice shared by a variety of conpeting institutions. The 
performance of these functions is undertaken by, besides the GIC, the 
l-'1inistry of Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP) and MIST whose 
functions and powers have a bearing thereon, GIHOC which examines its 
own investment agreenents including transfer of technology, the 
TfC ., and the PAB whose regulatory functions have so far been mainly 
centred on foreign currency payment aspect and the country's balance 
of payment position. 
This proliferation of institutions performing the same 
technology transfer regulatory functions has led to rivalry between 
the institutions involved which makes the co-ordination of their 
activities very difficult. This was clearly brought out by complaints 
made by almost all the senior officials of the relevant bodies the 
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author spoke to. Almost all of them complained that each body was 
"creating an empire for itself" which made co-ordination between them 
almost impossible. This situation seems to be exacerbated by the fact 
that all the relevant bodies are independent of each and ~re only 
remotely responsible to their respective supervising rrdnistries. So 
that none of them can, without the necessary co-operation of the 
other, compel the other or others to follow any particular line of 
action or perform a given function. A classic example which 
illustrates this situation and readily comes to rrdnd is the case in 
which the head of one of these bodies (the TIC ) requested certain 
documents and copies of approved contracts from the Secretary to 
another body (PAB). On receipt of this request the said secretary 
asked the requesting head to forward his request to the Attorney 
General, the supervising head, who on receipt thereof also asked the 
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requesting head to put in writing and in detail the reasons for 
wanting those documents. Several months of waiting did not furnish 
the requesting head with the documents he needed. A further demerit 
of the duplication of technology regulatory functions by these state 
institutions is that it involves unnecessary wastage of both financial 
and manpower resources which are not abundant. 
On the contrary, the administration and regulation of technology 
transfer transactions in Nigeria is entrusted to and performed by one 
body. In that country, apart from bodies such as the Federal Ministry 
of Finance (FMF) and Federal Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology (FHEsr) which exercise certain functions and powers having 
a bearing on the transfer of technology, the NOIP is the main 
adrrdnistrative body vested with the regulation of all inflows of 
technology into the country. In fact, unlike the prevailing situation 
in Ghana, it is only the ~DIP which evaluates, approves, registers and 
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issues a certificate of registration for all technology transfer 
agreements. Similarly, it is the body which is responsible for the 
efficient identification and selection of foreign technolCXJY, the 
development of the negotiating skills of Nigerians and adaptation of 
imported technology. Finally, it is the body responsible, though the 
Central Bank of Nigeria still vies with it in this respect, for 
evaluating and the setting of appropriate royalties or licence fees 
for licensors. The centralisation of the functions of regulating and 
approving of technology agreements in the NOIP makes it possible for 
it to undertake its assignments without suffering from the 
shortcomings which obtain in Ghana. 
A further point of dissimilarity which needs to be brought out 
relates to the fate of technology transfer agreements which embody any 
of the restrictive clauses out-lewed by the relevant laws of the two 
countries. The position under the Ghanaian law, as already <:bserved, 
is that any such agreements are null and void and cannot, therefore, 
be invoked in or enforced by any court of law. In addition, they 
cannot serve as a basis for the payment of any foreign currency to the 
favour of any party thereto. In contradistinction, any such 
agreements under Nigerian law may not necessarily be null and void and 
could therefore be enforced by any court of law in the country. The 
only sanction attached to these agreements by law is that they will 
not qualify for transfers of foreign currency to be made to the favour 
of any parties thereto, and accordingly any payments due thereunder 
will be disallowed. 
The final point of difference between the regulations of 
technology transfer in Ghana and Nigeria is the level of development 
of their regulatory regimes. The previous chapters have made it clear 
that the regulatory machinery in Nigeria seems to be more developed 
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than in Ghana. In the former, comprehensive criteria have been 
established to guide the NJIP in the execution of its functions. 
These criteria have clearly laid down the types of restrictive 
practices which disqualify agreements from registration and the 
general requirements they must satisfy. On the basis of these 
criteria the NOIP has rejected a number of agreements which would 
otherwise have been put into effect. Similarly, the roIP, on the 
basis of the criteria and the royalty rate established by it have 
saved for the country about N33 million. Despite the absence of an 
efficient monitoring system to enable the assessment of the actual 
irrpact of the roIP' s operations and the real value of the above saving 
it could be said that the Nigeria regulatory system has at least been 
put into motion and recorded some success. 
However, the regulatory regime in Ghana is yet to be given an 
actual breath of life. Though the Investments Code of 1981 called for 
the adoption of regulations to guide the GIC in controlling technology 
transfer transactions there have not, up to the present moment, been 
in existence any such regulations. It is hoped that the fresh 
provision in PNDCL 116 for the adoption of such regulations by the GIC 
will bring them into existence. The absence of these regulations and 
the ongoing rivalry between the GIC and other government institutions 
have seriously affected the regulatory functions of the GIC. Clearly, 
the technology transfer regulatory regime in Ghana is still in a 
rudimentary stage. 
In spite of these disparities between the technology transfer 
regimes of Ghana and Nigeria there do exist, in the same respect some 
degree of similarity. The first major similarity between the 
technology regulatory regimes of the two countries is the total 
absence from these regimes of a well developed and efficient 
monitoring system which is needed to ensure compliance by both 
licensors and licensees with approved terms and conditions, as well as 
to stop or minimise circumvention of government regulations. The 
absence of such a monitoring system represents a fundamental 
deficiency in the technology regulatory regimes, and until its 
effective establishment by the latter it may render the true 
assessment of the success or failure of the regimes difficult to make. 
A further similarity is that both countries, irrespective of the 
inadequacies of their regulatory regimes, have at least come to 
realise the need to regulate the inflow of foreign technologies to 
their respective countries. The significance of this is that by 
coming to terms with this and, thus, preparing the ground to control 
foreign technology they are both making some endeavours to ensure the 
efficacious transfer of technology which could contribute to the 
devel0tment of the I.T.C. of both countries. 
The final point of similarity relates to the additional measures 
adopted by the governments of both countries, besides the prohibition 
of restrictive clauses by the relevant enactments, to encourage more 
local R&D as well as to promote increased exports by domestic 
manufacturing enterprises. It will be recalled fram Chapters 4, 5, 6 
and 7 that in addition to the possible regulation of restrictive 
business practices (See S.33 of PNDCL 116) which encompasses 
restrictions on R&D and export in the case of Ghana, and the 
exclusion by the NOIP Decree of the above mentioned restrictions the 
two countries have established and provided for certain incentives to 
spur on more indigenous R&D and to increase the export potential and 
actual exports by their domestic manufacturing firms. These 
incentives or measures when effectively applied could enhance the 
capabilities of such enterprises in these areas. 
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It does appear from the above that while there are some 
similarities between the patent systems and technology transfer 
regulatory regimes of both countries there exist, at the same time, 
very fundamental differences. Consequently, it will seem that even 
though similar endeavours or recoIlUlendations could be nade to\'lards 
their improvements, appropriate solutions will not always be identical 
in the two instances. 
Recoomendations 
OUr discussions in the preceding chapters have revealed a number 
of difficulties in respect of the context within which the patent 
systems of both Ghana and Nigeria were developed and are currently 
practised, especially as a conduit for transfering to and developing 
teclmology in the two countries. In addition, they have nanifested 
some deficiencies in these countries' legal and institutional 
mechanisms for regulating the inflow of foreign technology. 
Accordingly, we shall in this section, based on our findings, offer 
some suggestions, which must be considered as a supplement to those 
already discussed in the course of the examination of some of the 
provisions under the patent and technology transfer laws of both 
countries in the preceding chapters, in the hope of irrprovinj both the 
patent systems and the technology regulatory regimes of the two 
countries and making them more effective in spurring on the transfer 
and development of teclmology in these countries. 
The Patent System 
As already noted, the patent systems of both Ghana and Nigeria 
were developed not within the context of any national technology 
programme. It is important, however, that for the former to play any 
meaningful role in the two countries I technological development 
efforts they will have to be incorporated into their national 
technology programmes. 
For any such incorporation there must exist, first and foremost, 
a well balanced and coherent national technology policy which must 
necessarily encompass the patent system. Slch a technology policy 
must deal with how the pattern of techniques currently in use as well 
as new ones both developed domestically and imported from abroad can 
be improved upon and used to serve the dual objective of increasing 
labour productivity and meeting the basic human needs of their 
nationals. l-loreover, it must define the role and place of all the 
agents of technology transfer such as the patent system, FDI, 
joint-ventures, technical and management services and the import of 
capital goods. Furthermore, it must cover the development of 
indigenous manpower skills, the upgrading of and increase in R&D 
personnel and resources respectively, and, generally the creation of 
the right environment for indigenous R&D. Technology, as has 
earlier been indicated, involves not only physical but also social 
technology, especially the framework of social relations and 
organisations through which the strategy of technology transfer and 
development has to be undertaken. Consequently, the national 
technology policy will necessarily have to take into account the 
social relations of production. 
It may be added that the technology policy to be adopted must 
not be isolated from but rather dovetailed into the entire national 
economic plan. This is crucial because it is only when it is made a 
necessary link in the overall national economic development programme 
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that its effective implementation may be guaranteed since either the 
non-feasance or malfeasance of the technological component may 
adversely affect the whole economic programme if not brought into 
disarray. It is when the national economic developnent prograrrane 
encompasses the national technology plan and the latter in turn covers 
the patent system that patents can be expected to play a more 
meaningful role in and make a harmonious contribution to the process 
of national technological and economic development. 
It is against this background that any serious revision of the 
patent laws and systems of both Ghana and Nigeria will have to be 
undertaken. It is pertinent to note, however, that the mere 
incorporation of their patent systems into their national technology 
policies may not automatically bring about the desired results. Much 
will depend on the entire national economic and technology planning 
and more importantly the nature and quality of the patent system they 
adopt. The patent system to be developed must, therefore, be governed 
by the criteria of p..1blic interest, particularly that of national 
economic and technological developnent, instead of the lop-sided 
system as we presently have in the two countries which mainly favours 
inventors the majority of whom are foreigners. However, this public 
interest must be juxtaposed with that of the inventor. 
In addition, for the patent system to be of any use it nust 
reflect and be relevant to the economic situation and environment of 
the two countries. In particular, it must reflect their level of 
technological and economic development. In this respect, it may be 
suggested for both Ghana and Nigeria, which are not technologically 
sophisticated, the possible provision in their patent laws for other 
legal protection for inventors, mainly the domestic ones, through the 
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grant of rights such as utility oodel or petty patent, for snaller 
inventions and innovations with a lower novelty requirement. The 
benefit of such a provision is that protection will be offered to the 
countries' lone inventors at a much lower financial and bureaucratic 
costs, in exchange for a shorter period of protection. 
It nay, in the same respect, be suggested for both Ghana and 
Nigeria the possible inclusion of inventor's certificate in their 
range of legal rights for inventors. This may be very appropriate for 
these countries, not for the same rationale for its adoption by same 
Eastern lliropean countries, but, in vie-l of the inadequate financial 
capabilities of inventors in the former which does not make it 
possible for them to develop and exploit their inventions. So that by 
the adoption of inventor's certificate the legal rights to the 
relevant inventions will pass to the state which corrparatively has 
more financial resources to undertake their exploitation while the 
inventors for their part will receive renumeration for their 
inventions. 
Finally, the patent system must not only encourage domestic 
inventive activity but must also ensure the inflow of more generative 
technology than consumptive, and contribute to the developnent of 
I.T.C. Consequently, these objectives will have to permeate into the 
individual provisions of the patent legal regime, particularly in 
respects of issues such as the patentability of inventions, the terms 
and duration of patent grants as well as patent fees. It nust be 
possible as suggested and discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 7, 
particularly in Chapter 5, to use the provisions on these subjects 
and the entire patent system as a teol of economic policy for national 
economic development, especially to guarantee the transfer of 
generative technology and to facilitate the development of I.T.C. 
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It may be advisable, against this background for both Ghana and 
Nigeria to revise their patent legislation and system in order to make 
them more relevant and beneficial to their respective economics. In 
the case of Ghana it may be suggested that it should abrogate its 
present patent law and system because of their inherent deficiencies 
and replace than with new and autonomous patent law and systan. This 
means that it will have to intensify the current efforts being made to 
develop independent patent legislation. The present patent systan of 
Ghana, as already observed, not only involves a very expensive and 
currbersome procedure for domestic inventors to obtain a Ghanaian 
patent, but also does not encourage the effective transfer of 
technology to the country, and makes no provisions to check abuses of 
patent monopoly priviledges (supra). As a result of all this and the 
fact that the criteria for patentability of inventions to be favoured 
with Ghanaian patents are based on the British requirements of 
patentability the present systan if left unaltered may continue not 
only to hamper the effective transfer of technology to the country but 
also to inpec1e the development of I.T.C. and the execution of a 
national technology programme as suggested. 
For Nigeria whose patent law is based on the BIRPI Model Law 
which itself has since been revised it may not only need to amend its 
law so as to update it in terms of recent developments in the field, 
but to appraise its efficacy in the transfer of technology and the 
c1evel0txnent of I. T .C. It may also need to examine heM the provisions 
of its present patent law and system can be altered so as to fit in 
harmoniously with the current efforts being made to develop a 
technology policy for the country. In this respect, therefore, 
Nigeria as well as Ghana may need to take account of our preceding 
discussions including those centring on some of the crucial provisions 
under patent laws. 
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The final suggestion that needs to be made here relates to 
patent administrations in the two countries. It will be recalled that 
our discussions on the patent offices of both Ghana and Nigeria reveal 
that they have not been successful in the administration of patents 
and have in particular not been effective as data banks for new 
technical knowledge and as agents for the disclosure or spread of such 
knowledge. All this, as rur discussions similarly reveal, have to a 
greater extent been attributed to the indifference of their 
governments to these offices' activities as well as inadequate 
resources as demonstrated by the case of the damaged Nigerian 
trademark and patent stamp (supra). 
Consequently, it will be recommended that for these offices to 
contribute to the transfer and develoFillent of technology in both 
countries they will have to be properly staffed, given the necessary 
and adequate resources and furnished with the appropriate facilities. 
~breover, there may be the need for their precise scope of operations 
to be properly defined and brought into the mainstream of technology 
planning and development. This will be one way of integrating the 
patent system with all other instrumentalities of development. In 
this way, the patent system will be able to assist in encouraging 
national inventiveness and, in general, strengthen the technological 
and scientific infrastructures of both countries. In effect, the 
patent administrations of the two countries must, instead of being 
isolated, be brought closer to and made to co-operate with other 
institutions directly involved in formulating and executing national 
development objectives. 
Transfer 9L~mol.99Y Regulato[Y Regimes 
As h.:ls rurcady been hinted, cur discussions in the previrus 
cropters revealed sane weaknesses with regard to the technology 
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transfer laws and regulatory systems of both Gh.:ma and Nigeria, and it 
is theze which "''C intend to address in this zection. Before making 
any recamen&ticns which my be applicable to both countries ",-e shall 
first of all direct our attention to specific weaknesses pertaining to 
them individually. 
It will be recalled that Ghana, unlike Nigeria, has not up to 
date ~doptcd any regulations or criteria to guide the GIC in its 
evaluation ~d ~roval of technology transfer agreements. This means 
that the latter has no legally binding rules upon which it could 
either approve or refuse such agreements. The absence of these rules, 
as already indicated, has contributed to hampering the work of the 
GlC. It may also result in inconsistencies in the approval and 
regulation of technology transfer transactions in the country. It is, 
therefore, imperative that the Board of the GIC adopts, without any 
further delay, relevant regulations to govern technology transfer 
agreements as called for by 5.3" of PNDCL 116. 
303 
We also noticed earlier on that in Ghana there are a n~ber of 
bodies which vie with each other with respect to the regulation of 
technology transfer transactions. As has been observed, this creates 
unnecessary competition among these institutions and more importantly 
results in unwarrantable duplication of both manpower and financial 
resources which are not in adequate supplies in the country. 
Consequently, it ~ay be recammended tr~t the functions of regulating 
the trQIlsfer ~d cevelopncnt of technology may be entrusted to one 
central organisation, though the performance thereof may not 
necessarily be carried out under one roof. This will avoid the 
unwarranted rivalry between state institutions and duplication of 
scarce national resources, ensure an effective technology transfer 
regulation, as well as consistency and optimality in technology 
policies and plans. 
In the case of Nigeria it was revealed that the NOIP which is 
the body entrusted with the regulation of the transfer of technology, 
unlike the Gle in Ghana, is not effectively linked to the bodies 
concerned with foreign investments and also plays very little role in 
the technological evaluation of foreign investment proposals. In view 
of the fact that technology transfer is an integral aspect of foreign 
investment and the regulation of the two may therefore be integrated 
it necessarily becomes important that the technological relations 
between the NaIP and other bodies concerned with foreign investments 
are re-examined with a viel to bringing than much closer together if 
not integrated. 
The first general recommendation which applies to both countries 
relates to the exclusion of machinery, equipment and capital goods 
imports from technology transfer transactions which must be examined 
by the competent regulatory bodies. It will be recalled that S.4~ of 
PNOCL 116 does not include in the definition of technology transfer 
agreement any agreement which concerns the import of machinery and 
equipment. In the case of Nigeria though S.4(d) (v) includes 
agreements for the supply of machinery and plant in the definition of 
registerable transfer of foreign technology agreements involving 
Nigerian parties a roIP guideline excludes from its registration 
exercise all technology transfer agreements involving the inport of 
machinery and equipnent unless foreign personnel are used in the 
execution (supra). '!he exclusion of this type of transaction from 
examination by the competent bodies seems to be very inappropriate. 
The supply or inportation of capital equipnent, as already renarked is 
not only another iIrportant vehicle for transferr ing technology but 
also one which is equally fraught with restrictive practices and it 
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will, therefore, have been expected to have had it included in the 
technology transfer transactions which are supposed to be examined or 
screened by the technology regulatory authorities. Accordingly, we 
recamnend that the imports or supplies of foreign machinery and 
capital equipnent be included in the transactions to be examined and 
registered by both the GIC and OOIP. 
A crucial aspect of the entire technology transfer regulatory 
regime which previous discussions have abundantly revealed to be 
absent and thus an outstanding issue in both Ghana and Nigeria is an 
efficacious nonitoring system. It is iIrpJrtant, as already indicated, 
that an effective and comprehensive monitoring system be perceived as 
a fundamental aspect of the regulation of the transfer of technology 
and developed in both countries. When this is Cbne it will enable the 
competent bodies to undertake the actual follow-up of approved 
contracts and to ascertain the absorption and adaptation of 
technologies covered by such contracts, especially at the time of 
renewals. It may be added that the monitoring system to be developed 
must also examine not only the behaviour of technology suppliers and 
their restrictive practices but, as one UNCTAD report (1980b) 
suggests, the behaviour of technology recipients as well. It is only 
through this that it will be possible to discover the extent to which 
government regulations have been circumvented or not as well as the 
1Irpact of the legal policies {Xlrsued in this field. 
Moreover, it does appear that so far the corcpetent bodies in 
both countries, especially in the case of Nigeria since Ghana has not 
been very active in the regulation of technology transfer, have been 
preoccupied with the examination, approval and registration of 
technology transfer agreements without being actively involved in the 
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actual selection of the technologies imported into the respective 
countries through these agreements. It may, therefore, be suggested 
that instead of this passive role the conpetent bodies mst playa 
IIOre active part in the process of selecting foreign technologies. 
This will permit a closer integration of the regulatory units into the 
indigenous systan of technological develot:ment. 
Finally, since the transfer of technology between parent 
multinational companies and their subsidiaries in both countries still 
takes place on a considerable scale it may be necessary for the 
~tent authorities in both countries to develop and extend their 
regulatory activities beyond technology transactions between foreign 
technology suppliers and domestic enterprises, as it is currently the 
case, to encorrpass those between parent and subsidiary companies. 
SUch a move will not only bring the technology transactions between 
the latter under the scrutiny of the conpetent bodies but will also 
enable than to keep, to some extent, a check over the indirect means 
of profit repatriation from subsidiaries to their parent companies or 
other affiliates, especially transfer pricing. It is when all these 
are done that the competent bodies will be in a better position to 
ascertain the efficacy of government regulations on the transfer of 
technology. 
Conclusion 
~le have, in this chapter, endeavoured to highlight some of the 
main similarities and dissimilarities between the patent and 
technology transfer laws as well as the patent administrations and 
technology regulatory regimes of Ghana and Nigeria. In addition, we 
have also, based on our findings, p..1t forward some suggestions in the 
hope that they may be able to rectify some of the inadequacies of the 
said laws and regimes of both countries. 
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In the opening chapter of this study we have discussed the 
concept of technology and explained it in terms of the knowledge to 
use and make tools to satisfy human needs. This, it will be recalled, 
was intiIr.ately related to the social relations of production. In the 
same chapter the legal nature of a patent and the economic functions 
of the patent systan, which include the spread and disclosure of 
technical knowledge, R&D, innovation, and the transfer of 
technology, were also discussed. Moreover, the chapter also examined 
some of the restrictive covenants which feature in technology 
licensing transactions, and danonstrated how they impede effective 
technology transfer. Finally, the chapter examined the process of the 
transfer of technology from the developed to the less developed 
countries. This was closely related to the problem of under 
developrrent and the desire of the LDCs to eradicate poverty and thus 
satisfy their needs on a continuing basis. Consequently, we have 
explained the transfer of technology to mean the introduction of 
technology from one envirorunent to another where its use will, in 
addition to meeting the needs of the recipient, be able to impart the 
necessary knowledge and skills for the satisfaction of these needs on 
a continuing basis. Based on the above we have classified the 
technology transfer process into generative and consurrptive (supra) 
and lave suggested the adoption of the former by LDCs which desire a 
permanent technological base for economic developnent. 
The technology transfer process, as has already been observed, 
is effected through a number of conduits which include FOls, 
joint-ventures, technical services and management contracts and the 
patent system. The last mechanism has been the focus of this thesis. 
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In this study, we have examined how the patent system actually 
contributes to the transfer of technology, and in the process noted 
some of the constraints that harrper the systan in that respect. 
In Chapter Two, for example, our discussion of the Paris 
Convention, which applies to both Ghana and Nigeria because of their 
accession to it, revealed that a number of its provisions do not work 
in their favour as well as other IDes. These provisions include 
articles 2, 4, 5 (A) (1) and 5 quater which deal with national 
treatment, priority rights, inI'orts generally, and iIrportation of 
products derived from patented products respectively. 
In addition to the Paris Convention, we have, in the course of 
our discussion of the patent laws and systems of both Ghana and 
Nigeria in Chapters Four and Five, and Chapters Six and Seven 
respectively, revealed a number of inadequacies in the patent laws and 
systans of the two countries. 1<.s we endeavoured to deroonstrate, they 
affect adversely the transfer of technology to both countries as well 
as the devel0txnent of their I.T.C., and particularly in the case of 
Ghana the sticulation of domestic inventive activity and initiative. 
It will be recalled that Ghana still operates a patent systan 
which is founded on a 1925 colonial ordinance. This systan, as has 
been explained, does not only incorporate the Ghanaian patent systan 
into the U.K.'s, but also makes it difficult and costly for Ghanaian 
inventors to procure Ghanaian patents. In fact , the present law and 
system do not seem to be in harmony with the economic and 
technological needs and developmental efforts of the country. 
Clearly, in addition to the constraints imposed on Ghana by the Paris 
Convention) its own patent regime serves as a clog to its patent 
systan as a tool for the transfer and developnent of technology. 
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On the other hand, Nigeria, unlike Ghana, P.as prorulgated its 
own patent law modelled on the BIPPI Model Law and developed its own 
patent system. Nevertheless, besides some of the meritorious 
provisions already discussed, the Nigerian patent law, as revealed in 
Chapters Six and Seven, contains a nunber of provisions such as those 
relating to monopoly rights to processes, import monopoly rights, the 
systan of examination, nullity of patents and contractual licenses 
which may not operate to its advantage. 
It is, therefore, necessary for the two countries to assess the 
efficacy of their patent laws and systems with a view to making them 
more relevant to their technological and economic needs, and to ensure 
that they minimise the adverse effects of the Paris Conventions on 
their patent systems and economy. In this respect Ghana and Nigeria 
may stand to gain from other efforts and policies regarding patents at 
the international, national and regional levels. In particular, the 
two countries may need to learn from the experiences of the Latin 
American countries. 
It will be recalled in Chapter Two that some Latin AIrerica 
countries including Brazil, the Andean Pact countries and Mexico, as 
well as India have taken steps to streamline their patent regimes in 
order to make than more relevant to their respective economies. They 
have, in particular, reformed their patent laws, with the objective, 
inter alia, of redefining the concept of invention, on the basis of a 
subjective concept requiring inventive activity as an im~rtant 
element of the invention. Moreover, these reforms have clarified and 
strengthened the conditions for the working of patents eliminated 
monopoly of imports granted to the patentee, and suppressed 
patentability in certain economic sectors. All this is 
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aimed at making the patent system a relevant tool for the economic 
develof(W1t of the countries involved. 
Ghana and Nigeria may need, instead of continuing their present 
patent systan, to follow the exarrple of these countries if they are to 
derive any economic benefit from their respective patent systems. In 
addition to the subjective redefinition of the concept of invention, 
the clarification and strengthening of the conditions for the working 
of patents, exclusion of import monopoly grants and the suppression of 
patentability, the two countries will need to tailor the individual 
relevant patent provisions such as patentability, patent duration, 
fees and mnopoly grants to their respective needs and enploy them as 
measures for technological developnent. As already indicated, all 
this could be more effective only within the framework of a national 
technological prograrnrre and policy. 
It may be reiterated that, for a meaningful contribution to the 
technology developnent process, the patent administrations in the two 
countries rust be developed and encouraged to serve as effective data 
banks for technical inforrration and as instruments for disclosing and 
spreading technical knowledge to institutions, bodies or individuals 
who may require than. The patent administrations must also be 
involved with the relevant institutions in the formulation and 
irrplementation of national develop:lent plans. In this way, the patent 
systan could be integrated with all other instruments of developnent 
and thus contribute to the strengthening of the technological and 
scientific infrastructure of the two countries. All this will not 
only enable their patent systems to make available new technological 
information but also to noke the best use of their limited skilled 
manpower resources available for developnent in both countries. 
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It is necessary, therefore, for Ghana and Nigeria to evaluate 
the effectiveness of their patent laws in contributing to meeting 
their technological needs and the develoF'Ilent of I.T.C., and to revise 
them against this background to include the suggestions put forward in 
the study, particularly in <l1apter Eight. Ghana xray not only need to 
revise its patent law, but possibly to jettison it corrpletely in 
favour of a new one. 
~~l this must be done in relation to the efficient development 
of the technology transfer regulatory regimes being pursued by both 
Ghana and Nigeria. This will ensure the effective transfer of 
technology to the two countries, as well as the exclusion of 
anticompetitive practices associated with this transaction, including 
patent licensing agreements which involve nationals of both countries. 
For the patent system, and especially licensing requirement to be very 
effective in this respect the present regUlatory regimes rust be 
strengthened, and a well developed monitoring system set up in the two 
countries to ensure compliance with relevant government regulations. 
In this regard, Ghana and Nigeria may benefit from the experiences of 
other LDCs including some Latin }.rnerica countries, and particularly 
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India which is the only LOC with a well developed monitoring system. ~ 
It is only when all this is done that the patent systems and the 
technology transfer regulatory regines of the two countries can 
contribute to the effective transfer of technology to and development 
of I.T.C. in their respective countries. It is important to p)int out 
here that we are not under any illusion that the mere revision and 
promulgation of new patent lal'lS, and the strengthening of the 
technology regulatory regioes will automatically lead to the 
accomplishment of the above objectives. However, the revision of 
these laws to reflect the levels of economic and technological 
develcprrent allowing them to be employed as neasures for economic 
development, as well as the consolidation of their technology 
regulatory regiJres will nark the beginning of the use of the patent 
system and technology licensing re~irernent as tools for the transfer 
and development of technology in both countries. 
It hardly need be added that for all these to be successful 
there will be the need for additional supporting neasures to be 
evolved. In particular, toore will be the need to develop the 
domestic technological infrastructure and to create the right economic 
environnent for technology transfer and developnent activities. 
Moreover, the necessary political direction and support for these 
activities will be an ooditional prere~isite. It is against this 
backgroorrl that the revision and strengthening of the patent system 
and tecmology transfer regiJres of (}}ana and Nigeria, will enable 
them, instead of adoptin;J the present passive role, to nake a IOOre 
neaningful contribution to the efficient and effective transfer of 
technology to and developrrent of in:Ugenoos technological capabilities 
in both countries. It is ooped that this thesis is a contribution to 
that eoo. 
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GENERAL NOTES 
Annex I 
TECHNICAL UNITES TAKEN FROM THE 
INTERNATIONAL PATENT CLASSIFICATION (IPC) 
Technical 
units 
1 
2 
3 
, 
Section A - HUMAN NECESSITIES 
Sub-Section: Agriculture 
Classes: 
AOl - Agriculture; Forestry; Animal Husbandry; 
Hunting; Trapping; Fishing 
Except: AOlN - Preserved animals or plants 
or parts thereof; Chemical 
treatment, e.g. disinfection 
of soil or living plant 
material; Pesticides and 
herbicides 
Sub-Section: Foodstuffs and Tobacco 
Classes: 
A2l 
-
Baking, Edible Doughs 
A22 
-
Butchering; ~eat Treatment; Processing 
poultry or fish 
A23 
-
Foods or Foodstuffs; their treatment not 
included in other classes 
A24 
-
Tobacco; Cigars; Cigarettes; Smokers' 
Requisites 
Sub-Section: Personal and Domestic Articles 
Classes: 
A41 - Wearin~ apparel 
A42 - Headwear 
A43 - Footwear 
A44 - Haberdashery; Jewellery 
_ A45 - Hand and travelling articles 
A46 - Brushware 
A41 - Furniture; Domestic articles or appliances; 
Coffee mills; Spice mills; Suction 
cleaners in general 
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Sub-Section: P.ealth and Amusement 
Classes: 
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4 A6l - Medical and veterinary science; Hygiene 
EXcept: A6lK - Preparations for medical, dental 
or toilet purposes 
A62 - Life-saving; Fire-fighting 
A63 - Sports; Games; Amusements 
5 A61K- Preparations for medical, dental or toilet 
6 
7 
purposes 
Section B - PERFORMING OPFRATrONS 
Sub-Section: Preparinq and Mixing 
Classes: 
BOl -
B02 -
B03 -
B04 -
B05 -
B06 -
B07 -
BOa -
Physical and chemical processes or apparatus 
in general 
Crushing, pulverising or disintegrating; 
Preparatory treatment of grain for millinq 
Separation of solid materials using liquids 
or using pneumatic tables or jigs; Magnetic 
or electrostatis separation 
Centrifugal apparatus or machines for carrying-
out physical or chemical processes 
Spraying, atomising in general; Applyiftg 
li~~ids or other fluent materials to surfaces, 
in general 
Generating or transmitting mechanical vibra-
tions in general 
Separating solids from solids; Sorting 
Cleaning 
, 5ub-5ection: Shapino 
Classes: 
B2l - Mechanical metal-working without essentially 
removing material; Punching metal 
B22 - Casting; Powder metallurgy 
B23 - Machine tools; Metal-working not otherwise 
provided for : 
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8 B24 - Grinding; Polishing 
9 
10 
11 
B25 - Hand tools; Portable power-driven tools; 
Manipulators 
B26 - Hand cutting tools; Cutting machines or 
devices not specially adapted for particular 
materials or purposes 
B27 - Working, preserving wood or similar material; 
Nailing or staplinq machines in general 
B28 - Working cement, clay, and stone 
B29 - Working of plastics; Working of substances 
in a plastic state, in general; Working of 
substances not otherwise provided for 
B30 - Presses 
Except: B31 - Making paper articles; Working 
paper 
B32 - Layered products 
Sub-Section: Printing 
Classes: 
B41 
-
Printing; Lining machines; Typewriters; 
Stamps 
B42 
-
Bookbinding; Albums; Files; Special printed 
r.latter 
B43 
-
Writing and drawing appliances; Bureau 
accessories 
B44 
-
~corative arts 
Sub-Section: Transporting 
Classes: 
B60 
-
Vehicles in general 
B6l 
-
Railways 
B62 
-
Land vehicles for travelling otherwise than on 
rails 
B63 
-
Shi?s or other waterborne vessels; Related 
equipment 
B64 
-
Aircraft; Aviation; Cosmonautics 
B65 - Conveying; Packing; Storing; Handling thin 
or filamentary material 
B66 - Hoisting; Lifting; Hauling 
B67 - Liquid handling 
B68 - Saddlery; Upholstery 
I 
) 
"-
12 
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Section C - CHEMcrSTRY AND METALLURGY 
Sub-Section: Chemistry 
Classes: 
Inorganic chemistry 
Treating water, waste water and sewage 
Glass, Mineral and slag wool 
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COl -
C02 -
C03 -
C04 - Cements; Ceramics, etc.; Sound or thermal 
insulating materials 
COS - Manufacture of fertilisers 
13 C07 - Organic chemistry 
14 
15 
16 
and AOlN- Preserved animals or plants or parts thereof, 
Chemical treatment, e.g. disinfection of soil 
or living plant material; Pesticides. or' , 
herbicides : 
Except: C06 - Explosi.ves, and matches 
cos - Macromolecular compounds; Their preparation 
or chemical working-up; Compositions based 
thereon , , , , . 
COg - Dyes; Paints, Polishes; Natural Resins; 
Adhesives; Miscellaneous Compositions; 
Miscellaneous Applications of Materials 
C10 - Petroleum, gas and coke industries; Technical 
ga~es containing carbon monoxide, Fuels, 
Lubricants; Peat " . 
Cll - Animal and vegetable oils, fats, fatty sub- '~;:" 
stances and waxes J Fatty acids ,therefrom; 
Detergents; Candles " 
", 
C12 - Fermentation industry; Beer; Spirits; 
Vinegar; Yeast 
C13 - Sugar and starch industry 
C14 - Skins; Hides; Pelts; Leather 
Wine; • 
.. 
.. ,,; 
" , -, 
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Sub-Section: Metallurgy 
Classes: 
17 C2l - Metallurgy of iron 
18 
19 
C22 - MetallurgYJ Ferrous or Non-Ferrous Alloys; 
Treatment of alloys or non-ferrous metals 
C23 - Working or treatment of metals, other than by 
_ mechanical means; Covering materials with 
metals; Inhibiting corrosion or incrustation 
in general 
C25 - Electrolytic or electrophoretic processes; 
Apparatus therefor 
Section 0 - TEXTILES AND PAPER 
Sub-Section: Textiles and Flexible Materials not 
Otherwise Provided 'for 
Classes: 
001 
-
Natural or artificial threads or fibres; 
Spinning 
002 
-
Yarns; Mechanical finishing of yarns or ropes; 
Warping or beaming 
003 
-
Weaving 
004 
-
Braiding; Lace-making; Knitting; Trimmings; 
Non-woven fabrics 
DOS 
-
Sewing; Embroidering; Tufting 
006 
-
Trea~~ent of textiles, etc. ; Laundering; 
Flexible materials not otherwise provided 
D07 
-
Ropes; Cables other than electric 
Sub-Section: Paper 
Classes: 
021 - paper-making; Production of cellulose 
land B3l - Making paper ,artic,les;. Working paper 
for· 
317 
"!-
I 
\ 
.' 
.... 
-, • 'f,' 
.. " . 
. :~ ... -
20 
:;18 
nmtJ~TRrAL PP.OPER'!"l S'!'A'!'I~TICS 
GEt-TEFJ.L NOTF.S 
Annex I 
page 6 
~ection E - F1XEO CONTRUCTIONS 
SUb-Section: Buil'ding 
Classes: 
EOI 
-
Construction of roads, railways and bridges 
Ee2 
-
Hydraulic engineering, Foundations; So 11-
shifting 
E03 
-
"later supplYJ ~ewerage 
E04 
-
Building 
EOS 
-
Locks; Keys; Window and door fittings, Safes 
E06 
-
Doors, windows, shutters and roller' blinds, in 
general; Ladders 
Sub-Section: Mining 
Classes: 
, 
21 E21 - M1~ing 
22 
Section F - MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; 
HEATING; WEAPONS, BLASTING 
Sub-Section: Engines and Pumps 
Classes: 
rOl - ~~chines or engines in general, Engine plants 
in general, Steam engines ' 
F02 - Combustion enginesJ Hot-gas or combustion-
product engine plants , 
FO) - Machines or engines for liquidsJ Wind, spring, 
weight, and miscellaneous motors; producing 
mechanical power or a reactive propulsive 
thrust, not otherwise provided for. 
F04 - Positive-displacement machines for liquidsJ ' 
Pumps for. liquids or .. elas.t1.c fluids " 
Sub-Section: Engineering in General 
Classes: 
FlS - Fluid-pressure actuators; 
pneumatics ,in general 
Hydraulics or 
" , 
., , 
, .,.," 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
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GENERAL NOTES 
Annex I 
page 7 
F16 - Engineering elements and units; General 
measures for producing and maintaining 
effective functioning of machines or 
installations. 
Fl7 - Storing or distributing gases or liquids 
" 
Sub-Section:. Lighting and Heating 
Classes: 
F21 - Lighting 
F22 - Steam generation 
F23 - Combustion apparatus; Combustion processes 
F24 - Heating; Ranges; Ventilating 
F25 - Refrigeration or cooling; Manufacture or 
storage of ice; Liquefaction and solidifi-
cation of gases 
F26 - Drying 
F27 - Furnaces; Kilns; Ovens; Retorts 
F28 - Heat exchange in general 
Sub-Section: Weapons; Blasting 
Classes: 
F 41 - Weapons 
F42 - Ammunition; 
and C06 - Explosives; 
Blasting 
Matches 
Section G - PHYSICS 
Sub-Section: Instruments 
Classes: 
Gal - Measuring; Testing 
G02 - Optics 
G03 - Photography; Cinematography; 
Holography 
G04 - Horology 
Electroqraphy; 
GaS - Controlling; Regulatinq 
G06 - computing; Calculating; 
G07 - Checking devices 
Counting, . 
GOB - Signalling 
;," 
/ 
319 . 
I 
-' :,~.," 
, .~) 
',' J. 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
INDUSTRIAL PROPERXY STATISTICS 
GENERAL NOTES 
Annex I 
page 8 
G09 - Education; Cryptography; Advertising; Seals 
GlO - Musical instruments; Acoustics 
GIl - Information storage 
G12 - Instrument Details 
Sub-Section: Nucleonics 
Classes: 
G2l - Nuclear physics; Nuclear engineering 
Section 8 - ELECTRICITY 
. 
Classes: 
HOI - Basic electric elements 
802 - Generation, conversion or distribution of 
electric power 
ExceEt: H03 - Basic electronic circuitry 
H04 - Electric communication 
technique . 
B05 - Electric techniques not otherwise provided for 
H03 - Basic electronic circuitry 
804 - Electric communication technique 
Others (unclassified; plant patents/inventors' 
certificates) , 
. 
[End of Annex Il 
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